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39. ICRD Notes 
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40. Pictures 
41. Earnings History 
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84. Idaho Department of Fish & Game Information 
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Additional Documents: 
1. Claimant Roy Green's Opening Brief, filed December 10, 2012 
2. Defendant Employer/Surety's Responsive Brief, filed January 17, 2013 
3. Defendant ISIF Post-Hearing Brief, filed January 14, 2013 
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WvRKER1S COMPENSATION COI\1PLA1NT 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION NO: 
Claimant: Claimant's Attorney: 
ROY GREEN STARRKELSO 
110 Highwood Drive Attorney at Law 
St. Maries, ID 83861 PO Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1312 
Telephone Number: (208) 245-3010 
Employer's Name And Address (at time of injury): Worker's Compensation Insurance Carrier's 
(Not Adjustor's) Name And Address: 
ST. JOE SALVAGE 
c/o Roy Green TRAVELERS 
110 Highwood Drive P.O. Box 7427 
St. Maries, ID 83861 Boise, ID 83707-1427 
' ,) 
!.j 
CLAIMANT'S  CLAIMANT'S  DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUPATIONAL 
  
DISEASE: 7-03-06 
,·1 
\) 
·. i·) 
• .. , 
-,,, 
STATE AND COUNTY IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRED: WHEN INJURED, CLAIMANT WASEARN~G AN AVERAGE 
Benewah, Idaho WEEKLY WAGE OF: $1,000 per day, PURSUANT TO §72-419, 
IDAHO CODE 
DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (WHAT HAPPENED): Struck on the head by a tree. 
NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE: Neck, back, and 
atrophied muscles as a result of denial of claim. 
WHAT WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THIS TIME: Medical; TTD's; Attorney fees and punitive 
costs. 
DATE ON WHICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO TO WHOM YOU GA VE NOTICE: Self and then ALE 
EMPLOYER: 7-03-06 
HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN: ORAL WRITTEN X OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY 
-- --
ISSUE OR ISSUES INVOLVED: 
Medical 
Causation 
TTD's 
Attorney fees and punitive costs. 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OFF ACTS? IF YES, PLEASE 
STATE WHY: 
No. 
NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND MUST BE FILED IN ACCORDANCE WITH IDAHO CODE §72-334 AND FILED ON FORM J.C. 
1002 
PHYSICIANS WHO TREATED CLAIMANT 
Dr. Bret A. Dirks 
Coeur d'Alene 
Dr. Katovich 
Benewah t:mnmunity 
Dr. Ludwig 
Coeur d'Alene 
AND ADDRESS) 
Dr.Horan 
Coeur d'Alene 
Brian L. Norce, D.C. 
Appleway Chiropractic 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HA VE YOU INCURRED TO DA TE? Unknown 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAID, IF ANY? Unknown 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HA VE YOU PAID, IF ANY? Unknown 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. o YES B NO 
DATE: SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT OR ATTORNEY: 
Benewah Community Hospital 
St. Maries 
PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW 
ONLY IF CLAIM IS MADE FOR DEATH BENEFITS 
NAME AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUl'vIDER 
OF PARTY FILING COMPLAINT? 
DA TE OF DEATH: RELATION OF DECEASED TO CLAIMANT: 
WAS CLAIMANT DEPENDENT ON DECEASED: DID CLAIMANT LIVE WITH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: 
DYES ONO DYES ONO 
CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on th~7 day 
Complaint upon: 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
ST. JOE SALVAGE 
c/o Roy Green 
110 Highwood Dr. 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
via: D personal service of process 
~ular U.S. Mail 
SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
TRAVELERS 
PO Box 7427 
Boise, ID 83707-1427 
via: D personal service of process 
llieg(ifar U.S. Mail 
DI HA VE NOT SERVED A COPY OF THE COMPLAINT ON-ANYONE 
~vtlfdv-··· 
Signature 
NOTICE: An Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer on Form LC. 1003 with the 
Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of mailing to avoid default. If no 
answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered! 
Further information may be obtained :from; Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-
0041 (208) 334-6000 
RELEASE FORM ON PAGE 
Send Original To: Industrial Commission, Judicial D1",1nn, 117 Main Street, PO BOX 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-,,v-+ I 1Cl 003 (Rev. i/01 /2004) 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
NO. 06-007698 INJURY DATE: 07/03/2006 _______ ;;..;;..;...;;..;;..;..;.;.;..,;;....;;..;;. 
X The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating: 
The Industrial Special Indenmity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating: 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
ROY GREEN STARR KELSO, ESQ. 
110 HIGHWOOD DRIVE PO BOX 1312 
ST. MARIES, JD 83861 COEUR D'ALENE, JD 83816-1312 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS WORKERS' COMPENSA TJON INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT 
ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS 
ST. JOE SALVAGE 
110 HIGHWOOD DRIVE TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY 
PO BOX 309 ST. PAUL TRAVELERS 
ST. MARJES, lD 83861 PO BOX7427 
BOISE, JD 83707 
ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME AND ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND 
ADDRESS) 
ERIC S BAILEY (!SB #4408) 
BOWEN & BAJLEY, LLP. 
350 NORTH NINTH STREET, STE. 200 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
IT [S: (Check one) 
Admitted Denied 
X 
X 
X 
X 
NIA NIA 
X 
X 
X 
(NAME AND ADDRESS) 
-
1. ·n1at the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint actually 
claimed. 
2. 1l1at the employer/employee relationship existed. 
·-
on or about the time 
a 
3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly F/J 
entirely '.J by an accident arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment. 
5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the nature of the 
employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, arc characteristic or and peculiar to the trade, 
occupation, process, or employment. 
6. That the notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given to the 
employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the manifestation of such 
occupational disease. 
7. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to Idaho Code, 
Section 72-419: $ under investioation. 
8. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act 
(COMPLETE OTHER SIDE) Answer-Par 
(Continued from front) 
I 0, State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affirmative defenses, 
(1) WHETHER THE CONDITION FOR WHICH CLAIMANT SEEKS BENEFJTS IS RELATED TO A JULY 3, 2006, INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT; 
(2) WHETHER CLAIMANT'S COND!TJON IS THE RESULT OF PREEXISTING COND!TIONS AND/OR EVENTS; 
(3) THE APPROPRIATENESS OF IDAHO CODE§ 72-406 DEDUCTIONS; 
(4) CLAIMANT'S ENTITLEMENT TO ADDITIONAL INCOME AND MEDICAL BENEFJTS; 
(5) WHETHER CLAIMANT IS ENTlTLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES; AND 
(6) DEFENDANTS ASSERT THERE EXISTS NO PROVISION UNDER TlTLE 72 OF THE IDAHO CODE FOR PUNJTIVE 
DAMAGES/COSTS, 
Under the Commission rules, you have twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint A copy of your Answer must be mailed 
to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by regular U,S, mail or by personal service of process, Unless you deny liability, you should 
pay immediately the compensation required by law, and not cause the claimant, as well as yourselt~ the expense of a hearing, All compensation which is concededly due 
and aecrued should be paid, Payments due should not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed, Rule Ill(D), Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the 
Idaho Workers' Compensation Law, applies, Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form LC 1002, 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE, YES NO X 
DEFENDANTS WILL NOTIFY THE COMMISSION IF AND WHEN MEDIATION IS APPROPRIATE 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE 
NO, 
Amount of Com ensation aid to date Dated Signature of Defendant or Attorney 
PPD TTD Medical 
U N D E R INVESTIG AT[ON 
PLEASE COMPLETE 
CERTfFJCA TE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _!_5_ t of November, 2006, 1 caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon: 
STARR KELSO, ESQ, 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX l312 
COEUR D'ALENE, JD 83816-1312 
FAX: (208) 664-6261 
via persona] service of process 
f_. regular U,S, mail 
l facsimile 
ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O. BOX !b720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
COMPLAINT AGAINST THE 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (ISIF) 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Roy Green Starr Kelso 
110 Highwood Drive Attorney at Law 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 PO Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS EMPLOYER'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Roy Green dba St. Joes Salvage Logging Eric S. Bailey 
c/o 110 Highwood Drive Bowen & Bailey, LLP 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 PO Box 1007 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
J.C. NUMBER OF CURRENT CLAIM WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT 
2006-07698 ADJUSTERS) NAME AND ADDRESS 
DATE OF INJURY 
Travelers Indemnity Company 
7/3/06 St. Paul Traveler
s 
PO Box 7427 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
NATURE AND CAUSE OF PHYSICAL IMPAffiMENT, PRE-EXISTING CURRENT INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE: 
See medical records previously provided with the Notice of Intent to File Claim Against ISIF. T12/L 1 fusion; AC separation of 
right shoulder; bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome; pre-existing multi-level cervical and lumbar disc disease and spinal 
de eneration. 
STATE "'HY YOU BELIEVE THAT THE CLAIMA IS TALLY AND PERMANENTLY DISABLED: 
Claimant asserts inabili to work due ination of medical factors. 
DA TE: November , 2008. 
CERTIFICATE OF SE 
-'-"'\, 
I hereby certify that on the __ day of November, 2008, I caused to be erved a true and correcl copy o(tfie foregoing Complaint 
upon: 
Manager, ISIF 
Dept. of Administration 
Claimant's Name 
Employer's Name 
Surety's Name 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-7901 
Roy Green 
c/o Starr Kelso 
PO Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Roy Green dba St. Joe Salvage Logging 
c/o 110 Highwood Drive 
St. Maries, Idaho 83861 
Travelers Indemnity Company 
St. Paul Travelers 
PO Box7427 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
D I have not served a copy of the Complaint upon anyone. 
via: D 
via: D 
via: 
via: 
persona[ ser:v'ice of process 
reg4lar~l,J.S. 'Mail 
per~al se%'.i.l;:e of process 
reguf§r U.S. 1Mail 
personal service of process 
regular U.S. Mail 
personal service of process 
regular U.S. Mail 
You must attach a copy of Form IC 1001 Workers' Compensation Complaint, to this document. 
An Answer must be filed on Form IC 1003 within 21 days of service in order to avoid default. 
ICI002 (REV. 3/01/2008) COMPLAINT AGA
INST ISIF 
Appendix 2 
SEP-19-2008 FR! 03:16 PM FAX NO,. P. 01 
WuRKER'S COMPENSATION COMPLAINT 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION NO· 
Clalmllnt: Claimant's Attorney: 
ROYGRERN STARR KELSO 
I l O Jlighwood Drive Attorney at Lnw 
SL Marles,JD 83861 · PO Bolt 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1312 
Telcuhone Number: (208) 245-30 I 0 
Employer's Nnme And AddreiiS (at time of injury): Worker's C(1mpc11sation Insurance Carrier's 
(Not Adj1t..qfor's) Name And Adtlress: 
ST. JOE SALVAGE 
c/o ltoy Green TRAVELERS '' 
·' 110 Highwood Driv~ P.O. Box 7427 '' 
,, 
, 
'" 
. .,.., 
St. Maries, ID 8386 t Boise, JO 83707-1427 '' ("'1 
I ' 'J 
·; ,r I ' - ! 
' 1,.,1 ' 
( ' , .. , CLAIMAN'l"S 8S#: CLAIMANT'S UlRTHDATE: DATE OF INJlJltY OR MANIFESTA 'f10N OF OCCUPA'J'!ONAL 
SJ 9-88-0707 7ff23wS9 DISEASE: 7-03~06 ::'.~' U 
(,.fJ i·,) 
\./ ~ 
ST/\TR AND COlJN'l'Y IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRRD: WHEN INJURED, cr.AIMANT WA$ ,BARNlij'G AN AVERAGE 
8em,wnh, rduho WEEKLY WAGE OP: $1,000 per clay, PURSUANT TO §72-419, 
IDAHOCOf>R 
DRSCRIB~ HOW lNJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL IJISEASE OCCURR[m (WHAT HAPPENED): Struck ou the hend by ll tree. 
-
NA'rURE OF MHDICAL PROFIT.EMS ALLEGED AS A RBS ULT OF ACClORNT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE: Neck, back, and 
11trophied muscle$ ns a result of denial of claim. 
WI lAT WORKERS' COMPENSATJON BBNIW1TS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THTS TlME: Medicitl; TTD's; Attorney fees and punitive 
cos!s. 
DATE ON WHICI I NO'l ICc OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO TO WHOM YOU GAVF- NOTICE: Self and then Al ,l~ 
EMPLOYER: 7-03"06 
HOW NOTICE WAS GIVJJN: ORAL __ x __ WR!TTEN _x __ - OTHER, PL.RASE SPECffY __ 
lSSlJE OR lSSUES INVOLVED: 
Mcdicnl 
Cnusathm 
'fTJ)'s 
Al1orney feci; nod pm1iti-v~ roots. 
PO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF I .AW Oil A COMPLTC,\ TRT> SET OF FACTS? IF YES. PLEASE 
STATE WHY: 
No. 
fi 1cr., COMl'I ,AIN'l'S AGAINS.1' TIIF. INJ>U51'RrAl, S!'l.:l'IAL INOF.MNITV FUN!) ll'IIJl>T J!I( VIJ,Ji)) IN AC( Onl)AN(:1> WlTII l!lA!lO COOE §7:!-,;;)4 ,\NI) JIii ,m ON JIOR~f Y.C. 
SEP-19-2008 FRI 03:16 PM FAX NO, P. 02 
"· -PHYS I Cf ANS WHO TREATW CLAIMANT(' 'IE AND ADDRESS) I""" 
Pr. Brill A, Dirks :Or. Ludwig Dr.Horan Drilin L. Norce, 0.C. Benew11h Com1111.1plty Hos11ihil 
Coeur d' .Alellt Coeur d'Alene Coinir d'Alene Applcw!ky Chiropractic St. M~tks 
Dr,Kutovkh 
Benewah C'om1111111it.y lfo9pihll 
WflAT Ml<f)lCAL COSTSHAVBYOU INGIJRREIJTO DATE? Unknown 
WITAT MEDIC AL COSTS llAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAID, IF ANY? Unknown 
WlfAT MEDICAL COSTS HA. VE YOU PATD, IF ANY? Unknown 
I AM tN·n:Rt:STlm JN MEDJATJNG 'l'lUS CLAIM. H<' TH!il OTHER PARTIES AGllEE. Cl YHS eNO 
PATrl; JI}- Z 7-·{)/; I SJGNATURB OF CLAIMANT OR ATTORNEY: ;; 1nAA/{,{lffr 
PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS TMMEDJATELY BELOW 
ONLY ll<' CLAIM JS MADE FOR DF!ATH BENEFITS 
NAMR AND S0C1AL Sl:lCURt'l'Y NUMOER DA TE OF DEATl-:I: RELATION OF Dl~CII1Ump TO CLAIMANT: 
or PARTY FILING COMPLAINr? 
WAS CLAIMANT DEPENDENT ON DECEASED: I)Jf) CLAIMANT LlVB WITH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT: 
oYns ONO l'.:!YES tJNO 
CLAIM_6.NT MUST COMPLF,TI<::, SIGN AND DATE THE A'l''rACHED MEDICAL RELEA,ST•"! FORM· 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on th(}'i.{7 day of 6c-Mf/ ..e.,1-
Complainl upon: 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
S'l'.J0.1£SALVAGE 
c/o Roy Green 
110 Highwood Dr. 
St. Maries, ID 83861 
via: D personal sci-vice of process 
[1.1-rcgi:,Iar U.S. Mail 
, 20Q/f...., T caused to be served a true and co11·ect copy of the foregoing 
SURETY1S NAME AND ADDRESS 
TRAVELERS 
P0Box7427 
Boise, ID 83707-1427 
via! D personal service of process 
~i:U.S.Mail 
DI HAVE NOT SERVED A COPY OF nm COMPLAINT O.N~ANYONE 4- 11./J ~-·· plaA.A,Mt{-},,. ___ ,~. --
Signatnrc 
NOTICE: An .Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer Orl F onn l .C. 1003 with the 
Indu$lrinl Commission within 21 clays of the date of service as specified on the certificate ofma.illng to avoid default. if no 
a11swer is flied, a Default Award may be entered! 
Further informntion may be obtained from: lndustrial Commission, Judicinl Division, PO Box 83720, Boise, Tdaho 83720-
0041 (20&) 334-6000 
(COMPLETE MEDICAL Rh'LEASE FORM ON PA GE."?) 
:;,end Orig}nal to: Industrial Commission, Judici ision, 317 Main Street, Boise, Idaho 83720-600 
ANS\VER TO COMPLAINT 
I.C. 06 07698 INJURY DATE: 07/03/2006 
Claimant's Name and Address: Claimant's Attorney's Name and Address: 
ROY GREEN STARR KELSO 
110 HIGHWOOD DR ATTORNEY AT LAW 
ST. MARIES, ID 83861 POBOX1312 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816 
Employer's Name and Address: Worker's Compensation Insurance Carrier's (Not Adjuster's) 
ROY GREEN DBA ST. JOBS SALVAGE LOGGING Name and Address: 
% 110 HIGHWOOD DR. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY 
ST. MARIES, ID 83861 ST. PA UL TRAVELERS 
POBOX7427 
BOISE, ID 83707 
Attorney ,nti,1g or E.mployer/Surety (Name !:l.nd Attome)' R_epr~senting Tndus!rial Special Indcnn1ity Fund (Name 
Address) and Address) 
ERIC S. BAILEY THOMAS W. CALLERY 
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP JONES, BROWER & CALLERY 
POBOX1007 POBOX854 
BOISE, JD 83701 LEWISTON JD 83501 
The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating: 
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating: 
IT IS: (Check One) 
ADMITTED DENIED 
X 1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint actually occurred on or about the 
time claimed. ,·? 
X 2. That the employer/employee relationship existed. 
X 3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act. 
4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly or entirely byan 
X accident arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment 
NIA 5. That, if an occupation
al disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the nature of 
the empioyment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of and peculiar io 
the trade, occupation, process, or employment 
UNKNOWN 6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given to the 
TO ISIF employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the 
manifestation of such occupational disease. 
NIA 
7. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, notice of such was given to the employer within five 
months after the employment had ceased in which it is claimed the disease was contracted. 
UNKNOWN 8. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to Idaho 
TO ISIF Code, Section 72-419: 
X 9. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self insured under the Idaho worker's 
Compensation Act. 
10. What Benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant? 
NONE FROM ISIF 
11. State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affirmative defenses. 
PLEASE SEE EXHIBIT A ATTACHED HERETO AND INCORPORATED HEREIN 
BY REFERENCE AS THOUGH SET FORTH IN FULL 
Under the Commission rules, you have twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A copy 
of your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by regular U. S. mail or by 
personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately the compensation required by law, and not cause the 
claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of hearing. All compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid. Payments 
due should not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed. Rule 11 l(D), Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho 
Worker's Compensation Law, appiies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form l.C. l 002. 
I am interested in mediating this claim, if the other parties agree. Yes No 
Do you believe this Claim presents a new question oflaw or a complicated set of facts? If so, please state. 
NO. 
Amount of Com ensation Paid to Date 
PPD TTD Medical Dated Signature of Defendant or Attorney 
Please Complete 
I hereby certify that on the-'-""-- day of November, 2008, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon: 
Claimant's Name and Address: 
ROY GREEN 
% STARR KELSO 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
via: Personal Service of Process 
---
regular U. S. Mail 
Employer and Surety's 
Name and Address 
ERIC S. BAILEY 
Bowen & Bailey 
PO Box 1007 
Boise, ID 83701 
via: Personal Service of Process 
_X __ regular U. S. Mail 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
(If Applicable) 
via: Personal Service of Process 
__ regular U. S. Mail 
EXHIBIT 'A' 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund recently received the Workers' Compensation 
Complaint against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund and contemplates the initiation of 
formal discovery. The Fund has limited medical records available and is unable at this time 
to accurately either admit or deny portions of the Complaint and reserves the right to amend 
this Answer as necessary and warranted by subsequent discovery. 
2. Claimant is not totally and permanently disabled. 
3. Claimant did not suffer from a known manifest, pre-existing, permanent physical 
impainnent within the meaning ofidaho Code Section 72-332(2). 
4. Any permanent physical impairment suffered by the Claimant was not a hindrance or 
obstacle to Claimant's employment or re-employment. 
5. If Claimant is totally disabled, it is not due to the aggravation and acceleration of a pre-
existing condition nor due to the combined affects of pre and post injury conditions. 
6. Claimant incurred no physical impairment from the alleged accident which gives rise to this 
action. 
7. Claimant's disability, if any, is due to the natural progression of an underlying degenerative 
process and was not aggravated or accelerated by a work injury, and Claimant would be so 
disabled irrespective of the events of Claimant's employment. 
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STARR KELSO 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816 
Tel: 208-765-3260 
Fax: 208-664-6261 
Attorney for Mr. Green 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ROYOREEN 
Claimant; 
vs. 
ROY GREEN DBA ST. JOE 
SALVAGE LOGGING, 
Employer, 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Surety, and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants 
: Case No. LC. 06-07698 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION 
FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST 
THE ISIP PURSUANT TO 
ICJRP&P RULE 16 
~001/010 
COMES NOW Claimant by and through his attorney of record and pursuant to ICJRP&P 
Rule 16 moves the Industrial Commission for it's Order entering sanctions against the Defendant 
State of Idaho, fudustrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF). 
The basis of this motion is as follows: 
1. Claimant, in good faith~ entered into settlement negotiations with the ISIF and accepted 
the ofter of the ISIP to settle this matter as pertains to ISIP exposure; 
2. Clajmant, as a result of accepting the ISIF's offer of settlement, sought and obtained a 
the vacation of the hearing scheduled herein so that it could be determined before this 
claim proceeded to hearing against the employer/surety whether the settlement 
agreement would be approved by the Industrial Commission so that the potential of 
two hearings would be avoided; 
l CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST TBE ISIF 
o I o o R . 0 [ X/Rr; 0 8 
O 5 / / 2 0 1·1 11 . 1 0 F ,a, )( 2 0 8 6 8 4 8 KELSO LAW OFFICE @002/010 
3. That as documented by the exhibits attached to the Affidavit of Starr Kelso filed 
herewith lSIF, with knowledge of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in 
'"Wernecke'\ required that a Lump Sum Settlement Agreement,... ... ~.,,..,.,,, .. by its counsel 
had to be used; 
4. The ISIF's Lump Sum Settlement Agreement was used in its entirety and signed by the 
Claimant in a good faith effort to resolve this matter against the ISIF. 
5. The only change to the ISIF's Lump Sum Settlement Agreement authorized by the 
ISIF was the insertion of language apportioning the lump sum offered to Claimant over 
a 25 year life expectancy. 
6. On May 17, 2011 Claimant's counsel received an e-mail from Kim Tagaki of the 
Industrial Commission that stated that the Industrial Commission's Commissioners had 
declined to approve the submitted Lump Sum Settlement Agreement; 
7. On May 17, 2011 Claimant's counsel e-mailed Kim Tagaki inquiring as to the reason 
for the Industrial Commission's Commissioners' action; 
8. On May 17, 2011 Kim Tagaki telephoned Claimant's counsel and informed him that 
the submitted Lump Sum Settlement Agreement failed to come close to meeting the 
"'Wernecke" requirements for an ISIF settlement; 
9. That Claimant has been anxiously awaiting the decision of the Industrial Commission 
on the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement submitted in an effort to stop a pending 
foreclosure on his home; 
10. "lllat Claimant's colli1se1 expended several hours of time working to craft an acceptable 
Lump Sum Agreement but his efforts were rejected by the 1SIF which insisted on the 
form that its counsel prepared be utilized for submission to the Industrial Commission; 
11. That Claimant's counsel expended substantial time obtaining, preparing, and faxing 
various medical records and rehabilitation reports to the Industrial Commission's staff 
at their request; and 
12. The industrial Commission's Commissioners, and the staff of the Industrial 
Commission, expended valuable time reviewing the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement 
required by the ISIF to be submitted, and then have to reject the same because of its 
failure to comply with the ''Wernecke'' requirements. 
2 CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ISIP 
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It is requested that the Industrial Commission enter its order: 
a. A warding Claimant reasonable attorney fees; 
b. A warding Claimant punitive costs/damages in a sum to established at hearing 
upon testimony and evidence regarding the same by the Claimant; 
c. Requiring the ISIF to pay the Industrial Commission a reasonable sum to 
compensate it for the lost time of the Commissioners and its staff in reviewing and 
considering the submitted Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. 
DATE~s ~ day of May, 2011. 
·· 
Starr Kelso, Attorney for Claimant Mr. Green 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was faxed to Eric Bailey attorney for employer/surety 
208-344-9670 and Thomas Callery attorney for lSIF 208-746-9553 on the 41 day of May, 
2011. 
~~ 
Starr Kelso 
3 CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ISIF 
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STARR KELSO 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 16 
Tel: 208-765-3260 
Fax; 208-664-6261 
Attorney for Mr. Green 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ROY GREEN 
Claimant, 
vs. 
ROY GREEN OBA ST. JOE 
SALVAGE LOGGING, 
Employer, 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMP ANY, 
Surety, and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants 
ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI ) 
: Case No. LC. 06-07698 
AFFIDAVIT OF STARR KELSO 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO 
ICJRP&P RULE 16 
ST ARR KELSO being first duly sworn upon oath hereby states as follows: 
14] 004/010 
1. I am the attorney for the Claimant> Roy Green, over the age of 18 years, and make this 
affidavit based upon personal knowledge to which I will testify to if required to by the 
Industrial Commission; 
2. I spent well in excess of three (3) hours negotiating with the Defendant State of Idaho, 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, (ISIF) counseling my client, and drafting proposed 
changes to the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement provided to m.e for review by the 
counsel for the ISIP; 
I AFFIDAVIT OF STARR KELSO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
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3. That my regular hourly rate billed to clients is $200.00 per .hour. That as a resu]t of the 
Industrial Commission's Commissioners' action in decHning the submitted Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement I will have expended time in excess of three hours that would 
have been compensated for under the contingency fee agreement with Claim.ant but 
which now will not otherwise be compensated for because those efforts were strictly 
directed towards the submitted Lump Sum Settlement Agreement and are of no use 
towards proceeding with this matter to hearing; 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibits A, B, and C, and D are the relevant contents of e-mails to 
and .from the counsel for the ISIF and myself. They speak for themselves. At the time 
of the preparation of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement by counsel for the ISIF the 
requirements of the Idaho Supreme Court in Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. 
No 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P. 3d 1008 (2009) were public record; 
5. The Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, with the ISIF'S knowledge of the Wernecke 
decision, was the one required by the ISIF to be submitted to the Industrial 
Commission; 
6. Exhibit D documents the ISIF's withdrawal of the settlement offer, without even an 
attempt to resolve the Wernecke requirements. 
7. One of the significant reasons that the Claimant agreed to enter into the Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement required by the ISIF was that he was, and still is, facing a 
foreclosure on his home in St. Maries, Idaho. The foreclosure is as a result of his being 
unable to work, the termination of his temporary total disability benefits, and the 
refusal, by either Defendant, to pay him permanent total disability benefits or djsability 
in excess of impairment benefits despite clear and overvvhelming evidence that he has 
suffered, if not total and permanent disability, very significant disability. 
8. Claimant was going to utili7.e the money from the Lump Swn Settlement Agreement to 
fund a payment plan for his home and/or to clear the title on another piece of property 
that he owns so that he could move his personal belongings and family to this other 
piece of property in the event that his home foreclosure proceeded to sale. 
9. The foreclosure of the sale of Claimant's home was just last month stayed for about a 
month in order to see if a loan modification could be reached. That decision is pending. 
2 AFFIDAVIT OF STARR KELSO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
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10. Toe ISIPs requirement that its language be utilized in the Lump Stun Settlement 
Agreement, the several month wait for review, and the Industrial Commission's 
Commissioners' declining to approve the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement submitted 
has caused Claimant significant and substantial emotional distress and economic loss 
that should he should be compensated for by an award of sanctions against the ISIF by 
the Industrial Comn1ission. 
DATED this 20lll day of May, 2011. 
Starr;j&k 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Not:arv Public, this ~1fay of M 2011 ~ ,,,,,rt,1111,,11,1. --ay, . 
' 'S',,,'...t.. r\DW,4 :t,.~ a s:<>~'i~ ......... '9/> ~ ~ ~ ...... •. v~ W S/ ,~ 
NOTARYP~HO i*f•.!T.~i*~ Residing at ~ ~ p C j ;5 My Commis~xpires: 8/t,,,/,,;,qJt,, \-,\ .... UBL ' ... •:ov§ 
~~·········~ z,e OF \~"':,,'1 111111111mn\\\\~ • 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was faxed to Bric Bai1ey attorney for employer/surety 208-344-9670 !Uld Thomas Callery attorney for ISIF 208-746-9553 on the ~ day of May, 
2010. fj__LJ_ 
Starr Kelso 
3 AFFIDAVIT OF STARR KELSO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
0 / 0/ 0 3 0 0 
05/~0/2011 11. 11 FA:~ 20B8848 
RE: Try this one 
OFrom: Tom cauery 
To: "star; kelso" <'m!rr.kelso@frontler.com> 
KELSO LAW OFFICE ia]007/010 
December 22, 2010 4:57 PM 
.. We have cases like this rejec by the Commission and 
then we are left with a stipulation that is used against 
us at hearing. Ever since the Werneke decision we have had the Commission exam our LSA with a fine tooth comb. 
Frankly there is a good chance this LSA will not be 
approved. I have been instructed to use the LSA I 
prepared. Tom Callery 
0 / 0/ 0 I 3 0 [ X X 8 
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this one 
Tom Callery 
To; "starr kelso" <starr.kelso@frontier.com> 
CC! "James Klle" <James.Kile@adrn.idaho.gov> 
~ 008/010 
December 21, 2010 11:10 AM 
Starr I have reviewed your revised LSA with the ISIF. We 
are not in a position to modify the agreement as you have 
requested as we must reserve our ability to defend the 
case if the LSA is not approved. Our version of the LSA 
is what we are willing to do. If you and your client can 
sign our version we will submit to the Commission 
otherwise we will be unable to settle. Tom Callery 
0 0 0 1 R 0 X 8 
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Frontier Mail 
14] 008/010 
5/18/2011 
± Font Sile::: 
RE: Green Lump Sum 
From : Tom Callery <tcallery@lewlston.com> 
Subject ; RE: Green LuITJJ Sum 
To: starr kelso <starr,kelso@frontler.com> 
Cc: 'Jarres KIie' <Jarrns.l<lle@admidaho.gov> 
Starr go ahead and add the 25 years llfe expectancy. Send back signed copies to ire. Tom ca11ery 
-----Original Message---·-
From: starr.ke!so@frontler.com [rrailto:st:arr,kelso@frontler.com] 
Sent! Thursday, January 20, 2011 10:09 PM 
To: Torn car1ery 
Subject: Green Lrnrp Sum 
If'fllOrtance: High 
Tom, 
Please take a look at the m:x:lifk:ation of paragraph 13 bebw: 
Fri, Jan 21, 2011 09:42 AM 
13. Clairmnt has requested that the $50, ooo luITJJ sum settlerrent be allocated to non-rredlc.al benefits, attorney fees, and costs 
advanced with the aroount of said IUITJJ sum less the attorney fees and costs approved by the Cormission being lifetirrn benefits for the Clallmnt to be a lu""' sum pciyment In full satisfactkm of the potential future Fund liabHlty for the payment of benefits to Claimmt prorated into, and tepre1;,enting the total of, equal rmnthly payrrnnts over Clairrant+s life expectancy of 25 years. 
However, the parties acknowledge and 
Let m; know If you are in agreerrent. Roy wlll be here in the a.mon Friday. 
Starr 
webma i!. frontier .com/ .. ./printmessage? ... 
0 11 .07 R 0 1] 
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fmntier Mail 
14]010/010 
:J/ i'tl/ LUll 
... ~.. ,. 
± Font size -
RE: Lump Sum settlement on Roy Green v .. ISIF DOI: 7-3-06 Employer: Roy Green dba St. Joe Salvage 
From : Tom Callery <tcallery@lewlston.com> Tue, May 17, 2011 03:SS PM Subject : RE: Lu,rp sum settlerrent on Roy Green v. ISIF DOI: 7-3-06 Errployer: Roy Green dba st. Joe satvage 
To : starr kelso <starr.ke!so@frontier.com> 
Cc : 'Verlene Wise' <Verlene. Wi.Se@adm.idaho.gov >, 'Jarres Kile' <Jarres. l<ile@adm. idi:lho. gov> 
Starr since the Lun-p has been rejected the lSlF has instructed rre to request calendaring and proceed to hearing. The language we used was based on my analysis of the case and the substantial evidence Green had no pre-existing restrlctbns prior to the last acooent based on his own deposition testlrrony and the video you provided.In addition we believe there ls evidence thi'lt Green can return to right duty type work. We agreed to settle because of the aflegatiOn by Balley and the surety that there Is a c:ont>lned with_ As a result the ISIF settlerrent offer of 50k ls withdrawn and the case wlll have to be tried. Torn Callery 
---~-Original Message-----
From: st<irr.kelso@frontier.com (11'Bilto:starr.kelso@frontiet.com] Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 20112:42 PM 
To: Tom Callery 
Subject: Re: Lurrp Sum settrerrent on Roy Green v. lSIF OOI: 7·3-06 Errployer: Roy Green dba St. Joe Salvage 
Yes, I received it. l called and asked why. She said It didn't corrply With Wernecke. I guess I am confused as it is essentially the form that the ISIF required to be used-
·---- Origlnal Message-···· 
From: "Tom Callery" <tcallery@lewiston.com> 
To: "starr kelso" <starr.kelso@frontler.com> 
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 201110:58:15 AM 
subject: FW: Lufll) Sum settlerrent on Roy Green v. rsIF DO!: 7·3-06 Errpioyer: Roy Green dba St_ Joe Salvage 
Starr this carre thru just rrinutes ago_ Tom Callery 
From: Takagi, Klm [rrailto:KTakagi@iic.ldaho.gov] 
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2011 10:17 AM 
To: tcallery@lewiSton.com 
Subject: Lulll') Sum settlement on Roy Green v. ISIF OOI: 7-3-06 Erfl)loyer: Roy Green dba st. Joe Salvage 
HiThorres, 
The Cormission dedlned to approve this settlem;nt agreem:nt, If you would like a hearing with the Conmssloners to discuss this settlerrnnt:, you can send a request for hearing to the Com-rission legal depamrent. 
Thanks. 
webrnail.frontier.com/ __ .Jprlntmessage?. __ 
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INDEMNITY FUND, ) 
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Case No.: I. C. 06-07698 
DEFENDANT ISlF RESPONSE TO 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ISIF 
Comes now the Defendant, STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY 
FUND, by and through its attorney of record, Thomas W. Callery of Jones, Brower & Callery, 
PLLC, and hereby responds to the Claimant's motion for sanctions against the ISIF as follows: 
L Claimant ROY GREEN filed a complaint for benefits on or about October 30, 
2006 against the Employer, St Joe Salvage Logging, and Surety, Traveler's Indemnity Co. 
2. The Defendant ISIF was served a complaint by the Employer and Surety alleging 
ISIF liability on or about November 6, 2008. 
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Comes now the Defendant, STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY 
FUND, by and through its attorney of record, Thomas W. Callery of Jones, Brower & Callery, 
PLLC, and hereby responds to the Claimant's motion for sanctions against the ISIF as follows: 
1. Claimant ROY GREEN filed a complaint for benefits on or about October 30, 
2006 against the Employer, St. Joe Salvage Logging, and Surety, Traveler's Indemnity Co. 
2. The Defendant ISIF was served a complaint by the Employer and Surety alleging 
ISIF liability on or about November 6, 2008. 
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3 At the request of counsel for the Surety and mediator Dennis Burks, the ISIF 
attended mediation in Coeur d'Alene on September 29, 2009. settlement offer was made on 
that date to the Claimant and his counsel. Said offer of settlement was neither accepted nor 
rejected at the conclusion of the mediation. 
4. Counsel sent the Claimant and his attorney a lump sum agreement for review on 
February 24, 2010. Said proposed lump sum agreement was never signed by Claimant. 
5. Eventually, the Claimant rejected said lump sum agreement and on March 10, 
2010 filed a request for calendaring. 
6. The case was rescheduled for hearing on December 14, 2010. 
7. On December 3, 2010, shortly before hearing, the Claimant, through his legal 
counsel, accepted the ISIF off er made at the mediation fourteen months prior. 
8. The acceptance of the offer by Claimant contained the following conditional 
language (see Exhibit A attached hereto): 
"I want to also emphasis that this acceptance by Mr. Green is not an admission, or 
concession, of any nature or kind, that the ISIF has any liability regarding Mr. 
Green's industrial accident and injury of July 3, 2006. I want to specifically 
reference the fact that Mr. Green did not "join" the ISIF in this matter, that Mr. 
Green's deposition testimony documents that he did not believe that his physical 
condition prior to the accident and injury was a hindrance or obstacle to his 
ability to obtain employment, that his cun-ent total permanent disability is solely 
caused by his said July 3, 2006 accident." 
9. In addition, Claimant's counsel was clearly aware that, under the facts of the case, 
approval of the lump sum agreement was not assured, and Claimant's counsel himself 
acknowledged this in his December 3, 2010 letter (see Exhibit A attached hereto): 
"It is my understanding from our discussions that the Industrial Commission has 
been cautious in approving settlements involving the ISIF. Thus, of course, if the 
Commission determines not to approve the settlement agreement the offer and 
Mr. Green's acceptance will be null and void and we will proceed to hearing." 
DEFENDANT ISIF RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST ISIF/2 
10. The Claimant and his legal counsel were well aware that any lump sum agreement 
would have to be approved by the Idaho Industrial Commission and were clearly advised that 
approval was not a certainty in light of the Wernecke decision. 
11. The lump sum agreement drafted by the ISIF was based upon the facts of the case 
and the very specific letter addressed to counsel for the ISIF dated December 3, 2010 by Mr. 
Kelso. In said letter, the Claimant and his legal counsel reiterated Mr. Green's position that the 
ISIF has no liability in this case and that the total and permanent disability of the Claimant was 
caused solely by the accident of July 3, 2006. 
12. Counsel for the ISIF drafted a lump sum agreement based upon the facts of the 
case and the information provided to it by the Claimant and his legal counsel. The lump sum 
agreement presented to the Commission accurately reflected the positions of the respective 
parties and the medical evidence. The ISIF did not prepare a lump sum agreement that was 
inaccurate, incomplete or made false representations to the Commission concerning the facts of 
the case in order to obtain approval by the Commission and satisfy the Wernecke requirements. 
13. It is the duty of the Commission to review the lump sum agreement and the 
underlying facts of the case to determine if the elements of ISIF liability have been satisfied 
based on Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School District, 147 Idaho 277 (2009). The Commission 
exercised its discretion in this case and determined that the elements of ISIF liability were not 
satisfied, and that the lump sum agreement could not be approved. 
14. The actions of the ISIF in this matter do not warrant sanctions and have been 
perfectly appropriate as to the Claimant and to the Idaho Industrial Commission. The motion for 
sanctions filed by the Claimant is frivolous. 
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DATED this 27th day of May, 201 L 
JONES, BROWER & 
Attorney for Defendant ISIF 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 27th day of May, 2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
served by the method indicated below and addressed upon each of the following: 
STARR KELSO 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1312 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816 
ERIC S. BAILEY 
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP 
P.O. BOX 1007 
BOISE, ID 83701 
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M(. Green hu.s authorized me to accept ll1e $50,000.00 Cull and final Jump :mm settlement oJkr of your clicrn. the ISi.F. in lh~ above matter. Mr. Gr(~cn's ~,cceptancc oftht.: !SfF's ,)flt:r is nol a waiver 
of m1y claim against the cmploycr/surt:Ly in this nwLtcr. Mr. Green reserves the rig11t to provide 
appropriate language regarding the apportionment ()f the s.::nkment over his rcn,aining life 
cxrcctancy. It ha:,; not yet been def.ermined whL":Lher or not Mr. (3rcen is willing 10 acct;pl the .surety's 
offer. This of'ler and acceptance is only a scttk:mcrH of the contingent liability ofthc ISi F regardless 
of whether the Industrial Comrnission, jf Lhe matter proceeds to hearing ,tgajn::;l the surety, dctcm1ines that the lS1F actually has no liability or some liability regJ.rdless oft:hc cxrcn1. I wa11L to 
also c111phi1.sis that !hi.-:: acceptance by Mr. Green i;; not an admission. or ctHicession, of any rwture or kind, that the 1SfF h~!.S any lia.bili1y rcg~mJing Mr. Green's industrial accident ;1nd injury of' .July 3. 2006. I want to s1x:cilic<Jlly reference Lhe fact that Mr. Grlccn diu not '·join" th;;~ lSIF in this matter. that: Mr. Green '.s lkposition testimony documents that he did not bcUcvc that hi:-; physical condition prior 10 lht! accident and injury w,1s ;;i hindrance orohswde 10 his ability to ohl;:iin. em.ploymi::rll. Lhi:rl his currenttowl pcnn:.mcni dis:1l;ili'ty is soldy cau!;:cd by his said July 3, 2006 11<:ddcnt. The foc1.1l1::i1 the surety chose to join the JSJF and the fact that the JSIF has chosen to offer a full and final 
:=:er tk:mc::nr f.o Mr. Green, hascd upon their respectivt~ independent ckcisions. in no way in rlw::nce or 
compromise Mr. Cin.:(.;.n 's belief that the ISTF ha~. and !Hid, no liability in his cl~~im arising out nf his 
accicknl and i t\iury. It is my under.standing from our discussi<rns that the I ndusif'ial Commi.ssion has been cmitious in approving settlements involving the JSIF. Thus, of cour~e, if the C'.ommission 
cklcrmines to not approve the s1.~u1ement agreement th<;.~ offer and Mr. Gr1:cn 's ,tcceptance will be null 
and void and we \Vi ll have to proceed 10 hearing. 
)!,_ct}'1r:.l;yo p rs. . 
' ()_14,~'.i itJ t-/,,····. 
St.11 r T....c:l~o 
Allorncy at Law 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE ST A TE Of< IDAHO 
ROY GREEN 
Claimant, 
vs. 
ROY GREEN DBi\ ST. JOE 
SALVAGE LOGGING, 
Employer, 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Surety, and 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRJAL SPECIAL 
IND EivfNITY FUND, 
Defendants 
Case No. LC. 06-07698 
CLAIMANT'S REPLY 
TO lSIF'S RESPONSE TO 
MOTION f<OR SANCTIONS 
'41001/008 
COMES NOW the Claimant and hereby files this Reply to the JSIF's Response to 
Claimant's Motion for Sanctions. 
FACTS 
The ISJF mischaracterizes the basis of Claimant's Motion for Sanctions. The Claimant's 
Motion is based upon the following: 
I. The Claimant was placed in the position of needing to resolve any claim against the 
ISIP because of the pending foreclosure on his home. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court entered its decision in Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School 
Distria No. 401, 147 ldaho 277,207 P. 3d 1008 on April 147 2009. 
3. As retlected hy Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Starr Kelso in Support of Motion for 
Sanctions 1he ISIF was well aware of the Supreme Court's decision. The e-mail 
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specifically states that "Ever since the Wernecke decision we have had rhe Commission 
exam our LSA with a fine tooth comb. 
4. The ISfF, if it had intended to settle their liability in good faith for the sum of 
$50,000.00, had to recognize that the known evidence supported findings of fact that 
the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot category and that 
the ISIP had liability exposure. 
5. The ISIF offered the settle111ent to Claimant on September 29, 2009 at mediation. On 
December 3, 2010, the Claimant accepted the offer of the TSIF Both of these dates are 
well after the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Wernecke. 
6. Any offer by the ISIF to settle the claim for the $50,000.00 in September 2009, that 
was left open to br;: ac<;epled until it was accepted on Decern ber 3, 20 l 0, necessarily 
included an implied agreement that the lump sum settlement agreernent would meet, 
and be consistent in its language with the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in 
Wernecke. Any offer that did not intend for the lmnp sum agreement to be in full 
compliance with Wernecke could not have been made in good faith. 
7. Claimant's counsel was certainly aware of the fact lhal the Indusuial Commission 
would review any lump sum settlement in light of Wernecke. Claimant's counsel 
acknowledged that fact in his letter of December 3, 2010 attached to the ISIF's 
Response filed with the Industrial Commission. 
8. When the settlement otler was accepted by the Claimant it was certainly done so with 
the good faith belief tlmt the agreement that the ISTF would prepare wottld meet the 
Wernec.:k~ test. 
9. The Claimant gave valuable consideration in accepting the offer of the ISIF. The 
Claimant agreed to vacating and rescheduling the hearing and settled any liabilityof the 
ISIF in this matter. The Claimant knowing the Industrial Commission would closely 
review the lump sum agreemem had to reason to believe that a lump sum agreement 
that on its face did not meet the Wernecke tes1 would be required to be signed. 
10. It is one thing to submit a lump sum settlement agreement that appears to meet the 
Wernecke test and have it declined by the Industrial Commission. It is a vastly 
different thing to be required, because of the change in status of the hearing and the 
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pre~!':>ing financial needs faced by Claimant, to be forced to sign a lump surn settlement 
agreement that did not even come close to meeting the Wernecke test 
11. Certainly the ISIF would not have offered to settle case for $50,000 ,00 if the ISIF 
believed that it had pre~existing hindrance or obstacle liability exposure and/or that it 
had no exposure that the Claimant was not totally and permanently disabled under the 
odd-lot doctrine. 
12. Based upon the opinion or Dan Brownell, vocational rehabilitation expert, and the Sc 
Maries, Idaho labor market, the Claimant has a solid belief that the evidence will 
support that he is totally and permanently disabled under the odd-Tot doctrine. 
I 3. The Claimant, in good faith does not subjectively believe that his total and pem1anent 
disability is the result of the combination of a pre-existing hindrance or obstacle to 
work and the industrial accident that led to this claim being filed. However, the 
resolution of this matter is based upon what must have implicitly been a good faith 
belief by the ISIF that Claimant's pre-existing condition was a hindrance or obstacle. 
Certainly the ISIF is not going to offer to settle a case, especially for $50,000, when it 
does not feel that it has substantial exposure to an extent of at least $50)000. 
14. The ISIF refused all attempts by the Claimant to correctly word the lump sum to 
accurately and correctly reflect that the opinion of Nancy Collins Ph.D, which the ISTF 
was also utilizing in defense of Claimant's claim, \Vas based on an erroneous 
assumption that a video tape that she reviewed was taken after the accident of July 3, 
2006. In fact the video that Nancy Collins, Ph.D. based her opinion on employability 
was taken prior to the industrial accident and injury of July 3, 2006. That fact is even 
confinned on the video tape. The ISIF had a copy of the tape, and it also knew that her 
opinion was e1roneous because the tape was taken prior to the July 3, 2006 industrial 
accident. 
15. The ISIP, 1:1.Her .supposedly making a good faith offer to settle for $50,000.00 (not an 
insignificant sum of money from the JSIF) ultimately demanded that the Claimant must 
sign the lump sum settlement agreement that it prepared. As reflected in the e-mail 
dated December 21, 2010 (see copy attached as Exhibit A) the ISIF, after making the 
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offer, and after the offer was acc;epte<l, demanded that the language in the agreement 
"must preserve our ability to defend the case if the LSA is not approved. 
16. In essence what this means that the ISIP submitting language in the agreement that 
would "preserve our ability to defend the case if the LSA is not approved" knew, that 
the insertion of the "defense" language would render the lump sum settlement 
agreement unacceptable to the Tndu,;trial Commission under Wernecke. 
17. The fundamental bad faith of the ISIF is that it made an offer to settk and then, after 
the offer was accepted, inse11ed language that it knew would not comply Wernecke 
and demanded 1hat it, and only it, be submitted to the Industrial Commission. 
18. The Claimant accepted the offer of the ISIF based upon the knowledge that the 
Wernecke test must be met and was j usti!iecl in believing when he accepted the offer of 
settlement that the ISCF would not make st.ich an offer if it did not believe that it could 
agree to the facts required under the Wernecke test. 
19. When it came time to put pen to paper and agree to the actual language the ISIF, with 
full knowledge of the Wernecke. unilaterally demanded that a lump sum agreement 
that it knew. or should have kno"vn, did not meet the Wermck test be signed. 
20. Claimant, having accepted the offer, and having agreed to vacate and reschedule the 
heating so that the pending lump srun agreement could be prepared and submitted for 
approval of the Industrial Commission, was in literally no position because of his 
ti nancial status to say "Oh, never mind, lets just reschedule the hearing.'' No, Claimant 
had to try and ride the storm out on the 'horse' that he, in good faith, had agreed to 
ride., after learning that the horse he was forced to ride tumcd out to be a nag. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
When the parties to a legal controversy, in good faith enter into a contract compromising 
and settling their adverse claims, such agreement is binding upon the parties and is enforceable at 
law or in equity according to the nature of the case. Wil.wm v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 347 P. 2d 
341 (Idaho 1959), Such a contract stands on the same stands on the same footing as any other 
contract and is governed by the same rules and principles as are applicable to contracts generally. 
ld at 542. In an action to enforce an agreement of compromise and settlement, made in good 
faith, the court will not inquire into the merits or validity of the original claim_ ld at 542. 
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The Claimant and the 18IF entered into an oral agreement to settle all ISIF liability to 
Claimant in this matter for the sum of $50,000.00. 
A contract not only of the agreements which the parties have in words, 
' 
but also of the obligations which are reasonably implied. Black v. Baker Of,/ Tools, Inc., l 07 P 
3d 1457 (101h Cir. 199 7). What is plainly implied in an agreement is as much a pa11 of the 
agreement as if expressly stated. see Wright v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., J 76 Okla. 27 4, 54 
P. 2d !084 (Okla. 1935) citing Kirke La Shelle Co, v. Paul Armslron Co., 263 NY. 79, 188 N.E. 
163, 164 and Draper v. Nelson, 254 Mich 380, 236 NW 808. 
It has long been the law in Idaho that "Good faith and fair dealing arc implied obligations 
of every contract .. Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 824 P. 2d 
84 I (ldaho / 99 I). Any action by either party which vilates, nullifies or significantly impairs any 
benefit of the contract is a violation of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Id. 
The Claimant accepted the offer of the TSTF on December 3, 2010. The Idaho Supreme 
Court's case in Wernecke, at that time, was well known to TSTF and it well knew that "the 
Commission (would) exam our LSA with a fine tooth comb," Exhibit A to Afi1davit of Starr 
Kelso in Support of Motion for Sanctions. It can not be argued, in good faith, that compliance 
with Wernecke in any h.imp sum agreement document was reasonably implied in the offer and 
acceptance. For the ISIF to argue otherwise is bad faith of the type that should be sanctioned. 
The unilateral demand of the TSTF, after it had offered to settle for $50,000.00 and the 
Claimant had accepted said offer, that the lump sum settlement agreement that it prepared and 
contained language that "reserve(d) our ability to defend the case if the LSA is not approved", 
and which language made the lump sum agreement unacceptable to the Industrial Commission 
because of Wernecke, was a violation of the covenani of good faith and fair dealing implied in 
the oral agreement, and v.Titten agreement attached a;; Exhibit A 1o lSlF's Response, to settle its 
liability to Claimant. 
The agreement to settle between Claimant and the ISTF in this case is not the same as in 
Wernecke. Prior to the Wernecke decision neither Claimants nor the TSTF were aware of the 
standard expressed by the Idaho S1iprer:ne Court applicable to lump sum agreements involving 
the lSIF Tn this present case, both the TSIF and the Claimant were aware of the Wernecke 
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standards established by the Idaho Supreme Court, and any good faith offer to settle made by the 
ISIF obviously included the implied obligation of the ISIP to submit to Claimant an agreement 
that complied with Wernecke. The ISIF submitted a lump sum agreement that the Industrial 
Commission found woefully lacking in meeting the Wernecke standards and demanded that it, 
and only it, be signed and submitted to the Industrial Commission. At the time that the offer of 
Lhe TSTF was made and accepted by the Claimant, there was no statement, or indication, made in 
the offer that the 1 ump sum set1leme11t agreement would have to contain wording that "reserve( d) 
our (ISIF's) ability to defend the case if the LSA is not approved." Indeed once the ofter was 
accepted the agreement superceded the liability exposure of the ISIF, and the Industrial 
Commission was "not in a position to inquire into the merits or validity of the original claim" 
against the ISIF. Wilson v. Bogert, supra. at 542. The issue upon offer and acceptance ha;:; 
become one of contract. The Industrial Commission has exclusive jurisdiction of all questions 
arising under the worker's compensation law. This agreement, and the actions of the 1SlF, 
clearly "arise under the worker's compensation law" and the Industrial Commission is the only 
t;ntity with jurisdiction to decide this issue. Van Tine v. Idaho State Ins. Fund. 126 Idaho 688. 
889 P 2d 717 (Jd,iho 1994), 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission should enter its Order requiring the ISIF to sHbmi1 to Claimant 
a lump sum settlement agreement that complies with the standards expressed in Wernecke. Once 
the offer was made and accepted the merits of any liability claim against the !SIF in favor of 
Claimant were superceded by the accepted offer. It is not the province of the ISIF to demand that 
terminology be inserted into the lump sum settlement agreement that ''reserve our ability to 
defend the case if the LSA is not approved." The underlying liability has been compromised and 
it is the obligation of the ISIF to prepare for submittal a lump sum settlement agreement that 
complies with Wernecke. The 1SIF has no liability after the offer and acceprance other than to 
prepare and present an agr1;;emenl for submission to the Industrial Commission that complies 
with Wernecke, and then upon appn>val by the Industrial Commission pay the Claimant 
$50,000.00. 
Tf the Industrial Con1mission does not enter its Order requiring the ISIP to prepare and 
submit such an agreement, the Industrial Commission should hold that the lSlF acted in bad faith 
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in the offering of such settlement to the Claimant and schedule a hearing at which the Industrial 
Commission vVill evidence on the nature and extent of damages suffered by the Claimant 
as a result of the ISTF's bad faith actions in demanding the insertion of language in the written 
lump sum agreement submitted to the Industrial Commission that does not comply with 
Wernecke. 
Starr Kelso, Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIF~ OF SERVICE: A. copy was faxed to Eric Bailey uttorney for employer/surety 
208-34~~:f!~ Callery attorney for ISIF 208-746-9553 on the 61h day of June, 2011. 
Starr Kelso 
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± Font size.: 
RE: Try this one 
From : Tom Callery <tc:allery@lewiston.com> 
Subject : RE: Try this one 
To ; sta rr kelso < st:a rr. ke lso@frontier.com> 
cc: 'Jarres K~e· <Jam;:s.Kile@admldaho.gov> 
Tue, Dec 21, 2010 11: 10 AM 
St'1rr 1 have reviewed yowr revised LSA with the ISIF. We are not in ci positiOn to rrodify the agreerrent as you have requested as 
we rrust reserve our ability to defend the case if the LSA is not approved. Owr version of the LSA is what we are wHling to do. If 
you and your client can sign our version we will submt to the Corrmssion otherwise we will be unable to settle. Tom Callery 
-····Or~inaf Message-----
From: starr.kelso@frontier.com [rreilto:starr.kelso@frontier.c:om] 
Sent: Saturday, December 181 2010 9:15 AM 
To: Tom Callery 
Subject: Try this one 
Torn, 
Take a gander at the attached draft and see what yow think. 1 reference Nancy Collins based upon her opinion prior to her last 
opinion that incorrectly assumed that the ykjeo was po$1: surgery from the July 3, 2006 accident. I think that it is a fair statem:mt. I 
think I have highlighted all of the changes, but I rrny have mssed a word llere and there. Also on the deleted portions I just 
indi(:Qte "OUT". 
Let me know, 
Starr 
webmail.frontier,com/ . ./printmessage? .. , 
08 0 011 MO 0 [ X ~W 8 
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STARR KELSO 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Tel: 208-765-3260 
Fax: 208-664-6261 
Attorney for Mr. Green 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ROY GREEN 
Claimant., 
u 
vs. 
ROY GREEN DBA ST. JOE 
SALVAGE LOGGING, 
Employer, 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Surety, and 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants 
ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI ) 
Case No. LC. 06-07698 
***SUPPLEMENTAL*** 
AFFIDAVIT OF STARR KELSO 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO 
ICJRP&P RULE 16 
STARR KELSO being first duly sworn upon oath hereby states as follows: 
1. I am the attorney for the Claimant, Roy Green, over the age of 18 years, and make this 
affidavit based upon personal k11owledge to which I will testify to if required to by the 
Industrial Commission; 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of the Trustee's Deed issued as a result of the 
foreclosure sale of Claimant's home on June 16, 2011. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a copy of the Affidavit of Publication regarding the 
sale of Claimant's home. It reflects that commencing January 1, 2009 Claimant was in 
default of monthly payments of $1,765.42. 
1 SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF STARR KELSO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a copy of the Affidavit of Compliance regarding the 
sale of Claimant's home reflecting the change in the sale date from April 21, 2011 to 
May 19, 2011, to ultimately June 16, 2011. 
5. That had the $50,000.00 settlement been approved and paid on or before June 1, 2011 
that amount would have been sufficient to allow Claimant to avoid the foreclosure sale. 
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2011. 
~~cd---
Starr Kelso 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, this 22nd day of 
June 2011. ,,,,nu111111,,11 
' ~~\\ ... , \-\ 0 VV'. ,,,/,,; ~ l)~\~!-·· ····:'!'9/\ ~ § ,.. ..v ~ ~ .. ·. ~ j : .. ~ 0 TA Ry.\ % 
=*= ............. :*§ ~ \PusL\C/ § ~ ••• ••• §: ~ <9>.·• • 0 ~ 
k ~ "lit .. ·····~'0 ~ ~'" c OF \Or;_,,,~ -· :t11111111m,,\\\'I: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was faxed to Eric Bailey attorney for employer/surety 
208-344-9670 and Thomas Callery attorney for ISIF 208-746-9553 on the Zcday of May, 
2010. 
Starr Kelso 
2 SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF STARR KELSO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS 
6/ /2011 11:49:40 AM PAGE 
260233 
RECEIVED-_ 
,o-
20~~,-~i~ -n,~~ 
0L1r,:11 ._.,_,,.;1hl 
Order No.: TS090l094A 
CHF No. 1786087507/Green/302184-SM 
TRUSTEE'S DEED 
T · 1 o , d h · (h . I dT .J. MICHELE hf':h!lL,a,:;..__CLERK 11 e ne Corporation, an I a o corporation erem ca le rustee) as su,ccssor trustee under the IJeed or r, ust 
hereinafter particularly described, does hereby Bargain, Sell and Convey, without warranty, to Chase Home Finance 
LLC whose address is 3415 Vision Drive, Columbus, OH 43219, (herein called Grantee), all of the real property 
situated in the County of Benewah County, State of Idaho, described as follows: 
A parcel ofland, which is a portion of Tracts 13 and 14 of Cherry Creek Tracts, in the Northwest Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of Section 21, Township 46 North, Range 2 West of the Boise Meridian, Benewah County, Idaho 
described as follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest comer of said Tract 13; thence along the south line of Tract 13 N 89° 46' E, 525.30 feet 
to an iron rod, which is the rrue point ofbeginning; thence 
N 39°32'40" E, 247.14 feet to an iron rod; thence 
N 32°35'30" E, 366.88 feet to an iron rod; thence 
N 41 °43'50" E, 402.19 feet to an iron rod: thence 
N 50°45'40" E, 199.08 feet to an iron rod on the east line of Tract 14: thence 
West 398.25 feet(rec. 498.2) to an iron rod on the right-of-way line of Highway 5~ thence 
along the right-of-way S 41 °28'25" W, 571. 72 feet to an iron rod; thence leaving the highway south 497.40 feet (rec. 
491.93 feet) to an iron rod, which was the true point of beginning. 
By reason of the automatic stay provisions of U.S. Bankruptcy CDde 1 l U.S.C. 362, the sale was discontinued, and 
pursuant to provisions of Idaho Code 45- I 506(A) the sale was rescheduled and conducted following expiration or 
termination of the effect ofthe stay in the manner provided by that section. The Affidavit of Compliance with I.C. 
45-l 506A(2)(3), together with copies of the required Affidavit of Affidavits which are anached hereto and 
incorporated herein. 
This conveyance is made pursuant to the powers conferred upon Trustee by the Deed of Trust between Roy J. 
Green, unmarried man, as original grantor(s) for the benefit and securicy of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as 
beneficiary, recorded November 7, 2008, as Instrument No. 252461, and assigned to Chase Home Finance LLC, by 
assignment recorded October 13, 2009, as Instrument No. 255369, Mortgage Records of Benewah County, Idaho 
and after the fulfillment of the conditions specified in said Deed of Trust authorizing this conveyance as follows: 
l. Default occurred in the obligations for which said Deed of Trust was given as security and the beneficiary 
made demand upon the said trustee to sell said property pursuant to the terms of said Deed of Trust. Notice of 
Default was recorded as Instrument No. 25537 l, Mortgage Records of Benewah County, Idaho and in the office of 
the Recorder of each county in which the property described in said deed of trust or any part thereof. is situated. the 
nature of such default being as set forth in said Notice of Default. Such default still e,cisted at the time of sale. 
2. After re,cordation of said Notice of Default, trustee gave notice of the time and place of the sale of said 
property by registered/certified mail., return receipt requested, by personal service upon the occupants of said real 
property and/or by posting in a conspicuous place on said premises IUld by publishing in a newspaper of general 
circulation in each of the counties in which the property is situated as more fully appears in affidavits recorded as 
least 20 days prior to date of sale as Instrument No(s}. 256006, 256007 & 256008, Mortgage Records of Benewah 
County, Idaho. 
3. The provisions, recitals and contents of the Notice of Default referred to in paragraph ( J) supra and of the 
Affidavits referred to in paragraph (2) supra shall be and they are hereby incorporated herein and made an integral 
part hereof for all purposes as though set forth therein at length. 
4. All requirements of law regarding the mailing, personal service, posting, publication and recording of Notice 
of Default, and Notice of Sale and all other notices have been complied with. 
5. Not less than 120 days elapsed between the giving of Notice of Sale by registered or certified mail and the sale 
of said property. 
6. Trustee, at the timi, and place of sale f'ixed by said notice, at public auction, in one parcel, struck off to 
Grantee, being the highest bidder therefore, the property herein described, for the sum of $316,587.08, subject 
however to all prior liens and encumbrances. No person or corporation offered to take any part of said property less 
than the whole thereof for the amount of principal, interest, advances and costs. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The Trustee, pursuant to a resolution of its Board of Directors has caused its 
Corporation name to be hereunto subscribed. 
Dated: June 16, 2011 
Fax Server 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Benewah, ss. 
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Cynthia Ann Hammes, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes 
and says that she fa vice presl.dent ofTI1e Corporation, owner of the 
St. Maries Gazette Record, a weekly newspaper printed and pub-
lished at St. Maries, Benewah County, State ofidaho; the St. Maries 
Gazette Record is a newspaper having general circulation in Benewah 
Cmmn,.~ Sn.re ·of Idaho, and·has been-conthmou sly and tminterrupt~ 
edly published in Benewah County, State of Idaho, during a period of 
more than seventy-eight consecutive weeks prior to the first publka-
d.on of notice of advertisement herein. 
That the notice, of which the one hereto att~ed is a trne copy, 
was ~ub!ished ~n said news~::?:g-or a p~riod o,L ~-.. issues, the first 
publtcauon bemg on _h~··· ········ .. ··· d8)j~of :_,J::e.f/:n.U(),.,,.. 20 .. i.l ... 
and the last on the .. .,.,'./';_ ..... , day of ./..tlt:Z. ... ch .. , 20?.r. .... 
That said newspaper was regularly distributed to its subscribers 
du1ing the time of the smne period; that said notice was published in 
the regular a11d
1
~re issue of pj9i~~er. J 
Dated this ··o/1¥· day ofj././i?l.:d.{!:i:; .......... , 20./ . 
.... ~.aw~ ... ... .. .
) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
COUNTY OF BENEWAH ) 
\ 
.( 
On this{,~ day of IJ&.fc:i2 , in the year of·~(/ ~-
before me, a Notar; Public. personally appeared Cynthia Ann ·.,. 
Hammes, knov-.'fl or identified to me to be the person whose name 
subscribed to within instrnment, and being by me first duly sworn, 
declared that the statements therein are tme, and acknowledged to 
metha1Sheexoc,,tedthesi~ '.J /• 
/jlJrit-~( ~1-·\. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at St. Maries, Idaho 
My commission expires: 
t? ~7--l 3-ZOI I 
3/004 Fax Server 
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AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLIANCE 
I, Cindy Van Lith, the undersigned., being first duly sworn, deposes and says that I am ;1 citizen of the United States, 
over eighteen (18) years of age, a resident of Ada County, State ofldaho, that I am an officer ofTitleOne 
Corporation, our business address is 868 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 100, Eagle, Idaho 83616, and that we are 
successor trustee. 
That by reason of the expiration or termination of the effect of the automatic stay provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code 11 U.S.C. 362 and by that reason of ldaho Code 45·1506(A} Rescheduled Sale, the successor Trustee 
rescheduled the sale for the 21 '1 day of April, 201 I and further postponed sale to May 19, 2011 and then to June 16, 
2011. 
That Notice of the Rescheduled Sale was given at least thirty (30) days before the day of the rescheduled sale by 
registered or certified mail to the last known address of all persons who were entitled to notice by mail of the 
original sale and to any person who shall have recorded a request for notice of sale at least forty-five (45) days prior 
to !he rescheduled sale date in the fonn and manner required by section 45-1511, Idaho Code. 
That Notice of the Rescheduled Sale was published in the newspaper of original publication once a week for three 
(3) successive weeks, making three (3) publications in all, with the last publication at least ten ( 10) days prior to the 
day of sale. 
That the successor Trustee makes this Affidavit, stating compliance with sub-section (2) and (3) of Section 45-
l 506A, Idaho Code, as more further required in sub-section ( 4) of said Section. 
Dated: June 16,201 l 
State of Idaho 
County of Ada 
On this 16"' day ofJune in the year 2011, before me, the undersigned, a notary public in and for said state personally 
appeared, Cindy Van Lith, known to me to be the Assistant Treasurer of the corporation that executed this 
instrument and the person who executed the instrument on behalf of said corporation as trustee, and acknowledged 
to me that such corporation executed the same. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my 
official se lie day and year in this certificate first above written. 
Not Public 
Residing at: . '-;1J ~d/ J,f'1.__,, 
My commissio"ne~Jiidn:~ II, t-{)f ~ 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ROY GREEN, ) 
Claimant, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) IC 2006-07698 
ROY GREEN DBA ST JOE ) 
SALVAGE LOGGING, ) ORDER DENYING REQUEST 
) FOR SANCTIONS 
Employer, ) 
and ) 
) 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, ) 
) 
Surety, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL ) 
INDEMNITY FUND, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
On May 20, 2011, Claimant filed a motion for sanctions against the Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund (ISIF) pursuant to Industrial Commission JRP 16. Claimant argues that he 
entered into good faith negotiations with the ISIF, and the parties submitted a lump sum 
settlement agreement (LSSA) to the Commission. The Commission declined to approve the 
LSSA, because the LSSA failed to meet the requirements of Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School 
Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P. 3d 1008 (2009). Claimant requests that the Industrial 
Commission award Claimant reasonable attorney fees, punitive costs/damages, and require the 
ISIF to pay the Commission a reasonable sum to compensate it for the lost time the Commission 
ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS - 1 
spent reviewing and considering the proposed LSSA. Claimant attached documentation to 
support his contention that the ISIP proceeded without good faith. 
On May 27, 2011, ISIP filed a response to Claimant's motion. ISIP argues that Claimant 
is not entitled to sanctions, an award of punitive damages, or costs to the Commission for the 
LSSA. ISIP presents that the parties entered into settlement negotiations around September 
2009. ISIP submitted a LSSA to Claimant for review around February 2010, which Claimant 
rejected and filed a request for hearing. Around December 2010, Claimant accepted ISIP's 
previous off er for settlement. ISIP did not guarantee that the Commission would approve the 
parties' proposed LSSA, and expressed reservations of how the Commission would proceed, due 
to the recent Wernecke decision. The ISIP declined to make certain admissions in the LSSA 
requested by Claimant, in the event that the parties might litigate the matter. Ultimately, the 
Commission declined to approve the parties' LSSA agreement. 
On June 7, 2011, Claimant submitted a reply regarding his request for sanctions, and the 
supplement affidavit of Claimant's attorney, Starr Kelso, on June 27, 2011. Mr. Kelso stated 
that Claimant could have avoided foreclosure had the proposed lump sum settlement agreement 
been approved and paid, and attached documentation of foreclosure proceedings. 
DISCUSSION 
Rule 16 of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure grants the Commission power to 
impose appropriate sanctions for any violation or abuse of its rules or procedures. Claimant's request 
for sanctions following the Commission's decision to decline approving a LSSA is without 
precedent. The Commission does not award punitive damages for an unapproved settlement or costs 
to the Commission for the time spent reviewing and analyzing LSSAs. 
ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS - 2 
The Commission notes that nothing in the regulatory or statutory scheme requires parties to 
settle their disputes, just as nothing requires one party to accede to the terms of a settlement proposed 
by the other. The Commission assumes that Claimant and his attorney discussed the terms of the 
settlement, including its strengths and weaknesses, and that Claimant eventually decided to accede to 
the terms of the proposed settlement despite evidently having some reservations about the same. By 
its very nature, a LSSA is a compromise between the parties and has no binding authority until the 
Commission reviews and approves the LSSA. The parties' submission of a LSSA does not guarantee 
Commission approval of such agreement. The parties are correct that the Commission scrutinizes 
ISIF settlements for adherence to the principles outlined by the Supreme Court in Wernecke v. St. 
Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P. 3d 1008 (2009). 
It is evident from the submitted documents that Claimant did not receive all the desired 
concessions from the ISIF regarding the wording of the settlement, and that Claimant felt that his 
requested changes would have satisfied the Commission and prevented the foreclosure of Claimant's 
house. Defendants were clear that they would not make the requested concession. Understandably, 
Claimant was frustrated about the settlement, yet still chose to execute and submit the same to the 
Commission. The Commission has no remedy for this situation. The Commission does not and 
cannot evaluate LSSAs on hypothetical terms from the parties. While the Commission is sensitive to 
the financial constraints facing workers' compensation claimants, the Commission cannot simply 
rubber-stamp a LSSA due to financial challenges of the parties. The Commission carefully reviews 
all proposed LSSAs, pursuant to its statutory authority. In this case, the Commission declined to 
approve the proposed LSSA, and the case will proceed to hearing. 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS - 3 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission hereby DENIES Claimant's request for sanctions, 
damages, and costs to the Commission. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this-~- day of September, 2011. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
I hereby certify that on the day of ~w , 2011 a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order Denying Request for Sanctions was served by regular U.S. mail upon: 
STARR KELSO 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 1312 
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83816 
THOMAS CALLERY 
POBOX854 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
ERIC S BAILEY 
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP 
PO BOX 1007 
BOISE ID 83701 
cs-m 
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STARR KELSO 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Tel: 208-765-3260 
fax: 208-664-6261 
Attorney for Mr. Green 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO 
ROY GREEN 
Claimant, 
vs_ 
ROY GREEN DBA ST. JOE 
SALVAGE LOGGING, 
Employer, 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Surety, and 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants 
: Case No_ LC_ 06-07698 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
OF ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS AND REQUEST FOR 
HEARING 
lg] 001 /008 / 
COMES NOW Claimant by and through his attorney of record and moves that the 
Industrial Commission reconsider its denial of Claimant's motion for sanctions against the ISIP 
and requests that a hearing be scheduled on the motion for sanctions. 
The lndustrial Commission misperceives the basis of the motion for sanctions_ The basis is 
not that the Industrial Commission denied the proposed lump sum settlement agreement. To the 
contrary the basis of the motion is contractual and it is founded upon the following facts: 
1. ISIF and Claimant agreed to settle the ISIF's exposure to Claimant for the sum of 
$50,000. 
1 CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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2. At the time of the offer and the acceptance there was no caveat made to the offer by the 
ISIF that it would only agree to a lump sum settlement agreement that would not be consistent 
with the Werneke v. St. Maries Joint School District No. 40 I, 147 Idaho 2 77, 207 P. 3d I 008 
(2009) decision of the Idaho Supreme Court. To even suggest that it the offer was made wjth 
such a caveat would be to be an implicit admission of bad faith and probably fraud. Claimant 
entered into the h.unp sum settlement agreement in the belief, fully justified by the known 
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court, that the offer necessarily was one that required a lump sum 
settlement agreement to be prepared in compliance with Werneke. 
As the Industrial Commission decision ''assumes", Claimant's counsel most certainly 
"discussed the terms of the settlement." However, contrary to the Industrial Commission's 
further assumption that "Claimant eventually decided to accede to the tenns of the proposed 
settlement despite evidently having some reservations about the same" what the Claimant did 
was sign the agreement because it was the last, and only, chance to save his family home. A 
refusal by the Claimant to sign the agreement that the ISIF required would have been totally 
contrary to his agreement to settle the claim and totally contrary to his extreme efforts 
undertaken to save his family home. He simply had no choice but to sign the agreement, exhaust 
all his efforts to obtain the contracted for payment, and hope that the Industrial Commission 
would approve the agreement. 
The Claimant is not suggesting, or requesting, that the Industrial Commission approve the 
lump sum agreement that was presented to it. As the Commission correctly notes there is 
"nothing in the regulatory or statutory scheme that requires patties to settle their disputes." That, 
however, misses the whole point. The Claimant and the ISIF did settle their dispute. The ISIF 
2 CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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just chose to subsequently sabotage the approval of the settlement agreement submitted to the 
Industrial Commission. Further whether or not the contractual agreement is binding on the 
Industrial Commission has no bearing on the contractL,al obligation of the ISIF to either provide 
Claimant with an agreement that the Industrial Commission will approve consistent with 
Werneke or pay him $50,000 subject to later setoff against a future award of benefits to the 
Claimant. 
Indeed the Industrial Commission has a very clear remedy for this situation. The Claimant 
claims that the Industrial Commission must either order ISTF to provide Claimant with a lump 
smn settlement agreement that complies with Werneke or pay to Claimant the amount of the 
settlement contractually agreed to by the parties. If the Industrial Conunission choses to order 
the payment of the contractual1y agreed amount instead of requiring the ISTF to submit a lwnp 
sum settlement agreement in compliance with Werneke, the ISIF will be entitled to set-off 
against the amount of benefits awarded by the Industrial Commission with the payment made 
under the contract. The Commission decision comments that the "Commission is sensitive to the 
financial constraints facing workers' compensation claimants" is without substance if the 
Commission chooses to deny Claimant's request that the ISIF be ordered to comply with one of 
the two remedies set forth by Claimant. The workers' compensation is a slow, cumbersome, and 
financial nightmare for injured workers who arc left grasping at ways to save everything that 
they have worked for their entire life to acquire. A failure to require the ISIF to choose •option A 
or option B' can be viewed as nothing less than a rejection of the Commission's responsibility to 
the injured workers ofldaho in favor of ensuring that a state agency, the ISIF, retains money that 
wa~ provided by surcharges on other workers' compensation settlements or awards for the 
3 CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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express purpose of assisting workers who, despite prior impairments and disabilities, continue on 
and struggle to lead productive lives. 
The matter before the Industrial Commission at this time is one of enforcing a contract 
entered into between the ISIF and the Claimant_ The contract simply requires the ISIF to pay the 
Claimant $507000.00 for the dismissal of the claim against it The Industrial Commission 
correctly notes in its decision that after C]ajmant and the ISIF agreed to the settlement the ISIF 
unilatera1Jy changed the contra.ct. The decision notes that the ISIF declined to make the 
admissions necessary for the agreement to pass Werneke, "in the event that the parties might 
litigate the matter." As the Industrial Commission decision further notes the Commission 
"scrutinizes ISLF settlements for adherence to the principles outlined by the Supreme Court in 
Werneke." If the agreement was prepared lawfully, by the ISTF's skilled counsel, to be in 
compliance with Werneke there would there be a reason to reasonably suspect the Industrial 
Commission would fail to follow its statutory mandates and approve it. There would be no 
reason to suspect that the ISIP would have to later litigate the matter. The 'logic' behind the 
submittal of the agreement by the IS1F must have been that it perceived there to be a reasonable 
chance that the Industrial Commission would reject a lump sum settlement involving the JSIF, 
even if it was in full compliance with Werneke. Such a position by the ISIF is nothing short of a 
direct attack on the integrity of the Industrial Commission when it is acting pursuant to its 
statutory mandates. The fact that the TSIF chose to require that Claimant sign a lump sum 
settlement that the Industrial Commission found did not comply with Werneke, does not relieve 
the ISIF from its contractual obligation nor Claimant from his acceptance of the contract. 
4 CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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The Idaho Supreme Court, since at least 1959, in Wilson v. Bogert, 8 I Idaho 535, 347 P. 
341 (1959) has mandated that when the parties to a legal controversy enter into a contract 
compromising and settling their adverse claims, such agreement is binding and is enforceable at 
law or in equity. Claimant and ISIF entered into an oral contract to settle their adverse claims in 
this matter. That was the contract. The ISIF subsequently chose to require the Claimant to sign a 
lump sum settlement agreement that it knew was not compatible with Werneke. The contracted 
settlement was not contingent upon the Industrial Commission approving an agreement that did 
not comply with Werneke. It was the ISIF's obligation, after agreeing to settle for the stated 
amount, to provide Clajmant with a lawful agreement. The law is clear that a contract (here the 
accepted offer to pay Claimant $50,000) consists not only of the expressed words (e.g. we will 
pay Claimant $50,000 to be released from this claim) but it also consists of the obligations 
reasonably implied (here it was reasonably implied that the ISIF would prepare and provide 
Claimanl with an agreement that was consistent with the law). The ISIF, instead of submitting a 
lawful agreement to Claimant to sign, demanded that he sign one that it knew, or should have 
known, did not comply with Werneke. Claimant could not have, and did not, foresee that the 
ISIF would proceed in such a bad faith manner. Claimant was entitled to presume that the ISIF 
would provide a lawful agreement to memorialize the contract it entered into for submittal to the 
Industrial Commission. The contract for payment is enforceable against the ISIF in law and in 
equity. In equity, the ISIP is entitled to a set-ofT, equal to the amount of its contracted payment, 
against a subsequent award by the Industrial Commission. The action of the ISIF in demanding 
that Claimant sign an agreement, solely for the purpose of presenting it to the Industrial 
Commission, vilates, nullifies and significantly impaired the benefit of the contract to Claimant 
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and it can only be presumed that it was done with malice aforethought knowing the requirements 
of a lump sum settlement agreement under Werneke. The benefit of the contract was obvious. 
Claimant was going to use the settlement money to save his family home. The ISIF's refusal to 
provide an agreement memorializing its contract with the Claimant was a violation of the 
implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing that exists in all contracls in Idaho. Idaho 
First Nat. Bankv- Bliss Valley Foods, Inc_, 121 Idaho 266, 824 P. 2d 841 (1991)-
This is a proceeding to enforce the agreement of compromise and settlement. This is not a 
proceeding demanding that the Industrial Commission approve an agreement memorializing a 
settlement that does not comply with Werneke. In considering the motion the Industrial 
Commission does not evaluate the merits or the validity of the lump sum settlement agreement 
forced upon Claimant, after the agreement to settle was made. see Wilson, supra. The Industrial 
Commission only orders the ISIP to live up to its contractual obligation to the Claimant. The 
Industrial Commission should either order the ISIF to submit a lump sum settlement agreement 
to Claimant that is in full compliance with Wemekc and without regard to whether the ISIF 
"might litigate the matter," or order the TSIF to pay Claimant the sum of $50,000 now subject to 
potential offset. 
Starr Kelso, Attorney for Claimant Mr. Green 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was faxed to Eric Bailey attorney for employer/surety 
208-344-9670 and Thomas Callery attorney for ISIF 208u746-9553 on the 20th day of September, 
2011.~~ 
Starr Kelso 
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Thomas W. Callery, ISBN 2292 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, PL.LC. 
1304 Idaho Street 
P. 0. Box 854 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-3591 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9553 
tcallery@lewiston.com 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ROY GREEN, 
vs. 
Claimant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ROY GREEN DBA ST. JOBS SALVAGE j 
LOGGING, ) 
Employer, 
) 
) 
) 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, ) 
Surety, and 
) 
) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL j 
INDEMNITY FUND, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
Case No. LC. 06 - 07698 
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 
DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Comes now the Defendant, STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY 
FUND, by and through its attorney of record, THOMAS W. CALLERY of Jones, Brower & 
Callery, PLLC, and hereby responds to the Claimant's motion for reconsideration concerning the 
order entered by the Commission denying a request for sanctions dated September 9, 2011. The 
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Claimant had previously filed a motion requesting sanctions pursuant to Rule 16 of the Judicial 
Rules of Practice and Procedure related to the ISIF's alleged misconduct surrounding the 
preparation and submission of a proposed lump sum settlement agreement between the Claimant 
and the Fund. 
In its decision, the Commission noted that the Claimant's request for sanctions against a 
party following a Commission decision to decline approval of a lump sum agreement was 
without precedent. The Commission further ruled that a lump sum settlement agreement is a 
compromise between the parties and is not binding until the Commission reviews and approves 
the lump sum settlement. The Commission further declined to impose sanctions or costs related 
to Commission time and expense reviewing lump sum agreements that are ultimately not 
approved. 
The Claimant's motion for reconsideration now appears not to request sanctions pursuant 
to Industrial Commission Judicial Rule 16, but requests an order from the Commission requiring 
the Fund to provide Claimant with a lump sum settlement agreement that complies with 
Wernecke or, in the alternative, to pay the Claimant the $50,000.00 referenced in the lump sum 
agreement. The relief requested in the motion for reconsideration is different than the relief 
requested in the Claimant's original motion for sanctions. The Commission should summarily 
deny this purported motion for reconsideration that attempts to raise completely new issues. 
A motion for reconsideration brought pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-718 and 
Industrial Commission Rule 3(f) must be properly supported by a recitation of the factual 
findings and/or legal conclusion with which the moving party takes issue. 
The Commission does not re-weigh evidence and arguments during reconsideration 
simply because the case was not resolved in a party's favor. A motion for reconsideration must 
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present to the Commission new reasons factually and legally to support reconsideration rather 
than rehashing evidence previously presented. Curtis v. MH. King Company, 142 Idaho 383 
(2005). 
The motion for reconsideration now requests that the Commission enforce a lump sum 
agreement the Commission has refused to approve. The Claimant, in essence, is asking the 
Commission to enforce the terms of the lump sum agreement even though the Commission 
evaluated and rejected the agreement pursuant to Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School District 
No. 401, 147 Idaho 277 (2009). The fallacy of the Claimant's argument is that there is no 
contract to enforce if the Commission does not approve of the lump sum agreement. As the 
Idaho Supreme Court stated in Wernecke: 
"Claimants and ISIF do not have absolute freedom to contract because the duties 
of the parties arise under the act." 
Further, the Court stated: 
"Unless the Commission finds that the reqms1te elements exist, it may not 
approve a lump sum settlement agreement involving ISIF. Such findings are for 
the benefit of both the Claimant -- to protect him or her from himself or herself --
and of ISIF -- to keep it from making unwarranted payments when there are no 
findings establishing ISIF liability." 
Without Industrial Commission approval there is no legal contract for the Commission to 
enforce. The entire rationale of Wernecke would be negated if the Fund could enter into lump 
sum settlement agreements with claimants that are contractually binding upon the parties but do 
not generate Commission approval. 
Moreover, the Claimant and his legal counsel knew full well that any agreement between 
the Fund and the Claimant to settle the case on a lump sum basis required Commission approval 
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and was not binding upon either party without Commission approval. Any agreement between 
the ISIF and the Claimant was contingent upon Industrial Commission approval and an order 
dismissing the complaint of the Claimant with prejudice. Without Industrial Commission 
approval and without an order dismissing the Claimant's complaint with prejudice, there is no 
agreement to enforce. The Claimant, in essence, is asking for a $50,000.00 cash payment without 
the ISIF receiving any of its benefit of the bargain. 
In addition, the Claimant conveniently ignores his letter of December 3, 2010, which is 
attached to this brief as Exhibit A. In that letter, counsel admitted that discussions had occurred 
between him and the ISIF that indicated that the Commission had been cautious in approving 
settlements involving the ISIF in light of the Wernecke case. The Claimant was fully advised that 
the lump sum agreement may very well not be approved due to the particular facts of the case. 
The Claimant went on to condition his agreement to enter into a lump sum settlement agreement 
with the following language contained in his December 3, 2010 letter to counsel for the ISIF: 
"Thus of course if the Commission determines to not approve the settlement 
agreement the offer and Mr. Green's acceptance will be null and void and we 
will have to proceed to hearing." 
It was clear to both parties to the lump sum agreement that if the agreement was not approved by 
the Commission it wouid be null and void, not be binding, and that both parties were then free to 
proceed to hearing. That is exactly what has happened. 
An understanding of the factual history of this case is important to an understanding of 
how the parties got to the point of submitting a lump sum agreement to the Commission that 
eventually was rejected. Throughout his briefing, the Claimant has eluded to the financial 
problems that the Claimant has and the length of the Industrial Commission process. The 
Claimant and his counsel conveniently ignore the fact that the Fund made a settlement proposal 
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to the Claimant at a mediation that occurred in Coeur d'Alene on September 29, 2009. This 
settlement offer was neither accepted nor rejected by the Claimant, but was held open by the 
ISIF after the mediation to give the Claimant additional time to think about the settlement. The 
Claimant received an initial lump sum agreement for his review on February 24, 2010, which 
was never signed. The Claimant eventually rejected the proposed settlement and on March 10, 
2010, requested that the case be set for hearing. 
The first indication from the Claimant that he would accept the ISIF settlement offer 
came in a faxed letter dated December 3, 2010 (see attached Exhibit A), fifteen months later. 
This letter contained numerous conditions that Claimant insisted be incorporated into the lump 
sum agreement. The ISIF acquiesced to the Claimant's demands contained in the December 3, 
2010 letter and incorporated those conditions into the proposed lump sum agreement. Contrary 
to the assertion of Claimant, the Fund did not sabotage this lump sum agreement, but the 
Claimant, in insisting that he had no restrictions of any kind prior to the last accident, and that he 
became totally disabled solely as a result of the last accident, made the likelihood of Commission 
approval remote in light of the Wernecke decision. The Claimant, in his December 3, 2010 letter, 
demanded the following conditions: 
1. If the matter proceeded to hearing solely against the Surety and the Commission 
ruled that the Fund had no liability, the Fund would not receive any type of 
refund on its $50,000.00 payment. 
2. The acceptance by Mr. Green is not an admission or concession of any nature or 
kind that the ISIF has any liability regarding Mr. Green's industrial accident 
and injury of July 3, 2006. 
The Claimant is asserting a position that the Fund has no liability and required that to be 
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included into the lump sum agreement, and now complains that the Fund in some manner 
sabotaged the lump sum approval process. It was the Claimant's insistence on settling the matter 
on the conditions outlined in the December 3, 2010 letter which made it highly unlikely that the 
Commission would approve the lump sum agreement. 
3. I want to specifically recognize the fact that Mr. Green did not join the ISIF in 
this matter. 
4. Mr. Green's deposition testimony documents that he did not believe that his 
physical condition prior to the accident and injury was a hindrance or obstacle 
to his ability to obtain employment. 
Under Idaho law it is clear that a Claimant must establish a pre-existing impairment that 
constituted a hindrance and obstacle to employment or reemployment prior to the last accident. 
This statement contained in the letter of counsel for the Claimant also made it highly unlikely 
that the Commission would approve the lump sum agreement. 
5. His current total permanent disability is solely caused by said July 3, 2006 
accident. 
Again, the Claimant is asserting that his pre-existing impairments did not contribute to 
his total disability and that he is totally and permanently disabled based upon the effects of the 
2006 accident alone. In other words, there is no combined with, which is a necessary prerequisite 
to ISIF liability. 
6. Mr. Green's belief that the ISIF has and had no liability in his claim arising out 
of his accident and injury. 
In essence, I'll take your money, but under Idaho law I am not entitled to it. 
7. If the Commission determines to not approve the settlement agreement the offer 
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and Mr. Green's acceptance will be null and void and we will have to proceed to 
hearing. 
Claimant recognized that if the Commission does not approve the lump sum settlement, 
neither party will be bound by the agreement and both parties will be free to assert their position 
at hearing. This is directly contrary to the position that the Claimant is now taking that there is an 
enforceable contract when, in fact, the Claimant insisted that he had a right to pursue his case 
against the Fund if the lump sum agreement was not approved. The Claimant's position now has 
conveniently changed. 
8. It is my understanding from our discussions that the Industrial Commission has 
been cautious in approving settlements involving the ISIF. 
The Claimant and his counsel were well aware of the Wernecke decision and had been 
advised by the Fund that the Commission may very well not approve the lump sum agreement. It 
is clear that under Idaho law there is no contract to enforce, nor any basis to order the Fund to 
pay any funds to the Claimant. The Commission has properly exercised its role in reviewing 
lump sum agreements, particularly in light of the Wernecke decision. 
In Wernecke, the Court stated: 
"ISIF's liability under Section 72-332 is not invoked unless the four elements 
requisite to such a claim are found by the Commission to be present. If the 
Commission does not make the requisite findings, it has no authority or 
jurisdiction to hold ISIF liable on a claim. In this case the Commission merely 
gave its stamp of approval to the agreement, making no findings as to whether 
ISIF's liability under Section 72-332 had been properly invoked. Without such 
findings the Commission lacks statutory authority to approve the agreement and 
its order purporting to do so is void. Without Commission approval the lump sum 
agreement is void." 
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As the Court went on to state in Wernecke: 
"ISIF's liability may only be invoked when the conditions specified in the statute, 
as defined in Garcia, are present. That requires findings by the Commission. 8 
Unless the Commission finds that the requisite elements exist, it may not approve a 
lump sum settlement agreement involving ISIF. Such findings are for the benefit of 
both the claimant -- to protect him or her from himself or herself -- and of ISIF --
to keep it from making unwarranted payments when there are no findings 
establishing ISIF's liability.9 
In this regard, the Commission plays a gatekeeper role and must scrupulously 
perform that function. The requisite findings may be made by the Commission 
upon a hearing on the merits or upon a stipulation of the parties considered and 
approved by the Commission. 
9These issues were recognized by Commissioner Maynard in his dissent: 
The majority would have you believe that a claimant's assertion of total and permanent 
disability is adequate information for all parties, including the Commission, to proceed 
with the settlement. On the contrary, it is proper for the Commission "to consider the 
underlying merits of the [claimant's} claims when making its statutorily required 
determination as to whether the settlement agreements were 'for the best interest of all 
parties. ' Without some preliminary inquire into the merits of the claim, the Commission 
cannot properly judge whether an injured worker is surrendering a strong claim for too 
small a settlement, or whether the ISIF is unwisely satisfying spurious claims at great 
cost." (quoting Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm'n, 141 Idaho 129, 137, 106 P.3d 455,463 
(2005)." 
Finally, the Claimant asserts that the Fund acted in bad faith by not preparing a lump sum 
agreement that complied with the requirements of Werneke, and further that the Commission 
should order the Fund at this point in time to redraft a lump sum agreement that complies with 
Wernecke. This allegation by the Claimant controverts the purpose of Wernecke and counsel's 
duty to the Commission and to the court system. The purpose of Wernecke is to ensure that lump 
sum agreements that compromise the rights of claimants to file future claims meet the strict 
criteria of Idaho Code Section 72-332, which outlines the basis for liability of the second injury 
fund. Counsel for the Fund will not construct a lump sum agreement that ignores certain facts in 
the case, or make inaccurate and misleading statements to the Commission in an attempt to 
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obtain approval of the lump sum agreement. What specifically does the Claimant want to change 
in the lump sum agreement? The Claimant himself, in his letter of December 3, 2010 outlining 
the various conditions attached to the lump sum agreement, made the likelihood of the 
Commission approving this lump sum agreement remote. The Fund takes the preparation of a 
lump sum agreement seriously and attempts to provide to the Commission a full factual basis for 
the agreement. The lump sum agreement prepared by the Fund in the present case accurately 
summarized the pre-existing condition, the July 3, 2006 accident and resulting surgery, and 
included the various impairment ratings and restrictions that the Claimant sustained. 
Frankly, ifthere were some small change in the lump sum agreement, or clarification that 
would result in approval by the Commission, the Fund certainly would have made the correction 
or change. However, it was clear that the Commission, under the facts of this case, chose not to 
approve the lump sum agreement in large measure based upon the position of the Claimant, 
where he was asserting total disability based upon the effects of the last accident alone. 
The Fund in this case has acted both appropriately and ethically toward the Claimant and 
the Commission. The Fund participated in a requested mediation which resulted in a settlement 
offer made to the Claimant which the Claimant refused to accept for a period of fifteen months. 
Ten days before hearing the Claimant finally accepted the Fund's offer, but inserted numerous 
conditions as a basis for its acceptance. The conditions requested by the Claimant were 
incorporated in the lump sum agreement but resulted in an agreement that was not acceptable to 
the Commission in light of the Wernecke case. The Claimant knew full well that approval by the 
Commission was not assured and that both parties reserved the right to bring the case to hearing 
in the event the lump sum agreement was not approved. The Claimant, nevertheless, has brought 
two motions in an attempt to force the Fund to amend the lump sum agreement in a manner 
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which the Claimant does not specify. Frankly, it should be the Fund seeking sanctions for 
attorney fees and costs for the meritless use of the legal process by Claimant in filing these two 
motions. 
The ISIF respectfully requests that the Commission deny the motion for reconsideration. 
DATED this day of September, 2011. 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
THOMAS W. CALLERY 
Attorney for Defendant ISIF 
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ORDER DENYING 
RECONSIDERATION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, Claimant moves for reconsideration of the 
Commission's Order Denying Request for Sanctions ("Order") in the above-captioned case. 
Defendant Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF") objects to the motion and asks that the 
Order be upheld. 
A decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive, 
provided that within twenty days from the date of filing the decision, any party may move for 
reconsideration. Idaho Code § 72-718. A motion for reconsideration must "present to the 
Commission new reasons factually and legally to support [reconsideration] rather than rehashing 
evidence previously presented." Curtis v. MH. King Co., 142 Idaho 383, 128 P.3d 920 (2005). 
The Commission is not inclined to reweigh evidence and arguments simply because an issue was 
not resolved in the party's favor. 
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On May 20, 2011, Claimant filed a motion for sanctions against ISIF. Claimant had 
previously entered into a lump sum settlement agreement ("LSSA") with ISIF, but the 
Commission declined to approve the LSSA because it failed to meet the requirements set forth in 
Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School District No. 401, 147 Idaho 277,207 P.3d 1008 (2009). In 
his subsequent motion for sanctions, Claimant stated that he had suffered financial hardship 
because the LSSA was not approved, and he argued that the failure of the LSSA was due to 
ISIF's refusal to insert language in the LSSA that would have rendered it consistent with 
Wernecke. Essentially, Claimant blamed ISIF for his hardship. Claimant asked the Commission 
to order ISIF to 1) pay Claimant reasonable attorney fees, 2) pay Claimant punitive costs and 
damages, to be determined at a hearing, and 3) compensate the Commission for the "lost time" of 
the Commissioners and staff who considered the LSSA. 
ISIF responded that Claimant and Claimant's counsel were aware at the time the LSSA 
was submitted that it might not be approved under Wernecke, but Claimant chose to sign the 
agreement anyway. ISIF disagreed that its actions caused Claimant hardship, characterizing 
Claimant's motion as "frivolous." 
Claimant replied that ISIF had a duty to prepare the LSSA in a manner that would be 
consistent with Wernecke. However, ISIF refused to do so. Such refusal constituted bad faith and 
caused the LSSA to be disapproved by the Commission. Claimant argued that his settlement 
agreement with ISIF was a legally binding, enforceable contract, that good faith and fair dealing 
are implied obligations in every contract, and that ISIF acted in bad faith by not inserting 
language consistent with Wernecke in the LSSA. Consequently, the Commission should order 
ISIF to "submit ... a lump sum settlement agreement that complies with the standards expressed 
in Wernecke." In the alternative, the Commission should hold a hearing to determine the "nature 
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and extent of damages suffered" by Claimant "as a result of ... ISIF's actions." See Claimant's 
Reply to ISIF's Response to Motion for Sanctions, p. 7. 
On September 9, 2011, the Commission issued the Order Denying Request for Sanctions, 
noting that the Commission "does not award punitive damages for an unapproved settlement," as 
there is "nothing in the regulatory or statutory scheme [that] requires parties to settle their 
disputes." See Order, pp. 2-3. Whatever Claimant's reservations about the LSSA, he voluntarily 
signed it, thus subscribing to the language therein. Claimant failed to cite a basis for which 
sanctions could be imposed. 
On reconsideration, Claimant argues that the Commission misunderstood the basis of his 
motion for sanctions. Claimant did not ask that sanctions be imposed because the LSSA was not 
approved. Rather, sanctions should be imposed because ISIF knowingly "sabotaged" the LSSA 
by refusing to insert language that would satisfy the Wernecke requirements. Claimant repeats 
his argument that when ISIF agreed to settle the case, it formed an oral contract with Claimant 
and was thus obliged to act in good faith under the law of contracts. By refusing to include 
language consistent with Wernecke, ISIF acted in bad faith, as it knowingly caused the LSSA to 
be disapproved, causing hardship to Claimant. Therefore, Claimant is entitled to one of two 
remedies: either the Commission should order ISIF to submit an LSSA that complies with 
Wernecke, or the Commission should order ISIF to pay to Claimant the sum of $50,000.00, 
which Claimant would have received had the LSSA been approved. 
ISIF denies that it acted in bad faith. It notes that Claimant and Claimant's counsel were 
aware that the LSSA might not be approved by the Commission, and that the agreement was not 
binding or enforceable without Commission approvaL In the absence of a binding agreement, 
ISIF is not obliged to pay anything to Claimant, because there is no contract to enforce. 
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Furthermore, ISIP argues that Claimant's motion for reconsideration should be denied because 
the requested relief is not the same as the sanctions requested in the original motion for 
sanctions. 
Regardless of the relief requested, we find that reconsideration is not warranted. Claimant 
1s incorrect that his motion for sanctions was misunderstood. The Commission addressed 
Claimant's argument about ISIP's refusal to include certain language in the agreement when the 
Commission observed: 
It is evident from the submitted documents that Claimant did 
not receive all the desired concessions from the ISIP 
regarding the wording of the settlement, and that Claimant 
felt that his requested changes would have satisfied the 
Commission and prevented the foreclosure of Claimant's 
house .... Understandably, Claimant was frustrated about the 
settlement, yet still chose to execute and submit the same to 
the Commission. 
See Order, p. 3. Thus, the Commission has already considered Claimant's arguments concerning 
the language of the LSSA and ISIP's alleged bad faith, but was not persuaded by them. 
Claimant's argument about bad faith might be more compelling if ISIP had promised to include 
language consistent with Wernecke in the LSSA, only to renege on that promise; however, 
Claimant has not shown that ISIP made such a promise, and Claimant has not offered additional 
arguments that would support imposing sanctions. Therefore, Claimant's motion for 
reconsideration is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this day 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
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Assistant Commission Secretarf 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the {~day , 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION was served by regular United States 
Mail upon each of the following: 
STARR KELSO 
PO BOX 1312 
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83816 
THOMAS CALLERY 
POBOX854 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
ERIC S BAILEY 
PO BOX 1007 
BOISE ID 83701 
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BEFORE 
ROY GREEN, 
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V. 
ROY GREEN, dba ST. JOE SALVAGE, 
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and 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
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IC 2006-007698 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the above-
entitled matter to Referee Rinda Just, who conducted a hearing in St. Maries on August 21 
and 22, 2012. Claimant was present at the hearing and represented by Starr Kelso of Coeur 
d'Alene. Eric S. Bailey of Boise represented Employer and Surety (referred to collectively as 
Surety), and Thomas W. Callery of Lewiston represented the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
(ISIF). The parties presented oral and documentary evidence and five post-hearing depositions 
were taken. Post-hearing briefs were filed, and the matter came under advisement on March 21, 
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13. Upon retirement the Commission April 20 I the case was 
reassigned to the Commissioners. 
ISSUES 
By agreement of the parties, the issues to be decided are: 
1. Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing or 
subsequent injury or condition; 
2. Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to benefits for: 
a. Medical care; 
b. Temporary partial and or temporary total disability (TPD/TTD); 
c. Permanent partial impairment (PPI); and 
d. Disability in excess of impairment, including total permanent disability 
pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine; 
3. Whether apportionment for a pre-existing condition pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-
406 is appropriate; 
4. Whether ISIF is liable under Idaho Code § 72-332; and, if so, 
5. Apportionment under the Carey formula; and 
6. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 72-804. 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
Claimant contends that he is totally and permanently disabled as an odd-lot worker due, 
at least in part, to his 2006 industrial injury to his cervical and lumbar spine. He primarily relies 
upon the opinions of Dr. Dirks, his treating orthopedic surgeon, as well as those of Dan 
Brownell, vocational consultant. Claimant does not advance any arguments regarding ISIF 
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liability. Claimant asserts 1s entitled to an attorney 
unreasonable adjustment of his claim. 
Surety contends that Claimant suffered no permanent impairment ( and, therefore, no 
disability) due to his 2006 industrial injuries and, further, that Claimant is not totally and 
permanently disabled. In the event the Commission disagrees on both of these issues, then 
Surety asserts that ISIF is liable for 57% to 67% of Claimant's benefits because Claimant's total 
and permanent disablement is due to a combination of Claimant's 1) pre-existing permanent 
impairments due to prior injuries to his cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine, both of his upper 
extremities and both of his lower extremities, and 2) the cervical and lumbar injuries Claimant 
sustained in his last industrial accident in 2006. Surety seeks findings that Claimant's pre-
existing impairments were manifest, constituted subjective hindrances to employment, and 
"combined" with injuries sustained in Claimant's last accident such as to trigger ISIF liability. 
Surety also seeks a credit for overpaying temporary disability benefits. 
ISIF joins Surety in maintaining that Claimant is not permanently and totally disabled 
under either the 100% method or the odd-lot doctrine. However, if the Commission finds that he 
is, then ISIF contends it is nevertheless not liable because 1) the evidence fails to establish 
Claimant had any pre-existing permanent impairments that meet the first three requirements of 
the Dumaw test, and 2) any pre-existing impairment did not combine with Claimant's 2006 
industrial accident to cause total and permanent disability. 
Surety and ISIF both rely upon the vocational opinions of Nancy Collins, Ph.D. 
OBJECTIONS 
All pending objections preserved in the deposition transcripts are overruled. 
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record in matter consists of the following: 
1. The pre-hearing depositions of: 
a. Claimant dated January 5, 2007 and February 20, 2009; 
b. Michael Ludwig, M.D. dated January 2007; 
c. Bret Dirks, M.D. dated December 23, 2004; and 
The testimony taken at hearing of: 
a. Claimant; 
b. Robby Macklin; 
C. Randy Reynolds; 
d. Dewey Shawver; 
e. Shelby Green; 
f. Wesley Green; 
g. Mike Roland; 
h. Dan Brownell; and 
1. Nancy Collins, Ph.D; and 
3. Joint Exhibits 1-91 submitted after the hearing, which consist of the following 
exhibits admitted at the hearing: 
a. Claimant's Exhibits 1-59; 
b. ISIP and Employer's Exhibits 1-32; and 
c. Employer's Exhibits 1-12; and 
4. The post-hearing depositions of: 
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a. Nancy J. Collins, Ph.D. taken J../'"'''""'' 
Carrie Nordin taken October 5,201 
2011; 
c. Don Williams, D.O. taken September 17, 2012; and 
d. Bret Dirks, M.D. taken September 18, 2012. 
After having considered all the above evidence and briefs of the parties, the Commission 
renders the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
PRE-INDUSTRIAL INJURY VOCATIONAL AND MEDICAL HISTORY 
1. Claimant was 53 years of age at the time of the hearing and resided in St. Maries, 
the seat of Benewah County. He was 46 at the time of his relevant industrial accident in 2006. 
2. Claimant left high school after the 11th grade (in 1976) to go to work to help 
support his parents. He later obtained a GED. He has no fmiher formal education. 
3. While in high school, Claimant began working at a service station where he 
changed oil, pumped gas, checked tires, filled propane tanks, and performed other service station 
work. He left to work in saw mills, including the Potlatch saw mill. 
4. In 1980, Claimant was incarcerated for grand larceny after he cut cedar trees from 
federal land and sold them. He testified that he did it to support two families of cousins who 
were starving. Claimant has had no other problems with the law. While he was incarcerated, he 
got his GED and did some teaching. Later, in 1981, Claimant took a job operating a Caterpillar 
tractor (Cat). 
5. Claimant's pre-existing medical history is long and complicated. 
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6. In 1981, Claimant underwent imaging that, to Drs. Westbrook, 
~~, .. ~,, .. , and Barnard, evidenced some sort of neck injury. (No accompanying medical records 
were available.) 
7. In 1982 and 1983, Claimant worked in Alaska as a night shift foreman on a fish 
butchering line. He also ran a forklift and organized cold storage, among other things. In 
addition, Claimant performed some electrical work and "engineered a fishing boat." JE-339. 
8. In 1984, Claimant was seriously injured when a choker belt struck him in the low 
back, causing him to fall down a mountainside. Claimant was off work for 245 days in recovery. 
With assistance from the Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division (ICRD), Claimant 
received on-the-job training with CC Services, a vehicle repair shop, but he soon left to take 
another logging job because the pay was too low. Claimant testified that he made a full recovery 
and returned to logging without further difficulties. 
9. Thereafter, Claimant began working as a sawyer and operator of logging 
equipment including skidders, Cats and log processors, among other machines. Notably, he ran 
Mike Roland's salvage logging operation for several years, during which he also logged the 
timber he used to build his own house. 
10. In 1987, Claimant injured his neck and jaw when he was involved in a rollover 
skidder accident. He initially reported symptoms including right arm and hand pain which his 
physician ultimately deemed to be unsupported by findings evidencing true neurologic deficits in 
sensation. Claimant received conservative treatment, including physical therapy (which 
worsened his symptoms) and medications (including Flexeril, Tylenol 4 and Motrin 800). 
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11. As passed, Claimant developed additional symptoms including pain in his 
right scapula and shoulder, paresthesia in his right upper extremity (RUE) without radiation, and 
low back pain. He then developed pain in both upper extremities with spasm in his left posterior 
cervical dorsal muscles, crepitus in his neck and upper back, and neurologic complaints without 
objectively identifiable source. Claimant's complaints grew to include ear-ringing (worse with a 
wide open mouth), but his neck and shoulder symptoms remained his worst problems. Claimant 
also reported temporomandibular joint (TMJ) symptoms that Dr. West brook could not connect to 
an objectively identifiable injury. In addition, Claimant reported his arms would fall asleep if he 
slept on his back and that he could not carry a half gallon of milk with his right arm because it 
was too heavy, among other intensifying symptoms, all of which Claimant attributed to the 
skidder rollover. 
12. A panel evaluation by Drs. Powell and Clark on February 29, 1988 produced 
opinions that Claimant's subjective complaints were out of proportion to the (lack of) objective 
findings. The panel returned Claimant to work with no impairment and no restrictions. 
Nevertheless, Claimant continued to report symptoms and obtain medical treatment. In March 
1988 Claimant advised Dr. Westbrook that he intended to pursue the matter in the courts. In 
April 1998, Dr. Lea opined that Claimant's bizaiTe complaints were likely due to 
psychophysiologic factors aggravating his pain, but he later opined that EMG findings were 
consistent with mild right carpal tunnel syndrome. In May 1988, a functional capacity evaluator 
opined Claimant exaggerated his pain and recommended, among other things, a psychological 
assessment. Thereafter, Claimant sought treatment from Dr. Gould, a chiropractor, and 
Drs. Hopwood and Henriksen, who recommended more treatment for cervical strain, chronic 
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pain, and left carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Henriksen and 
to return to skidder operating. 
Gould advised Claimant not 
13. In 1988, Dr Gould, a chiropractor, opined that Claimant had weakness at L4-5 
that would likely result in a disc problem if not stabilized, and thinning at L5-S 1. 
14. In approximately October 1988, Claimant submitted a lump sum settlement 
agreement (LSSA), which was approved by the Commission on November 10, 1988. Claimant's 
settlement included a general 5% whole person PPL The LSSA states that Claimant alleged he 
incurred injuries to his head, neck, back, knee, fingers, shoulder and right arm, specifically 
including acute strains of his neck and dorsal areas, mild concussion, and residual tinnitus. In 
addition, Claimant received $6,147.18 via the LSSA for retraining (presumably truck driver 
training recommended by ICRD). For whatever reason, Claimant did not follow up after 
receiving his settlement funds. He testified at the hearing that he did not pursue this option 
because he could not afford it, he was not interested in a sedentary job, and furthermore, he felt 
uncomfortable (fearful) with the idea of driving a big rig truck. However, ICRD records indicate 
that Claimant, at the time, told the consultant that he was very interested in truck driver training 
and intended to pursue it. By December 9, 1988, Claimant still had not returned to work; 
however, he ceased obtaining treatment for neck, TMJ, or back conditions. Claimant returned to 
logging and testified that he was able to perform his job without difficulty. 
15. In approximately 1992, Potlatch contracted Claimant to log its property. 
Claimant hired a sawyer, obtained a business loan and workers' compensation coverage, moved 
his Cat trailer to Mica Meadows, and went to work. He nan1ed his sole proprietorship St. Joe 
Salvage. 
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16. 
equipment. 
Claimant 
work 
a crane, a 
and cleanup, almost 
among 
for 
Potlatch. "I go through - - they give me areas that the wind blows trees down, or that we have 
bug kill, and I just pretty much - - they start me in an area and I work my way." 2007 CL Dep., 
p. 8. 
17. Potlatch provided 90 to 95% of the logging salvage work for St. Joe Salvage. 
Claimant did not need to bid jobs; Potlatch contacted him when logging work was available and 
paid just under $40 per ton delivered to the mill. After expenses, such as a 34% charge for 
loading and hauling, fuel costs, payroll, payroll taxes, and workers' compensation, Claimant 
figured he averaged $314 or $340 ( apparently he could not remember which) per day over five or 
six years. 
18. Claimant developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome while working for 
Mr. Roland's salvage logging operation. He underwent bilateral corrective surgeries in 1993. 
The surgeries were ultimately successful. Claimant testified he fully recovered from his carpal 
tunnel conditions, with no residual difficulties and no PPL 
19. In August 1995, Claimant separated his right AC (shoulder) joint while running 
down a hill with chokers, when the line tangled and abruptly stopped, yanking his ann. Claimant 
underwent surgery by Dr. Cody in Spokane. The surgery was successful and Claimant returned 
to work without permanent restrictions or pain. 
20. In February 2000, Claimant was diagnosed with a hernia. He underwent hernia 
repair surgery, after which he returned to logging work. Complications with the repair mesh 
ensued, and Claimant underwent a second hernia surgery. Following this procedure, Claimant 
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to logging. or 
medical were assessed. 
21. On September 25, 2001, Claimant separated his left AC joint pulling on a winch 
line. At his 2009 deposition, Claimant described being hit by a root wad (stump with roots 
attached) rolling down the mountain. At the hearing, however, Claimant described the accident 
differently. "Running down the mountain with a choker and the winch came loose and stopped, 
and it just yanked you [sic]." TRI, p. 80. "[S]o I'm kind of just like hanging by one arm, but 
you [ sic] don't know it's coming, so ... [y ]our [sic] collar bone just pops out of that socket right 
there and pops up." Id. Claimant also described wrapping his collar bone with an Ace bandage 
to keep it stable, and using his other arm at work until breakup in March or February because he 
did not want to take time off from work to have it repaired. Apparently, Claimant did not 
accurately remember which of his shoulder injuries occurred first. In any event, on March 14, 
2002, Claimant underwent left AC repair surgery with Dr. McNulty. The surgery was 
successful. Claimant returned to work without restrictions or residual pain. The date of 
Claimant's return to work is not discernible from the record. 
22. On January 14, 2003, Claimant reported to William Ganz, M.D., a neurosurgeon, 
that he had injured his mid-back limbing a tree on April 29, 2002: 
I was just cutting a big bull pine limb, pulling up on it, because the way it was 
bent, I couldn't cut it down, I had to pull up. And it felt like somebody shot me 
right in the back and paralyzed me. And I ended up in a puddle on the ground. 
And three days later I could work and I went back to work. I laid on the couch for 
three or four days, though. 
TRI, p. 82. Claimant was eventually diagnosed with a herniated disc with spurring at Tl2-Ll, 
for which Dr. Ganz performed a T12-Ll fusion surgery in January 2003. After conducting a 
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not claim that 
problem was the result an April industrial Claimant first reported 
back pain in May 2002; however, at that time, he attributed it to a November 2001 accident. 
Also, Dr. Weiss opined that Claimant's long history of arthritic problems in his neck and 
shoulders, long smoking history, the suggestion of a chronic degenerative process not yet ruled 
out, and Dr. Ganz's intraoperative findings of significant osteophytes suggesting an underlying 
degenerative process all complicated the question of what brought on Claimant's disc herniation. 
As well, after reviewing Claimant's prior records that were not available to him at the time he 
performed surgery in 2003, Dr. Ganz became suspicious that Claimant's injury was due to 
natural degeneration, and not an April 2002 injury. 
23. In recovery, Claimant wore a back brace for four months. Dr. Ganz initially 
restricted Claimant from heavy lifting and bending on a regular basis; however, Claimant did not 
heed these restrictions. "Well, that's impossible. That entails tying your shoe. You know? So I 
just ignored him and took my time and got better because I could." TRI, p. 85. 
24. Claimant returned to work after about four months. As detailed in the Safety 
Video section below, Claimant testified inconsistently in these proceedings with respect to his 
actual abilities following his thoracic spine surgery. However, he consistently testified that he 
does not believe he was employable by anyone else as a logger following his 2003 spinal fusion, 
regardless of his actual abilities, because of the perception that he was an unreasonable insurance 
risk. Claimant believed that, had he not been running his own logging business, he could have 
obtained employment as a mechanic or mill worker running a debarker, forklift, or other 
equipment in 2003. 
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Shelby 
his did not know how dad his 2003 back surgery 
because she was only 10 years old at the time. Wesley was 11 years old at the time. recalled 
that his dad worked just about every day, but when he got home he mostly just relaxed. "He 
wouldn't do as much after that." TR2, p. 17. Dr. Williams (see below) recalled that Claimant 
told him he no longer did any heavy work after the 2003 surgery. 
26. Dewey "Duke" Shawver, a long-time salvage logger in the St. Maries area who 
has worked with Claimant and respects his work ethic and logging abilities, agreed that Claimant 
was not employable as a logger following his 2003 surgery. 
27. No PPI has been assessed to Claimant's thoracic spine condition, and Dr. Ganz 
released Claimant without restrictions in 2004. On the other hand, Dr. Dirks endorsed 
restrictions for Claimant following his 2003 thoracic spine surgery of no heavy lifting and 
limited bending. Dr. Ludwig agreed that he would assess similar restrictions, but deferred to Dr. 
Ganz in Claimant's case. 
28. Claimant received a check for temporary disability benefits related to his surgery 
with Dr. Ganz because he had been required to miss ten weeks of work. Claimant testified that 
he refused the check, however, because he had saved enough money to cover his wage loss. 
"Associated Loggers, yeah. They told me, "Well, you got 10 weeks coming." And I said, "Well, 
I don't need it, man. Put it somewhere else." They thought I was crazy." TRI, pp. 84-85. 
29. MRI and other imaging techniques in 2003 and 2004 revealed diffuse disc bulges 
at every lumbar level, and other pathology, but no spinal impingement. By November 2004, 
Claimant's L4-5 diffuse posterior disc bulge was accompanied by moderate bilateral apophyseai 
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to mild canal 
a 2004 EMG nerve conduction study 
produced findings consistent with right-sided SI radiculopathy, according to 
though his lumbar spine MRI revealed no impingement. 
Dirks, even 
30. In 2004, Claimant fractured his right calcaneus showing his son how (not!) to 
jump a motorcycle. He worked in a cast for a period before fully recovering without work 
restrictions or limitations. Following this event, however, Claimant cut down on his motorcycle-
riding. He also contracted pneumonia, from which he fully recovered with no residual effects. 
31. In November 2004, Claimant hit his head while getting into the cab of his dozer. 
Dr. Dirks obtained an MRI on November 24, 2004 that identified minor disc bulging and minor 
arthritic changes, but no frank disc herniations or compression on the spinal cord. "I did not see 
anything that was surgical or might explain any of his pain complaints." 2004 Dirks Dep., p. 10. 
Further, he opined that any future care related to Claimant's neck would be due to a new 
accident. Claimant's industrial claim related to this injury was settled by LSSA approved 
January 27, 2005. No related PPI or medical restrictions were assessed. 
32. Claimant also complained of numbness in his feet in 2004 that Dr. Dirks opined 
could not be explained by his MRI findings. "It may be residual problems from the previous 
surgery and herniated disk problems." 2004 Dirks Dep., p. 12. Claimant also reported persistent 
pain down his back and into his legs with numbness, increased electrical shocks down the back 
of his thighs, calves, and into his heels (right worse than left), incontinence, sleeping problems, 
and tingling with motion, which Dr. Dirks opined were attributable to his injuries and surgery at 
Tl2-Ll, from which he had reached medical stability. 
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to 
PPI of of the whole person due to his 1984 back injury. 
spine) and 2004 
acknowledged 
34. In 2005 and 2006, Claimant was awarded the Potlatch Logger of the Year Award. 
To Claimant's knowledge, no one else has been twice honored with this distinction. 
35. At the hearing, Claimant testified that there isn't much salvage work left anymore 
because "they're" now "fjlust clear cutting everything." TRI, p. 170. Mr. Shawver agreed. 
"Getting to be less and less all the time." TRI, p. 214. 
36. Claimant's tax returns show his gross receipts/adjusted gross income (AGI) from 
2001 through 2008: 
2001 - $187,349 I $53,286 
2002 - $204,757 I $41,052 
2003 - $346,596 I $17,180 
2004 - $303,757 I $60,107 
2005 - $200,288 I $27,345 
2006 - $150,177 I $42,321 
2007 $244,396 I $70,295 
2008 - $187,673 / $50,016 
SAFETY VIDEO: JUNE 25, 2006 
37. On June 25, 2006, just eight days before his industrial accident, Claimant and his 
employee made a Safety Video that captured images of Claimant doing salvage work. He is 
featured climbing, jumping down from logs, walking across logs, and falling and limbing trees 
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m a canyon, as a among other 
immediately could 
do everything he used to do, except install a winch line on a Cat. "I could run and jump. 
Everything. Ride motorcycles. I could do anything I wanted to." JE-345. He said he could still 
hook a tree, set chokers, saw down and skid trees, limb trees, and carry buckets of oil, and he did 
not feel at all disabled. He recalled that Dr. Ganz told him to avoid only extremely heavy lifting, 
which he did: 
Q. And what do you mean by extremely heavy lifting? 
A Oh, like putting a winch line on a Cat. Eighty, ninety, hundred pound winch 
line. 
Q. So you did avoid that? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q. Anything else? 
A. No. 
Q. Did the doctors recommend that you get out of logging? 
A Yeah, possibly. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you ever think about getting out oflogging after the T-12 L-1 surgery? 
A No, sir. 
JE-345. 
38. At the hearing, Claimant contradicted his 2009 testimony: 
Q. . .. Does the video accurately reflect what you were doing on a regular eight-
hour-a-day basis? 
A Well, no. I didn't - - that was a - - I didn't saw much. I mostly run the Cat. I 
sawed maybe two hours a day, if that. 
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was there a reason - was 
most of the falling? 
Well, it did me. to 
to cut the stump or get on your hands and knees or on your knees. 
Q. So would it be fair to say two hours a day you did the activities in the video 
and the rest of the time you would work on the Cat or the log processor? 
A. Not every day. Some days I didn't even saw. 
Q. Some days you did no sawing? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Would there be some days you did eight or ten hours of sawing? 
A. No. Never. Two is about tops. 
Q. Did you ever think about getting out of logging after the Tl2-Ll surgery? 
A. No, not really. I figured I'd give it a shot anyway and see ifl could do it. 
Q. Your testimony is that you avoided the sawing part of the job after your Tl2-
Ll surgery. Correct? 
A. Yeah. 
TRI, pp. 161-162. 
SUBJECT INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT: JULY 3, 2006 
39. On July 3, 2006, Claimant was working alone when he was struck on his hardhat 
by a falling tree. Claimant's employee had previously cut the tree that hit Claimant, but left it 
standing. The draft created by a tree Claimant had just fallen apparently knocked the rogue tree 
loose, unbeknownst to Claimant. Fleeing the tree he had just cut, Claimant ran smack into it. A 
nearby stump prevented the tree from crushing Claimant. When he came to, Claimant wriggled 
out from under the tree. His legs were tingling and numb. He couldn't lift his chainsaw. He 
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made his to his pickup and 
was clumsy 
a soda. 
were 
he tried to 
- - it was 
he knew he seriously 
done." 'pp. 1 
103. Claimant drove to the emergency department at Benewah Community Hospital in St. 
Maries. 
POST-INDUSTRIAL INJURY MEDICAL CARE 
40. July 3, 2006 initial evaluation (Dr. Katovich). At Benewah Community 
Hospital, Claimant was examined by John R. Katovich, Jr., M.D. Claimant reported he had been 
momentarily stunned by the accident, but he did not believe he had lost consciousness for a 
significant period of time, and he remembered everyihing after the event. He had a 9/10 
headache, as well as pain in his neck, elbow, and back. He was taking Neurontin daily. He 
smoked two packs of cigarettes and drank a six pack of beer per day. On exam, Claimant had 
"no evidence of ecchymosis, swelling or anything on the scalp and occiput, evidently to the 
credit of his hard hat. Tenderness to the neck but full range of motion." JE-2. Claimant did 
have a small bruise on his left side at the pelvic brim. A cervical x-ray revealed degenerative 
changes, but no fracture. Dr. Katovich diagnosed multiple contusions, prescribed medications 
(Flexeril and Lortab ), took Claimant off work for 24 hours, and recommended follow-up with his 
primary care physician. 
41. July 7, 2006 follow-up (Dr. Ludwig). Claimant was certain he had injured his 
back, but he felt Dr. Katovich had not properly evaluated him for a spinal injury. Claimant 
testified at the hearing for the first time that, the next day, he had clear fluid running out of his 
ears, so he called Mary Cronin, adjustor. She approved an evaluation by Dr. Ludwig, a 
physiatrist, in Coeur d'Alene. 
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Dr. evaluated Claimant on July 0 m 
worse while standing and looking up/down, walking or uvJLi'4JLHf', 
forward. He also reported bladder incontinence, but no worse than before the tree hit him. There 
is no mention of ear drainage in these or any other medical records. Claimant was taking three 
Neurontin pills per day. On exam, Dr. Ludwig noted no gross ecchymosis over the area of 
impact, pain localized to the left temporal region, diffuse tenderness over the cervical spine, 
tenderness over the vertebral prominence, no evidence of instability, good bilateral upper limb 
strength, lower extremity strength testing inhibited by pain, diminished Achilles reflex on the 
right as compared to the left, mildly positive adverse neural tension to seated slump exam, 1 
tenderness over his lower lumbar spine "well inferior to the area of his previous surgery," no 
rash or erythema, intact distal pulses and no edema or swelling. Dr. Ludwig reserved his 
diagnosis, but recommended cervical and lumbar MRls due to the nature of Claimant's recent 
trauma, his vague symptoms including pain, his recurrence of problems similar to those he 
experienced prior to his 2003 spinal fusion surgery, and his asymmetric reflexes, which Claimant 
could not identify as either pre-existing or new. In the meantime, Dr. Ludwig returned Claimant 
to work, restricting him from overhead work, bending and lifting no more than 30 pounds. 
43. July 11, 2006 lumbar spine MRI. The radiologist's report indicates Claimant 
had lower extremity pain, worse on the left, and that Claimant's March 17, 2004 lumbar spine 
MRI (or at least its report) was available for comparison. The radiologist noted four findings in 
his "Impression" section. At L4-5, a left lateral disc extrusion was compressing the left L4 nerve 
1 Dr. Ludwig described the seated slump exam: 'The patient is in a seated position and with cervical flexion and 
concomitant extension of a leg at a time. They have varying degrees of pain and reproduction of back pain, leg pain 
with extension of the knee. A grossly positive test is reproducible at the same angle usually corresponding to exact 
symptoms. A mildly positive test usually refers to some diffuse pain either nonlocalizing to a nerve distribution or 
with varying reproducibility." Ludwig Dep., p. 42. 
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with a 
at a 
now 
the 
sac mm. was 
sac to mm 
narrowing. There was mild worsening at TI0-1 I with a left paracentral disc protrusion that 
might be contouring the thoracic cord. Finally, the radiologist noted a mild left lateral disc 
protrusion at L5-S 1. 
44. July 11, 2006 cervical spine MRI. The radiologist's report indicates Claimant 
had neck pain following his industrial injury and that Claimant's July 3, 2006 cervical spine x-
ray film and November 24, 2004 cervical spine MRI report were available for comparison. The 
radiologist noted three findings in his "Impression" section. At CS-6 Claimant had an 
interspinous ligament sprain with adjacent paraspinous musculature strain involving C4-5 
without malalignment or evidence of longitudinal ligament disruption. Also at CS-6, a broad-
based right paracentral disc bulge causing mild contouring of the cervical cord was identified, as 
was minimal spinal stenosis. There was also multilevel facet arthropathy and variable-to-
moderate foraminal narrowing at other cervical levels. 
45. Dr. Ludwig's initial diagnoses. Claimant followed up with Dr. Ludwig on 
July 12, 2006. Claimant's Achilles reflexes were symmetric on this exam, and he had tenderness 
over his mid cervical spine. Given Claimant's imaging results and his exam findings, 
Dr. Ludwig diagnosed a CS-6 ligament sprain and a left L4-5 disc extrusion, consistent with his 
left leg complaints, along with mild progression of the same degenerative changes demonstrated 
on his November 2004 lumbar spine MRI. As to Claimant's left leg complaints, Dr. Ludwig 
clarified in his deposition that Claimant's reported pain did not follow the typical dermatornal 
pattern associated with compression of the L4-5 nerve root. The typical expectation is pain in 
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hip and lateral extending across the ,,,~·~ .. ~, knee and medial 
both the front thigh. 
recommended relative rest for Claimant's neck, which he believed would heal on its own. 
46. For Claimant's lumbar disc extrusion, Dr. Ludwig recommended a 
diagnostic/therapeutic transforaminal epidural steroid injection. A positive response to the 
injection would indicate an inflammatory component to Claimant's pain, signaling an acute 
(within six months) injury. Chronic conditions, on the other hand, like chronic herniations, are 
associated with less inflammation and do not respond well to steroid injections. "Lack of 
response to the injection is also helpful in that it may not be the structure causing the pain." 
Ludwig Dep., p. 59. "Pain could be coming from other structures; bone, muscle." Id. In 
response to the injection, Claimant had "[m]inimal improvement, at best." Id., p. 56. Dr. 
Ludwig released Claimant to modified duty work as described above, and prescribed 70 more 
Lortab pills for pain control. 
47. On July 27, 2006, Dr. Ludwig noted Claimant still had pain in his neck, but his 
motion was improved and there was no evidence of instability or step-off. Claimant still had 
positive adverse neural tension bilaterally to seated slump exam and diminished sensation in a 
"subjective pattern in the bilateral thighs." JE-19. Dr. Ludwig recommended an EMG study to 
confirm whether or not there was acute axonal loss or denervation in the IA myotomal 
distribution and to reevaluate Claimant's right leg. He also noted Claimant's history of 
underlying peripheral neuropathy diagnosed via EMG testing several years previously. 
48. Claimant returned to work at some point, but he was still having trouble walking. 
"I tried, yes, and I - - my legs wouldn't work, and I couldn't - - I was floundering half the time." 
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'p. 1 fast enough and was 
on the arm a falling tree top. son, 
Wesley, testified that Claimant's arm was pretty torn up as a result. The next day, Claimant 
attended the Idaho State Championships at Fossil Bowl, a motorcycle race in which his son was 
competing. There, Claimant spoke to a nurse about his left arm swelling. She encouraged him 
to seek medical treatment. Surety obtained surveillance video of Claimant attending this event, 
among other things (see below). 
49. On July 30, 2006 Claimant sought treatment for his left forearm injury. X-ray 
imaging showed no acute changes, and he was diagnosed with contusions and abrasions of his 
left forearm and wrist. Claimant's arm was placed into a sling, Norco (26 pills total) was 
prescribed, and Claimant was instructed to rest and ice the arm. 
50. July 29 and 30, 2006 Surveillance Video. Surety obtained video recordings of 
Claimant on July 29 and 30, 2006, as he drove in his truck and attended his son's motorcycle 
competition. The video is of poor quality for the most part, apparently shot from a significant 
distance, and most of the frames are shaky. Claimant is depicted standing and walking around 
without a limp, talking to people, and a couple of times he bent deeply at the waist to look more 
closely at the engine areas on motorcycles. At one point, it appears as if Claimant is limping and 
the camera is shut off for no reason that is apparent from the video. Claimant is also depicted 
climbing a mobile stair unit, standing on it videoing the action, and sometimes sitting down on 
one of the steps. 
51. Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). Claimant applied for SSDI 
benefits on July 31, 2006, alleging disability based upon a broken back and a neck injury. His 
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the to perform a wide range 
after this initial denial. 
u,-~,~u, duty 
October 
2008, he was denied because he was still making management decisions for St Joe Salvage. 
Around this same time, Claimant ceased operations. Following Claimant's retention of an 
attorney in 2009, and his subsequent non-industrial accident in 2010 (see below), his SSDI 
application was eventually approved. 
52. Follow-up with Dr. Ludwig. On August 7, 2006, Claimant followed up with 
Dr. Ludwig. His cervical sprain was unchanged, with some stiffness but not much interference 
with his range of motion. He still had tenderness over his occiput and claimed he could make his 
legs go numb by pressing on it. With respect to his low back, Claimant had numbness and 
tingling in his right leg and left posterior calf and thigh. Claimant's recent EMG testing revealed 
no evidence of acute denervation of his left leg. On exam, Claimant's Achilles reflex testing 
revealed symmetric results, and he no longer demonstrated adverse neural tension to seated 
slump examination. Claimant walked without significant foot drop. Dr. Ludwig noted some 
twitching of the left medial gastrocnemius, but no edema or swelling. Claimant had a little 
crepitus over his posterior cervical spine to active motion, with no instability and no upper limb 
weakness. 
53. Dr. Ludwig diagnosed, among other things, multi-level lumbar degenerative disc 
disease. Given Claimant's EMG results, he was uncertain whether his L4-5 herniated disc was 
acute. He wrote, "Interval development of a left L4-5 herniated nucleus pulposus without 
evidence of acute denervation. It is unclear if this actually [sic] from his trauma or if he had 
developed this in the interval." JE-22. "At this point, the L4-5 [ ... herniation] does not appear to 
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acute in it is not acute denervation potentials into the 
Ludwig also that Claimant's was stable. that Claimant 
would reach medical stability from his July 2006 injuries about a month, prescribed pain 
medications, including gabapentin and 50 hydrocodone pills, and returned him to modified duty 
work. "I do feel that Roy has a number of medical problems pre-dating his on-the-job injury 
which are contributing to his ongoing problems including his peripheral neuropathy and known 
right SI radiculopathy." JE-23. 
54. On August 24, 2006, Dr. Ludwig agam evaluated Claimant. Since the last 
examination, Dr. Ludwig learned that Claimant obtained unauthorized refills of his prescription 
pain medication.2 Accordingly, he ceased Claimant's Lortab prescription and looked into 
Claimant's past medical records, which evidenced 1) Dr. Lea's opinion in April 1988 that 
Claimant demonstrated significant symptom amplification, and 2) left leg numbness following 
his 2003 spinal fusion surgery, among other things. Dr. Ludwig administered Waddell's testing 
on exam, which he detailed in his report and summarized was "positive by multiple accounts." 
JE-29. 
55. Dr. Ludwig opined that Claimant's cervical sprain appears acute on his July 2006 
MRI, but those findings are insufficient to explain his current cervical symptoms of tingling in 
his hands, in his legs with motion, and when pressing on his back. Along those lines, he noted 
Claimant's "motion with distraction is significantly improved as opposed to his motion during 
active testing." JE-30. With respect to Claimant's left leg numbness, "His interval MRI does 
show a left L4-5 disc extrusion but there is no correlation with his electromyelogram findings 
2 Dr. Ludwig believed at the time that Claimant had altered his prescription to obtain more narcotic pain medication. 
By the time of his deposition, however, the parties agreed that Claimant's friend had admitted to altering the 
prescription to obtain more medication for Claimant. 
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and given his symptom amplification and denial of previous symptoms despite documented 
of this is a new complaint 
of injury." Id. "At this point I feel that the patient is manifesting significant symptom 
amplification of his relatively benign injuries." Id. Dr. Ludwig opined Claimant had reached 
maximum medical improvement (MMI), recommended an impainnent evaluation, and released 
Claimant to modified duty work of "no significant repetitive bending or heavy lifting due to his 
ongoing condition of chronic S 1 radiculopathy on the right as well as his history of lumbar 
fusion, but not due to his date of injury of 07/03/2006." Id. 
56. At his deposition, however, Dr. Ludwig had softened his stance. "I do not know 
whether or not that disc herniation occurred with his work injury dated 7 /3/06 and whether or not 
the surgery recommended by Dr. Dirks is required for the work injury or for the preexisting 
condition." Ludwig Dep., p. 34. He pointed out that disc herniations are not always due to a 
traumatic event, and can be due to degeneration. Although Claimant's MRI showed an L4-5 disc 
herniation impacting the nerve, Claimant's response to the diagnostic nerve block did not 
confirm that this was the source of his pain, and his EMG did not suggest any acute nerve 
damage, which Dr. Ludwig opined would be expected. "So I had nothing at that point to date his 
pain or the change of the disk at the L4-5 level to his date of injury. It was new since '04. That 
was all I knew." Id., p. 74. 
57. Dr. Ludwig did not consider somatoform disorder in diagnosing Claimant's 
conditions. Somatoform disorder as "[a] pain process that is - - has a large psychogenic 
component not necessarily from a[n] anatomic defect or disease." Ludwig Dep., p. 92. 
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the end of his deposition, 
to the 2006 industrial and 
that the L3-4, L4-5 bi-level fusion performed by Dr. Dirks in 2007 was reasonable. His change 
of hemi was based upon new information, including Dr. Dirks' opinion, Claimant's history of 
left leg radicular symptoms (indicating a chronic problem), and Claimant's pre-injury 
functionality as depicted on the Safety Video. "His previous level of function was - - did not 
appear to be significantly inhibited by his stenosis that was known to be present at that time. So 
being the new change being [sic] the disc herniation, that appears to be what was likely due to 
his injury dated 7/3/06." Ludwig Dep., p. 114. 
59. September 11, 2006 IME (Dr. Stevens). On September 11, 2006, Claimant 
underwent an independent medical evaluation (IME) at Surety's behest by Craig Stevens, M.D., 
a physiatrist. Dr. Stevens reviewed medical records pertaining to Claimant's pre-existing 
conditions prior to examining Claimant. He apparently did not have the chart note 
corresponding to Claimant's initial evaluation by Dr. Katovich or Dr. Ludwig's records prior to 
July 12, 2006, but he did review the July 2006 cervical spine x-ray films and the July 11, 2006 
cervical and lumbar spine MRI films. 
60. Claimant reported continuing back and neck pain. 
61. On exam, Dr. Stevens noted positive Waddell's signs and nondermatomal sensory 
loss, among other things. Dr. Stevens found Claimant's presentation lacking in credibility: 
I did note signs of malingering and symptom magnification, in particular the 
positive Waddell's signs as noted above with multiple inconsistencies noted on 
the physical examination including inconsistency of SLR, nondermatomal sensory 
loss, described pain m1d numbness of the entire left leg with grams of pressure 
applied to the top of his head and description of increased low back pain on 
various postural maneuvers that in no manner stress the low back. 
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Stevens that controlled a possible 
out 
considerations: 
Id 
I have come to these conclusions independent of his previous medical records 
which reveal multiple previous workmen's compensation claims which I feel may 
cause me to become biased in my approach to this evaluation. I tried to maintain 
an unbiased approach and come to my conclusions separately from knowledge of 
those previous events. 
62. Dr. Stevens diagnosed chronic pre-existing cervical and lumbar disc degeneration 
and left S 1 radiculopathy. In addition, he diagnosed cervical strain (temporary and now 
medically stable), as a result of the July 3, 2006 industrial accident, with no permanent 
impairment related to his industrial injury and no recommendation for further treatment. 
"Certainly he may eventually experience some increase in impairment as a result of his 
progressive lumbar degenerative disc disease but again no further impairment has occurred as a 
result of the date of injury of July 3, 2006." JE-46. 
63. Dr. Stevens also noted, in his answers to questions posed by counsel for Surety, 
that Claimant's prior injuries precluded him from heavy lifting and heavy work. "Certainly it 
had already been established previously that the claimant not engage in heavy lifting or heavy 
work because of his prior injuries. It is very likely that, if the claimant were not to engage in 
such work, he would be less likely to have sustained cervical strains or other injuries such as 
occurred on the date associated with this injury." JE-46. 
64. Additional treatment sought by Claimant (Drs. Norce and Dirks). On 
September 11, 2006, Claimant consulted Brian Norce, D.C., who referred him to Dr. Dirks. (As 
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discussed, above, Claimant had previously seen 
regarding 
in 2004.) 
on September 18, 
Dirks and his nurse 
long-standing pain and numbness in his right heel, for which he was taking Neurontin, as well as 
details concerning his industrial accident. He had some neck and elbow pain, and back pain, and 
he reported that his left leg just did not work anymore. Dr. Dirks' nurse practitioner diagnosed 
neck pain without radiculopathy ("He does have a disc bulge at C5-6, but this does not seem to 
be clinically significant for the patient") and back pain with a radicular component and weakness 
("left leg sensory dysesthesias, longstanding in the right leg, correlating with MRI findings of 
disc bulges at L3-4 and L4-5 with moderate to severe neural foraminal [sic] as well as central 
canal stenosis from L3 to L5"). JE-54. 
65. On September 26, 2006, Dr. Dirks recommended lumbar fusion surgery, from L3 
to L5 with decompression. On October 5, 2006, Claimant left a telephone message for Dr. Dirks 
advising that his left leg was sore, and very weak. Claimant sought an estimate for surgery, 
because Surety denied benefits for further treatment. On November 10, 2006, Dr. Dirks wrote to 
Claimant's attorney, "Roy Green has bee [sic] a patient of mine for quite some time ... .I believe 
his current injury in his lower back requiring surgical intervention, which would include a 
lumbar decompression and fusion from L3 to L5, is directly related to his worker's compensation 
injury that he sustained on July 3, 2006." JE-59. At his 2012 deposition, Dr. Dirks reasoned that 
the changes demonstrated on Claimant's July 2006 MRI, in comparison to his former MRI 
studies, were consistent with further injury to Claimant's lumbar spine due to a tree falling on his 
head in July 2006. 
So if I put together the mechanism of injury, in this case the tree falling on him, 
the temporary relationship of that, knowing I have a previous MRI before that 
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does not show a herniated disc, then on a 51 percent basis or better, I have to 
the accident caused the current problem and caused to come and see me, 
which culminated the onr,>yofl 
2012 Dirks Dep., p. 20. 
66. On October 4, 2006, Dr. Ludwig responded to a letter from Surety's counsel, 
essentially confirming opinions he set forth previously in Claimant's chart. 
67. By the time of his deposition in January 2007, Claimant had two employees to 
assist him at work (instead of his usual one) because he had to hire someone to replace himself. 
Claimant testified that he had no problems driving out to the job sites or managing his business. 
His symptoms included peripheral neuropathy in his right foot, shocks and nerve damage in his 
calf from his prior injury; right-sided pain from his spine surgery; "dead" feeling left leg with 
pins and needles (new with the 2006 accident); and grinding noises and pain in his neck and low 
back. 
68. Claimant never returned to manual logging work. 
69. Lumbar fusion surgery, L3 to LS (February 21, 2007). Following Dr. Dirks' 
surgical recommendation, Claimant underwent testing with Bruce Woodall, M.D., a family 
practitioner, to obtain medical clearance. On January 31, 2007, noting Claimant was a heavy 
smoker, Dr. Woodall diagnosed chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) with acute 
bronchitis, which he treated with Rocephin. No PPI has been assessed to Claimant's COPD. In 
response to Claimant's request for pain medication, Dr. Woodall prescribed 120 Lortab pills. 
However, he declined to undertake long-term management of Claimant's pain. 
70. On February 21, 2007, Claimant underwent a bi-level lumbar fusion with 
decompression surgery, from L3 to L5, with Dr. Dirks. Claimant's recovery was complicated by 
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at 
17, 2007, Dr. 1 reported 
Claimant was doing fine in regard to his back, but still had "complaints of leg pain from 
before and he has low back pain." JE-103. On exam, Claimant had good leg strength and was 
walking. Also, "He has right-sided neck pain that goes into the right arm and makes it feel like 
jelly," with right deltoid, triceps, and biceps weakness on exam. Id. 
71. Cervical fusion surgery at CS-6 (Julv 16, 2007). Dr. Dirks ordered a new 
cervical spine MRI, performed on May 23, 2007. The images demonstrated motion; however, 
the radiologist reported they revealed bony changes at C3-4, C4-5, and C5-6, as well as 
"moderate narrowing of the bilateral C3-C4 neuroforamen and moderate narrowing of the C5-C6 
right neural foramen." JE-104. On June 7, 2007, Claimant continued to have pain in his neck 
and down his right arm "since his accident." JE-106. Claimant explained that previously, when 
he had neck pain, he could alleviate it by lying on a rolled-up towel. After his 2006 industrial 
injury, however, this procedure provided no relief "If I lay on that towel now with stenosis, or 
whatever is going on in there now, I can't - - everything goes numb." 2007 CL Dep., pp. 26-27. 
72. Upon review of the latest MRI, Dr. Dirks opined Claimant's neck and right arm 
complaints were the result of a "right, greater than left, radicular component correlating with a 
C5-6 disk bulge on the right." JE-110. Dr. Dirks recommended an anterior cervical discectomy 
and fusion at C5-6 with plating and cadaver bone. He attributed the need for surgery to the 2006 
industrial injury. 
73. On June 14, 2007, Claimant sought pam medications from Dr. Woodall. 
Dr. Woodall complied, cautiously, by prescribing 60 Lortab pills and 10 Duragesic patches, 
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lS 
repeatedly conflicting demands." 
strongly encouraged Claimant to quit smoking in order to prevent progression of his 
and reduce his chronic pain. Dr. Woodall again provided pain medication to Claimant on June 
28, 2007 (100 Norco 7.5 mg., 1-2 every six hours as needed, or 100 per month, with two refills). 
"Patient understands that I am only providing analgesics until Dr. Dirks gives him definitive 
treatment." JE-13 5. 
74. On July 16, 2007, Claimant underwent cervical fusion surgery, at C5-6, with 
Dr. Dirks. A week later, Claimant sought stronger pain medication from Dr. Dirks for continued 
right arm pain and mostly posterior bilateral shoulder pain. Claimant was also experiencing 
numbness into his hands. Dr. Dirks prescribed Norco 10. On August 7, 2007, Claimant sought 
pain medication from Dr. Woodall, who prescribed MS Contin and Duragesic patches. "He has 
an appointment with Dr. Dirks for follow-up on 08/30 .... Patient anticipates that he will ask 
Dr. Dirks to make a referral to a pain management center. If Dr. Dirks declines, we will make 
the referral as my continuing to provide him with large quantities of synthetic opiates for a 
permanent condition is not an option." JE-135. Dr. Woodall also noted, "In February he had 
L3-L5 fusion which he states was fabulously successful and alleviated his lower body pain." Id 
75. On August 14, 2007, Dr. Dirks observed that Claimant was doing better pain-
wise, having procured MS Contin, a long-acting pain reliever, from Dr. Woodall. However, he 
still had pain across his shoulders. Dr. Dirks prescribed physical therapy, twice weekly for four 
weeks. Claimant did not follow up. 
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approached Woodall for 
As with encounter for the past year, patient is in seeking pain 
medications .... Taking him at his word that he sees Dr. Dirks on 09/13, I provided 
MS Contin ... Since chronic pain management with opiates such as MS Contin is 
not part of my practice scope, I will not be providing any opiate narcotics for 
patient beyond today. If this issue is not addressed with Dr. Dirks, patient will 
need to see a pain management consultant or perhaps seek a different primary 
care provider. 
JE-137. 
77. Surveillance video (September 11 and 12, 2007). Surveillance video taken 
September 11, 2007 shows Claimant, alone, backing his boat and trailer into the water, getting in 
and out of his truck multiple times, jumping from his truck cab a few feet over to the dock to 
avoid getting into the water, tugging on the boat to get it off the trailer, lowering himself to his 
stomach on the dock to retrieve a hubcap from the water, and other activities. It is not apparent 
that Claimant ever bent at the spine below approximately shoulder-level. He maintained a 
straight low and mid spine throughout his activities. Claimant thinks he was wearing a back 
brace. In addition, he recalls wearing a Fentanyl patch and having taken morphine, an anti-
inflarnmatory, Gabapentin, and Neurontin that day. 
78. Video footage taken September 12 shows Claimant carrying a gallon of milk in 
his right hand and a small sack in the other. When he got to his pickup, he smoothly lifted the 
milk jug to chest-height and tossed it into the passenger seat. Claimant described his symptoms 
Well, I was ruined. My shoulder would get - - it was the weirdest thing. It would 
get so bad that I couldn't move. All my body wanted to do was lay there with 
heat on it. And after a couple days of that, I could go out and do some - - you 
know. I was trying -- the more I - ifl used it, it would get better. That's what I 
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79. In 201 Dr. Dirks opined that Claimant's functionality as depicted in the 
surveillance videos was consistent with his recollection of Claimant's presentation, on pain 
medication, on August 14, 2007. As discussed below, Drs. Zoltani and Barnard disagreed. They 
opined these videos evidenced what they had already concluded based upon their evaluation of 
Claimant: that he was faking his symptoms. 
80. MRis of cervical and lumbar spine {September 12, 2007). On September 12, 
2007, Claimant underwent MRis of his cervical and lumbar spine. The cervical studies revealed 
slight anterior subluxation of C4 relative to C5 with flexion. The lumbar studies revealed a well-
seated L3-5 laminectomy and posterior fusion with no definite subluxation on flexion or 
extension, as well as an unchanged T12-Ll right-sided bone graft with metallic plates and 
screws. 
81. Pain management. On September 13, 2007, Claimant returned to Dr. Dirks, who 
provided him with a prescription for 20 Norco tablets with instructions to make them last for at 
least a couple of weeks. He also referred Claimant to Dr. Magnuson for pain management. "He 
is hurting quite a bit in his neck and along the top of his shoulders .... He is difficult to assess 
because he hurts so much." JE-123. 
82. MRI of cervical spine {September 19, 2007) and EMG study {October 2007). 
Due to ongoing neck pain complaints, Dr. Dirks ordered another cervical MRI, which was 
performed on September 19, 2007. It demonstrated mild narrowing of the bilateral C3-4 neural 
foramina, with no significant impinging lesions. Dr. Dirks summarized, " ... good decompression 
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evidence Dirks 
no atrophy arms a 
back was doing quite nicely. At Claimant's attorney's prompting, Dr. Dirks ordered an EMG 
study to further evaluate Claimant's nerve condition. On October 30, following the EMG study, 
Dr. Dirks wrote, "As far as his arms are concerned, the EMG studies were unremarkable and do 
not show any sort ofradiculopathy." JE-129. He ordered a thoracic MRI to rule out problems at 
that level, "although I doubt this will be the case." Id. 
83. Pain management. On October 1, 2007, Claimant was evaluated by Scott 
Magnuson, M.D., a pain specialist. According to the chart note, the purpose of the visit was 
(contrary to Dr. Woodall's repeated instructions) "simply to have a recommendation back to 
Dr. Woodall to prescribe." JE-142. Following an examination, Dr. Magnuson recommended to 
Dr. Woodall that he continue prescribing pain medications for 3 to 6 months in tandem with 
physical therapy. Dr. Magnuson opined that Claimant had obtained good relief of his cervical 
radicular symptoms following surgery, but was now experiencing severe chronic myofascial pain 
in his shoulders and thoracic back area. 
84. On October 8, 2007, Claimant again sought pain medication from Dr. Woodall. 
This time, Claimant specifically requested oxycodone. Dr. Woodall complied, but reluctantly. 
"Chronic pain and opiate seeking behavior. I shared with him Dr. Magnuson's written 
communication of the non-advisability oflong-term opiate use ... Also at his request I am making 
a referral to a pain management consultant in Moscow who may be more willing to accept his 
management than Dr. Magnuson was." JE-136. He also noted that, as far back as 2003, 
Claimant had been receiving large amounts of narcotic pain medications. The record does not 
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2006. 
85. On October 18, 2007, Claimant was reporting bilateral shoulder pain, neck pain, 
and bilateral arm weakness, worse on the right. An EMG nerve conduction test by R. Clinton 
Horan, M.D., revealed mild nerve conduction abnormalities that he opined did not meet criteria 
for an entrapment neuropathy, and are of questionable clinical significance. An underlying 
peripheral neuropathy could not be ruled out, but would be unlikely to explain arm weakness. 
No electrodiagnostic evidence of cervical radiculopathy or brachial plexopathy existed. 
86. On December 18, 2007, Dr. Woodall again declined to continue prescribing pain 
medications and advised Claimant to return to Dr. Magnuson or Dr. Dirks. Claimant also 
requested an MRI of his thoracic spine, as Dr. Dirks' request had been denied by Surety. 
(Dr. Woodall made the MRI recommendation; however, Surety denied this request, as well.) 
Ten days later, Claimant returned. He had been unable to get in to see Dr. Magnuson. 
Dr. Woodall prescribed ten days worth of MS Cantin to tide him over. 
87. On January 3, 2008, Dr. Dirks' nurse practitioner contacted Dr. Woodall's office 
to advise she had prescribed 40 Norco 7.5 mg. and concurrently advised Claimant that she would 
not prescribe any more pain medications and that he should not be going around to other 
physicians and "double dipping." JE-138. 
88. Continued right arm/shoulder and neck pain. Also on January 3, 2008, 
Dr. Dirks evaluated Claimant for right arm and shoulder pain, as well as neck pain. Dr. Dirks 
found "severe atrophy of his arm and in the deltoid and biceps area. He also has strength loss in 
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89. On January 10, 2008, Dr. McNulty evaluated Claimant's right shoulder. 
"[Claimant] states during the original injury he did not hurt his shoulder. He is having pain 
mostly in the trapezial area, radiating to his neck." JE-515. Dr. McNulty diagnosed tendonitis 
and injected Depo-Medrol and Lidocaine. He denied Claimant's request for narcotic pain 
medication. 
90. On January 16, 2008, Dr. Woodall declined to make an appointment for Claimant 
to discuss refilling his pain medication. Instead, he referred Claimant to Don Williams, D.O., for 
pain management. 
91. January 31, 2008 initial evaluation by Dr. Williams for pain management. 
Dr. Williams undertook Claimant's pain management treatment on January 31, 2008. At this 
visit, Claimant reported almost complete loss of use of his right shoulder. 
92. Thoracic MRI (February 5, 2008). On February 5, 2008, Claimant underwent a 
thoracic MRI, which revealed normal findings except for a small left posterior disc protrusion at 
the Tl0-11 level that mildly contoured the ventral aspect of the thecal sac on the left, resulting in 
mild encroachment of the inferior recess of the left neuroforamen. 
93. February 13, 2008 panel evaluation (Drs. Barnard and Zoltani). On 
February 13, 2008, Claimant underwent a panel evaluation arranged through Inland Medical 
Evaluations by Surety. The panelists were J. Greg Zoltani, M.D., a neurologist, and Michael 
Barnard, M.D., an orthopedist. The panelists reviewed Claimant's industrial injury-related 
medical records through December 18, 2007, when Dr. Woodall diagnosed chronic pain and 
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among other things: low back symptoms, neck pain and headaches, left hand and right arm 
numbness, chronic pain disorder in the absence of any objective organic cause, generalized 
axonal motor neuropathy (as suggested by EMG findings), thoracolumbar disc fusion followed 
by physician restrictions of no regular heavy lifting or bending at the waist plus a 
recommendation to obtain retraining assistance, residual right Sl radiculopathy (as demonstrated 
by November 1, 2004 EMG study), and multilevel degenerative changes (as demonstrated by 
lumbar spine MRis dated January 8, 2003 and November 10, 2004). Claimant brought in his 
February 2007 lumbar MRI films, but no cervical spine films. The panel also had a report of the 
February 2008 thoracic MRI identifying a small disc protrusion at Tl0-11. In addition, the 
panelists reviewed Dr. Dirks' December 23, 2004 deposition and interviewed and examined 
Claimant. 
94. According to the report, Claimant told the panel physicians that he was still 
having pain in his neck, mid back and low back, with crunching and snapping in his neck, and 
that his symptoms had worsened since his neck surgery. Also, "He notes that he had symptoms 
previous to this incident in both legs prior to his fusion at Tl 2-L 1, and following that surgery he 
had improvement in his left leg, but had no improvement in the right leg. He notes that 
following the incident, his left leg was then worse than the right." JE-166. 
95. Functionally, Claimant told the panel physicians that he was unable to do any 
neck or back exercises, clean fish, carry or lift items ("Even lifting a carton of milk would be 
impossible for him with the right arm," Id.), do bookwork (because he cannot look down), or 
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over to had 
the an upward 
included fishing, cooking (some), and walking out and getting the mail. 
in his pickup 
Claimant could do 
96. On entering the exam room, the panel physicians noted Claimant was lying on the 
exam table. Claimant's sensory exam revealed, among other things, "subjectively decreased" 
feeling in the right arm that "does not follow any specific dermatomal pattern," and was negative 
for Tinel's sign. Claimant had heavily callused hands. 
It is noted that the claimant's hands are not only callused but they are extremely 
heavily callused and extremely dirty. There is ground in dirt, there is subungual 
dirt, and there are heavy calluses which are discolored. The claimant states that 
all of the calluses on his hands, which are several millimeters thick, and all of the 
dirt is from a recent snowfall where he had to move snow. This is not possible. 
The Claimant is, in my opinion, purposefully misrepresenting his history. There 
is no way he would develop multiple thick calluses on his hands and fingers in the 
period of the last week. 
JE-169. 
97. During his orthopedic exam, Dr. Barnard noted, "The claimant moans, groans, 
grunts, and complains of pain throughout the entire examination, no matter what position he is 
in." JE-168. Claimant demonstrated positive Waddell's signs at the shoulders and in en bloc 
rotation, with complaints of severe pain. Claimant refused the lumbar range of motion test 
because he was unable to do it. Asked to demonstrate what he could do, Claimant rotated 
bilaterally approximately 30 degrees, but exhibited O degrees of flexion, extension, right tilt, and 
left tilt. "It is interesting to note that he would have to have far more motion in his lumbar spine 
to get on and off the table than demonstrated when he was asked to do so. These measurements 
are felt to be completely invalid, with no effort on the part of the claimant." JE-168. Likewise, 
Claimant's cervical range of motion testing was deemed invalid. Claimant complained of severe 
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and left rotation, as measured "When to active 
range of motion, the claimant does not paiiicipate fully in the examination. He claims he cannot 
move his shoulders." JE-169. However, with encouragement, Claimant demonstrated motion in 
all planes. "Again, it is felt that all of these measures are invalid, as the claimant does not appear 
to be participating fully and does appear to be manipulating the examiner." Id. "The claimant 
has 'total body jolting' with his movements. He has cogwheel motions with his neck, back, 
shoulders, etc., which are nonanatomical." Id. 
Overall, the orthopedic examiner found no objective findings consistent with the 
claimant's current complaints, and found multiple findings which I feel are 
manipulated by the patient and are false. I carmot give any valid rating for his 
neck, back, shoulders, etc., based upon my examination, as I do not feel the 
findings are correct. I am mystified by the claimant's statement that he does no 
work whatsoever and has not worked for several years, although he claims that 
calluses on his hands, which are obviously months or years old, are recent in the 
last snow storm. This is blatantly false. 
JE-170. 
98. The panel concluded that Claimant was medically stable from his 2006 industrial 
accident. Drs. Barnard and Zoltani opined Claimant's subjective complaints were far out of 
proportion to any objective findings, that he is more functional than he reports he is, and that he 
inaccurately reported his symptoms in relation to his prior injuries and pre-existing conditions, 
including chronic pain syndrome. Further, Claimant suffered only muscle strains that had 
resolved, with no permanent aggravation of any pre-existing conditions, and no permanent 
impairment as a result of his 2006 industrial injury. 
99. The panel approved Claimant to return to his time-of-injury job as a full-time 
owner/operator of his salvage logging company, as described on a Job Site Evaluation (JSE) 
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without indicated Claimant needs to 
to two day to reach his job the to pounds 
frequently and 51 to pounds rarely; bend/stoop, twist, and reach at shoulder height or below 
continuously; climb, kneel, reach at shoulder height or above, and grasp/handle frequently; finely 
manipulate/finger occasionally; and crouch rarely. 
100. Subsequently, Drs. Barnard and Zoltani reviewed the September 11, 2007 
surveillance video depicting Claimant launching his boat. They appended individual notes to the 
end of the panel report in which each, in the strongest possible terms, opined that Claimant lied 
in his IME and that he is not disabled. According to Dr. Barnard: 
There is no doubt in this examiner's ... mind that the claimant is willfully and 
deliberately misrepresenting his claim for secondary gain. He has, in my opinion, 
absolutely nothing to justify his cun-ent claimed disability ... .It is impossible to 
believe that a person with his claimed disabilities could do any of these activities, 
which included jumping out of a pickup truck onto a stone wall, pulling on a 
leader for the boat, and launching the boat by himself. His activities, as 
demonstrated in the video, demonstrate in my opinion complete and total 
misrepresentation on his part. 
JE-172 to 173. According to Dr. Zoltani: 
JE-173. 
The diagnosis he best fits at this time is a willful misrepresentation of his medical 
condition to his providers. It is our opinion that this further confirms our opinions 
that he is fully capable of continuous gainful work activity and is not in need of 
any formal treatment to his spine nor is it indicated that he should continue to 
receive narcotic medications. 
101. February 21, 2008: Claimant reached MMI as per Dr. Dirks. Dr. Dirks 
opined that Claimant reached MMI following his July 3, 2006 industrial accident on February 
21, 2008 (one year following his February 2007 lumbar spine surgery). 
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1 thoracic and 
make an at not to somebody 
back to work with a labor, heavy lifting position. 2012 Dirks Dep., pp. 10-1 L However, 
he speculated that Claimant could have probably returned to work in some capacity as of 
February 2008. 
103. Dr. Dirks believes Claimant would be back at work, apparently in his time-of-
injury position, if he had not injured his lumbar spine in 2006 . 
. . . lf you talk to [Claimant] now I don't think he has a lot of complaints in the 
cervical region. I don't think - let's put it this way. lf you measure what I was 
saying about the success of the surgery or not, if he just had had the cervical 
surgery do I think he would be back to work today. [sic] Yes. 
Dirks Dep., p. 23. 
104. Functional capacity evaluation by Dr. Williams. On February 28, 2008, 
Dr. Williams prepared an estimate of Claimant's physical capabilities at Surety's request. He 
opined that, in an eight-hour workday, Claimant could sit a total of two hours, stand one hour out 
of each four-hour segment, and walk one hour out of each four-hour segment. He could carry up 
to five pounds continuously (67% to 100% of the day), up to 10 pounds occasionally (2% to 33% 
of the day), and up to 20 pounds seldom (0 to 1 % of the day). (See JE-155.) In addition, 
Claimant could occasionally bend, squat, kneel, crawl, and crouch, but could not reach above 
shoulder level at all. Dr. Williams did not restrict Claimant's left hand use, but opined that he 
could not push, pull, or execute fine manipulations or simple grasping with his right hand. Dr. 
Williams opined Claimant could work at unprotected heights and around moving machinery, and 
in environments with marked changes in temperature and humidity. As well, Dr. Williams 
opined Claimant could drive automotive equipment. 
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1 2008, Williams opined that Claimant was unable to return to his 
anticipated ~·~·"'"M"' another to reach medical stability 
and, in the meantime, would require ongoing care. 
106. CT myelogram of cervical and thoracic spine (April 10, 2008). On March 25, 
2008, Claimant sought treatment from Dr. Dirks for ongoing pain in his neck and down his right 
arm primarily, but also into the left arm. Dr. Dirks ordered a CT myelogram. 
107. On April 10, 2008, Claimant underwent a CT myelogram of his cervical and 
thoracic spine. The cervical myelogram demonstrated small ventral impressions on the thecal 
sac at the C4, 5, 6, and 7 levels consistent with small disc protrusions, with normal filling of the 
nerve root sleeves. The thoracic myelogram returned results within nonnal limits. "There are no 
significant abnormal impressions on the thecal sac." JE-293. The post myelogram CT of the 
thoracic spine revealed a moderate, focal, central disc protrusion at Tl 0-11. "The protrusion, in 
combination with posterior osteophytic spurring results in ventral impression on the thecal sac 
with abutment and mild contouring of the ventral cord. The clinical significance of this lesion is 
uncertain." JE-288. The post myelogram CT of the cervical spine revealed facet joint 
arthropathy at C3-4 on the right and at C7 and Tl on the left, as well as small focal central disc 
protrusions at C4-5 and C6-7. "These result in mild contouring of the ventral thecal sac but do 
not appear to significantly focally impinge on the neural structures." JE-297. 
108. On April 22, 2008, Dr. Dirks opined, "His CT scans of his cervical and thoracic 
spines do not show any evidence of neural element compression at this time. They show good 
decompression where the surgical sites are." JE-298. Nevertheless, because Claimant continued 
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see him back following studies." Id 
109. MRis of cervical and thoracic spine (April 25, 2008). On April 2008, 
Claimant underwent MRls of his cervical and thoracic spine. At the cervical level, there was 
broad-based bulging (a protruding disc), accentuated on the extension views at C4-5, abutting the 
ventral cord. In addition, foraminal stenosis was noted at this level and mild subluxation 
between the flexion and extension data suggested ligamentous laxity at C4-5. "Facet arthrosis 
may contribute to the listhesis." JE-299. At the thoracic level, a broad-based leftward eccentric 
spondylotic disc protrusion at Tl 0-11 effacing the ventral and leftward aspect of the thecal sac, 
along with mild foraminal encroachment, was identified. "Otherwise, spondylosis is of mild 
severity and includes shallow noncompressive spondylotic disc displacements at several levels 
without central or lateralizing soft disc herniation or soft disc extrusion." JE-300. 
110. On May 8, 2008, Dr. Dirks opined, "His cervical and thoracic spine MRis shows 
[sic] multilevel minimal disk degeneration. He shows good postoperative decompression." JE-
301. Dr. Dirks recommended no treatment, but instructed Claimant to follow up in three months. 
He also encouraged Claimant to file for SSDI "as he hurts and is not able to do any heavy labor 
activity at this time. He has had multiple surgeries on his cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spines 
and I believe he is disabled and unable to return back to work at this time." JE-301. Dr. Dirks 
was apparently unaware that Claimant had been pursuing an SSDI award since July 2006. 
111. Dr. Williams continued to treat Claimant periodically with narcotic pam 
medications and osteopathic manipulations for his lumbar, thoracic, and cervical pain, as well as 
for his right shoulder pain and rotator cuff-like symptoms. 
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1 1 authored to Claimant's counsel, apparently 
posed. wrote following 
records and films, did not believe that the current MRI findings were contributing to 
Claimant's cmTent symptoms or that further surgical intervention was warranted. He opined that 
physical therapy, injection therapy, and anti-inflammatory medication were reasonable options to 
treat Claimant's neck pain. 
113. On July 21, 2008, Dr. Williams took Claimant off logging work for six months. 
114. On August 7, 2008, Dr. Dirks wrote an open letter confirming that he does not 
believe Claimant can return to his time-of-injury job and that he suggested Claimant file for 
SSDI. The coffesponding chart note indicates that, on exam that day, Claimant had good 
strength and his incision was well-healed. Claimant was seeing a chiropractor, "which seems to 
help him as far as keeping his head in alignment." JE-304. 
115. On October 1, 2008, Dr. Ganz evaluated Claimant, at Claimant's request. 
Following review of Claimant's imaging and an examination, Dr. Ganz opined that Claimant's 
persistent neck pain is due to musculoskeletal factors, not neurogenic causes. To be certain, he 
recommended an EMG study "to confirm that there is no radicular component to his pain." JE-
309. He recommended that Claimant get back into physical therapy. "After his neck surgery he 
only had two sessions ... and then he quit because it hurt. I have explained to him that the muscle 
spasm is the main cause of his pain and that he needs to give therapy another try and I think his 
symptoms will significantly improve." JE-309. He wrote Claimant a prescription for physical 
therapy two to three times per week for six to eight weeks. Dr. Ganz also opined that Claimant 
should not return to logging work or heavy labor because of his prior back surgeries. "The only 
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to most likely surgery the 
116. On November 11, 2008, counsel for Defendants enclosed the February 2008 IME 
report in a letter to Dr. Dirks seeking information regarding an impairment rating. Dr. Dirks did 
not respond because he does not do impairment ratings. At his 2012 deposition, he could not 
recall anything about the IME report. 
117. Also in November 2008, Claimant underwent an appendectomy. He does not 
allege that this procedure was related to an industrial injury. No related PPI was assessed, and 
no permanent medical restrictions were issued. 
118. Functional capacity evaluation by Mark Bengston, MPT (March 31, 2009 
and April 2, 2009). On March 31, 2009 and April 2, 2009, Claimant underwent a functional 
capacity evaluation (FCE) by Mark Bengston, MPT, at the request of Claimant's attorney, to 
determine his physical abilities and limitations. Mr. Bengston opined that Claimant gave 100% 
maximal effort on all test items, that his performance was consistent among FCE items, as well 
as from the first to the second day of testing (indicating Claimant should be able to perform at 
the tested levels sustainably day-to-day), and that his functional abilities as measured by the 
Spinal Function Sort were consistent with his perceived abilities, among other things. Mr. 
Bengston administered Waddell's tests, opining that five of five were negative. 
119. Mr. Bengston opined that Claimant had high hand function and coordination, 
"occasional" sitting tolerance, "frequent" walking tolerance, and "prolonged tolerance to activity 
was noted with a myriad of position and activity changes instead of maintaining sustained 
postures and repetitive lifting and Right [sic] hand use." JE-679. Claimant could sit/stand/walk 
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with frequent position changes, at a set Claimant, for up to hours per 
addition, Claimant 30 pounds rarely pounds occasionally or 
frequently), and could bend and stoop occasionally. However, Mr. Bengston also opined that 
Claimant was significantly limited in activities requiring him to shift from a neutral spine 
position (i.e., bending, twisting), as well as in repetitive grasping and handling with his right 
hand, due to right cervical pain and numbness in the C7 distribution. 
120. Given Claimant's limitations, Mr. Bengston did not entirely rule out the 
possibility of Claimant someday returning to logging, but given "the large discrepancy between 
[Claimant's] abilities and job demands," he may be better off to look for alternate employment, 
rather than to attempt to rehabilitate himself to his prior level of function. 
121. On May 7, 2009, Dr. Dirks had an informal conversation with Claimant about his 
right shoulder. Claimant asked for a right shoulder MRI, and Dr. Dirks complied by making the 
recommendation. "I have suggested that he get this looked at in the past." JE-314. Also, 
Dr. Dirks commented, "He is actually happy with his neck and his back at this stage." JE-314. 
122. On September 8, 2009, Claimant underwent an IME by John McNulty, M.D., an 
orthopedic surgeon. Following a medical records review and examination of Claimant, 
Dr. McNulty opined that the injuries requiring surgeries in 2007 were due to the 2006 industrial 
accident. "The mechanism of injury of being hit on the head with a tree in parts [sic] axial load 
throughout his spine. The injuries he sustained to his cervical and lumbar spine that resulted in 
surgical treatment are on a more probable than not basis the result of being struck on the head by 
a tree." JE-331. 
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"'"',.""" impairment to spine condition and 20% whole person impairment to 
lumbar spine condition. He did not apportion any impairment to pre-existing degeneration 
because he believed this was asymptomatic prior to the industrial injury. In the event Claimant 
is found to have lumbar impairment due to his prior accident, Dr. McNulty opined this should be 
subtracted from his lumbar impairment rating for apportionment purposes. 
124. Regarding the right shoulder, Dr. McNulty found evidence of muscle atrophy, 
weakness and limited movement on exam. He also noted that Claimant had an injection in 
January 2008 that did not relieve his symptoms. Given Claimant's report that he fell on his 
shoulder in the accident (which is notably inconsistent with earlier notes stating Claimant did not 
injure his shoulder in the 2006 accident), Dr. McNulty recommended a right shoulder MRI to 
evaluate Claimant's rotator cuff. 
125. Dr. McNulty agreed with Mr. Bengston's FCE findings, opining that Claimant 
should not engage in heavy physical activities such as logging due to his thoracic and lumbar 
fusions. "He should not engage in heavy physical activities such as logging. He is more suited 
to work in a light job duty category as outlined in the FCE." JE-332. 
126. Although Dr. McNulty summarized medical records in which other physicians 
doubted his credibility, including the panel IME report, he did not comment on them or, 
apparently, administer any validity testing on exam. 
127. On September 10, 2009, Dr. Dirks opined that Claimant could not return to his 
time-of-injury job, as defined in the ICRD JSE previously approved by the IME panel 
physicians. He also disapproved, without comment, JSEs provided by Mr. Brownell for 
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and small engme mechanic. On 
to Claimant's which 
indicated he agreed with Mr. Bengston's 
right shoulder MRl. 
of March 31-April 2009 and recommended a 
128. On November 18, 2009, Claimant underwent an MRI of his right shoulder. The 
radiologist opined there was no evidence of discrete rotator cuff tear; however, the imaging did 
reveal tendinopathy of the supraspinatus and infraspinatus tendons, as well as mild 
acromioclavicular mihropathy. On January 14, 2010, Dr. McNulty opined that Claimant had 
chronic tendinitis in his right shoulder and offered an injection, which Claimant declined. "It 
appears he did not have a significant injury to the shoulder as a result of the 7/3/2006 injury. He 
does not require any further treatment related to that accident." JE-515. 
129. On January 28, 2010, Dr. Williams diagnosed Claimant with depression, 
prescribed Effexor and discussed coping strategies. Claimant had lost his ambition, was stressed 
about finances and the prospect of losing his house to foreclosure, and felt like a burden to his 
family. He had initiated bankruptcy paperwork. After a couple of months, Claimant no longer 
took Effexor because he did not believe it helped. 
130. Psychological evaluation {April 13, 2010). On April 13, 2010, Claimant was 
evaluated by Tim Rehnberg, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, at Claimant's SSDI attorney's 
request. Dr. Rehnberg administered psychometric testing and interviewed Claimant. Test results 
revealed no clinically significant match with malingering criteria. However, Claimant did 
produce scores clinically significant for identifying somatization, depression, acute stress, 
affective and psychological symptoms of depression, somatoform disorder, Cluster 8 ( often seen 
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persons 
diagnoses 
reaction. 
marked concerns about physical functioning, most commonly associated 
somatoform disorder, adjustment disorder and dysthymia), and 
131. Although Dr. Rehnberg was informed that a prior IME had resulted in an opinion 
that Claimant was exaggerating his symptoms and that he had previously been accused of 
manipulating his prescriptions, the actual IME report was not provided for review. Likewise, 
neither Dr. Lea's records, nor the panel IME report were provided. These omissions undercut his 
ultimate opinion that "[t]here was nothing in the clinical interview, medical record or current 
testing that would indicate that he is malingering or exaggerating his current physical and 
psychological symptoms." JE-376. 
132. Dr. Rehnberg diagnosed Claimant \\,ith a pam disorder associated with both 
psychological factors and a general medical condition (chronic), adjustment disorder with 
depressed mood (chronic, in response to his chronic physical health issues), sleep disorder due to 
chronic pain (insomnia sub-type), and nicotine dependence. In addition, he opined that Claimant 
has psychosocial stressors from occupational, financial and health care access problems, as well 
as Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores of 50 (current) and 50 (highest). 
Dr. Rehnberg did not explain his diagnoses. Specifically, he did not discuss how Claimant's 
pain disorder affects his perception or reporting of pain to his physicians, if at all. 
133. On April 23, 2010, Dr. Williams completed a fill-in-the-blank worksheet provided 
by Claimant's Social Security benefits attorney. Among other things, Dr. Williams opined that 
Claimant could only do seated work for four hours out of every eight-hour day. 
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fell a while at a reigniting his back and neck pam, as as 
radiculopathy into his leg. Cervical and lumbar spine MRis taken that day raised the 
question of a C-4 fracture versus an imaging artifact. They also identified mild grade 1 cervical 
anterolisthesis, and no evidence of lumbar fracture or static evidence of lumbar instability. A CT 
of Claimant's cervical spine the next day revealed no evidence of cervical fracture, C3-4 facet 
arthrosis, mild dextroscoliosis, or cervical spondylosis, and he had "adequately patent neural 
foramina at all levels." JE-393. 
135. Thereafter, Dr. Williams prescribed either Lortab or Norco in addition to MS 
Cantin for Claimant's pain. In March 2011, he referred Claimant to Dr. Dirks for a surgical 
consultation and increased Claimant's restrictions to no lifting over ten pounds, with bending, 
lifting, and twisting only seldom. 
136. EMG nerve conduction study (May 9, 2011). On May 9, 2011, Claimant 
underwent an EMG nerve conduction study by Ken Young, D.O., to help sort out the etiology of 
his new complaints of left lower extremity symptoms. Dr. Young opined the results 
demonstrated "left sided lumbar radiculopathy mainly involving the lower lumbar and sacral 
region on that side. Right lower extremity reveals residual chronic neuropathy without any 
active lumbar involvement currently." JE-396. 
137. Spinal fusion surgery at L3-S1 by Dr. Dirks (April 2012). Claimant underwent 
another fusion surgery with Dr. Dirks in April 2012. The procedure required removal of his 
prior lumbar fusion hardware at L3-L5 to integrate L5-S 1. 
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138. 
Williams administered a questionnaire, the 
is a low-risk for opioid abuse or addiction. 
1, 
which he interpreted to mean Claimant 
139. On August 13, 2011, Dr. Williams wrote an open "Justification Letter" stating 
that Claimant is "unable to participate in any form of gainful employment for the next two years" 
due to his post-surgical status. JE-273. The corresponding chart note indicates the purpose of 
this letter was "to support getting government aid for housing." JE-274. 
140. Dr. Williams' chart notes following Claimant's 2012 lumbar spine surgery 
indicate he continued to have left foot numbness and lower extremity weakness, along with 
cervical, thoracic and lumbar pain. Around the end of 2012, Claimant's left foot and lower 
extremity symptoms apparently resolved. 
POST-INDUSTRIAL INJURY VOCATIONAL AND INCOME HISTORY 
141. Claimant was approved for SSDI benefits in 2012. 
142. Claimant remained in business until October 2008. He explained that he ceased 
operations because Jerry Pokriots, his most trusted employee, was off work with an injury, his 
Cat was broken down, he had been operating at a loss for several months, and he could not afford 
to pay a $12,000 workers' compensation bill coming due. So, he saw no other viable options. 
Claimant could not explain why his tax forms demonstrated he had substantial earnings during 
the two years following his industrial accident, even though Claimant was not doing any heavy 
logging work. 
143. To support himself after he closed his business, Claimant sold his equipment and 
whatever belongings he could. In October or November 2008, Claimant mortgaged his house 
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were spent, made one Eventually, foreclosure 
were initiated. He later filed for bankruptcy. 
144. Claimant did not look for work until the first part of 2009 because he did not 
believe there were any jobs he could do in the St. Maries area. His daughter brought him an 
application from a casino and he filled it out, but did not keep it current. He initially thought he 
could do security work there, or flagging work elsewhere, but changed his mind when he learned 
these jobs required constant standing. Claimant thought he could do millwork, but upon inquiry 
at a mill, he was told his condition presented too big of a liability. He applied for a job as a lead 
forester with the Coeur d'Alene Tribe in Plummer. "This one I went over there as soon as I seen 
it." TR2, p. 179. The application process included a two-hour exam testing Claimant's 
knowledge of topics like tree species and fire procedures. Claimant believed he aced the exam, 
but then he was required to demonstrate that he could walk a mile carrying a 45-pound fire 
fighting pack. This, Claimant could not do. He was disappointed: 
... another requirement was to know their land, where it is and whatnot, and from 
all the time I worked for Potlatch, man, designing the logging operations, it was 
right up my alley. It was perfect. And I was very disappointed about that. 
TR2, p. 181. 
145. Claimant was also listed with Job Service for a period, and he regularly perused 
the Nickel's Worth and the St. Maries Gazette for job listings. Claimant never found any listed 
openings for which he felt qualified, and no employer he approached ever offered him an 
interview or a job. 
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not an 2008 
concluded he could return to without restrictions. did not have an active file with Idaho 
Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (IDVR), apparently because he was unaware of how to go 
about initiating this. After the first part of 2009, he worked with Dan Brownell, vocational 
consultant, to find work. With Mr. Brownell, Claimant has approached a number of employers 
about jobs. Those efforts were unsuccessful. 
147. In July 2012, Claimant lost his house. He was living in a camp trailer on 
mortgaged land at the time of the hearing, receiving $1,700 per month in Social Security 
Disability benefits along with assistance from his children. Claimant's three children help him 
financially. Two of them, Shelby and Wesley, sincerely testified that Claimant can no longer do 
the things he did before his 2006 industrial accident, that he was devastated that he could no 
longer work and support his family, and that he was ashamed of having to accept assistance from 
his children. Wesley explained the hardships occasioned by Claimant's inability to work, 
including the loss of their house to bankruptcy and Claimant's resulting depression. He believes 
that Claimant stopped socializing because his source of pride his work - was gone. 
TESTIMONY FROM POTENTIAL EMPLOYERS 
148. Mike Roland, owner of a logging salvage operation and Claimant's former boss, 
confirmed that Claimant is an excellent worker and has a reputation as such in the St. Maries 
community. He heard through the grapevine about Claimant's 2006 back injury. Mr. Roland 
would not hire anybody with a back condition, including Claimant. "It's just business, you 
know, work. You gotta be able to, you know, work, pull winch line, run chainsaws. And you 
can't do that with a bad back. You can't do it." TR2, p. 22. 
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149. Robby Macklin, owner of St. Maries Saw & Cycle, a Yamaha dealership and 
repair shop catering to all brands, confirmed that Claimant had approached him about a job 
several times over the four years preceding the hearing. Mr. Macklin has known Claimant all his 
life and knows his mechanical experience and abilities. Although he would like to help Claimant 
out with a job, he never had a position that fits Claimants functional capabilities (specifically, his 
lifting limitations that he presumed from observing Claimant). Also, Mr. Macklin gets many 
inquiries from presumably able-bodied job-seekers. Mr. Macklin said he thought he could hire 
Claimant to be a "broom pusher" four years ago, but he never had an opening when Claimant 
inquired. TRI, p. 133. 
150. Randy Reynolds, owner of a marine and automotive repair shop/U-Haul rental 
store in St. Maries, confirmed that he has declined to offer work to Claimant, who he knows 
incurred a spine injury in a logging accident. "He's asked me for work, and I just - - to be 
honest, I gotta have somebody that has a strong back and is not going to be a liability to our 
business." TRl, p. 143. Also, Mr. Reynolds must hire mechanics who, unlike Claimant, are 
certified to do warranty work. He sometimes hires high school kids to clean out the U-Hauls, but 
he has not done so since 2010. Mr. Reynolds owns the shop along with his brother. They have 
only employed one other mechanic since they went into business in 1983, and that individual 
only worked two days per week. 
151. Dewey "Duke" Shawver, a long-time salvage logger in the St. Maries area who 
has worked with Claimant and respects his work ethic and logging abilities, testified that 
Claimant was not employable as a logger following his 2003 surgery. 
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152. 
reporting at Stimson Lumber, where she had worked for nearly 16 years at the time of the 
hearing. She testified that she is familiar with the job of a forklift driver at the mill. Usually, 
this job is filled from the pool of available general laborers already working for Stimpson. Also, 
an individual with limitations on bending and twisting one-third of the time, limited grasping and 
handling with his right hand, sitting limited to one-third of the time, lifting limited to ten pounds 
on a frequent basis, and moving his head from side to side would likely not be able to drive a 
forklift on a full-time basis. She estimated that forklift drivers must sit 85% to 90% of the day, 
which is sometimes ten hours long. She also explained that sometimes boards fall off the 
forklift, and the driver needs to pick them up, requiring an ability to bend and lift more than ten 
pounds. In addition, Ms. Nordin estimated that a forklift driver spends 75% of his day driving 
backwards, requiring him to twist and move his head from side to side. Further, forklift-driving 
entails a great deal of bouncing. 
VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION OPINIONS 
153. Dan Brownell. Mr. Brownell, a vocational rehabilitation consultant, was retained 
by Claimant in early 2009 both to assist him in job placement in the St Maries local labor 
market, and to provide an expert forensic opinion as to Claimant's employability. He continued 
to work with Claimant and/or look into job possibilities for the next three years. He "was kind of 
excited" to work with Claimant "because he was famous down here. Logger of the year for 
Potlatch for two years, that's a big deal. So I thought it was going to be a piece of cake in job 
placement." TR2, p. 41. However, Mr. Brownell ultimately opined that Claimant is totally and 
permanently disabled. 
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1 2009, 
one dated August 2012. He noted 2012 that Claimant appeared to have regressed since 
2009. He reviewed Claimant's medical and vocational records and spent a great deal of time 
assisting Claimant with his job search. 
155. In determining what jobs Claimant could physically do, Mr. Brownell adopted 
Mr. Bengston's 2009 FCE limitation recommendations for limitations on: 
• Any activities requiring him to lose his neutral spine position (bending, twisting) 
• Repetitive right (dominant) hand grasping and handling 
• Sitting: occasional 
• Sit/stand/walk: up to 8 hours per day 
• Lifting/carrying: 10 pounds frequently/occasionally, 30 pounds rarely 
• Bending/stooping: occasionally 
156. Mr. Brownell defined Claimant's local labor market to include all of Benewah 
County (St. Maries, Plummer, Worley, the Coeur d'Alene Casino, Fernwood, Santa, Harrison 
and Princeton). 
157. It 1s undisputed that Claimant is a bright fellow. In 2012, a TABE test 
administered by Mr. Brownell revealed that Claimant has college-level applied math skills. 
158. Although Mr. Brownell did not detail Claimant's transferrable skills specifically, 
he identified Claimant's main occupations with transferrable skills as logger, owner/operator, 
lumber mill laborer, mechanic and operator of logging truck and skidder. 
159. Mr. Brownell opined that Claimant's physical limitations following his 2006 
industrial accident place him in the light/sedentary work category, taking him out of any of his 
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as a result 2003 spme 
surgery, he opined Claimant was able to do medium/heavy work, but he was unemployable in 
the logging industry because employers were aware of his limitations and prior accidents. 
However, Mr. Brownell opined that Claimant remained employable as a mechanic at that time. 
160. In Claimant's job search, Mr. Brownell started with potential employers in 
Claimant's "sphere of influence." TR2, pp. 49-50. " .. .I really talked to Roy about who his 
sphere of influence was, and his sphere of influence is massive. I mean, he knows - - it's a rarity 
for some of the old timers or most of the people in town to not know Roy or Roy to not know 
them. He has relatives that own businesses here in town .... So I utilized a lot of that, and he and I 
came up with a list of a lot of people to contact that way." Id He also picked Claimant up at his 
house and, on some occasions, helped him get ready to go meet employers. 
161. Mr. Brownell opined that Claimant's popularity in his community was detrimental 
to his job search in that "most, if not all, possible employers know of the injuries that Mr. Green 
suffered in the 7/3/06 accident and ... as a result he was unable to keep his salvage logging 
business operating." JE-699. 
162. Together, Mr. Brownell and Claimant approached Claimant's relatives, who own 
a local sporting goods store. They declined to offer employment because they could not afford 
to hire anyone outside the immediate family. Also, Claimant was unable to do any stocking. 
163. Either together with Claimant or on his own, Mr. Brownell approached other 
employers, too. A local hardware store had no positions and was laying people off. The sawmill 
and other employers were afraid of the liability risk Claimant posed. Pete Manufacturing, a 
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women line and some of the lifting 
up to 20 pounds. Brownell did not elaborate on how often such lifting would required.) 
164. Mr. Brownell also apparently ruled out some positions without contacting the 
employers due to Claimant's appearance, personality, physical abilities, and other factors. For 
example, he believed Claimant could work in retail clothing sales, but for the "yuck factor" -
essentially Claimant's poor appearance which he opined would preclude Claimant from being 
hired. He similarly ruled out convenience store and smoke shop work. Mr. Brownell opined 
Claimant had a speech impediment on the telephone that precluded him from call center work. 
He ruled out the Subway sandwich maker position because the employer has a lot of turnover 
and a lot of biases, and he did not see Claimant fitting in there. He thought Claimant's hobbling 
around, his personality, and his overall appearance would be off-putting. He also thought there 
would be too much computer work and tallying, and he vaguely opined that there would be too 
much physical work. "They expect them to work in other areas." TR2, p. 56. Mr. Brownell 
ruled out any security guard position at a casino because there is a hiring preference for tribe 
members and, too, Claimant would be physically unable to apprehend uncooperative rowdies. 
He ruled out Potlatch and, apparently Jack Buell Trucking, because he did not believe Claimant, 
physically, could do any job at either place. 
165. In his 2012 report, Mr. Brownell asserted that he had contacted over 50 employers 
in Claimant's local labor market. Although it is unclear exactly which employers Mr. Brownell 
actually approached, or when, Mr. Brownell testified that he exhausted all possible options in 
Claimant's job search. "I can honestly say that I sincerely saturated the market on 
possibilities ... .I can sincerely say that I think he is a total perm. He's not employable in the labor 
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I challenge anybody else thinks that they could place him." TR2, pp. 59-60. 
Mr. Brownell did not reveal his private database of employer information because it is 
proprietary. 
166. In developing his opinions and trying to place Claimant in a job, Mr. Brownell 
also consulted Carol Jenks, ICRD consultant; Tony Frazier, IDVR consultant; Alivia Metts, 
Idaho Department of Labor (IDOL) labor analyst; Annie Frederick and Sue Shoemaker, IDOL 
workforce consultants; a testing counselor at ABE in St. Maries; and Jeff Truthrnan, 
president/owner of SkillTRAN. 
167. As for his statistical analysis of the job market, Mr. Brownell included a list of 
resource materials and some raw job market data. However, he did not describe his 
methodology in either of his reports or at the hearing. 
168. Mr. Brownell is not a certified rehabilitation consultant, and he does not agree 
that his involvement in a case should be limited to either forensic analysis or job placement 
assistance. He believes he can be a strong hands-on advocate in assisting an individual in job 
placement, and at the same time provide an objective opinion based upon statistical analysis of 
the relevant job market and an individual's established education, skills, and abilities. 
Mr. Brownell has extensive knowledge of the St. Maries labor market through his many years 
working as an ICRD consultant before he began his own vocational consulting business. 
169. Nancy Collins, Ph.D., CRC. Dr. Collins was retained by ISIF to assess 
Claimant's employability. Surety also relies upon her opinions. 
170. Dr. Collins authored a letter summarizing her preliminary opinions (based upon 
records provided by ISIF and Claimant's 2007 deposition transcript) on July 27, 2009. She 
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opined that Claimant's most 
limitations on lifting over 20 to 
limitations were his 1988 FCE, 
pounds, stooping, overhead work, and right-handed strength 
limitations, as well as physician recommendations that he leave logging. Also noting Claimant's 
2003 condition prompting new recommendations that Claimant leave logging, Dr. Collins was 
unable to find any permanent restrictions related to either the 2002 or the 2006 injury. She did 
note Dr. Williams' 2008 temporary restrictions, as well as the 2008 panel IME opinion that 
Claimant could return to work as owner/operator of St. Joe Salvage. Dr. Collins concluded: 
Mr. Green's deposition testimony is certainly different from the medical records 
the [sic J discuss past pain complaints and physical restriction. My preliminary 
opinion, based on the records reviewed, is that he has some pre-existing 
restriction (that was ignored), but there is no support for a total disability opinion 
as a result of a combination of industrial injury and pre-existing condition. 
JE-741. 
171. On August 20, 2009, Dr. Collins prepared a full written analysis and report in 
which she listed all of the records she reviewed, including medical records, Claimant's 2007 
deposition and interrogatory responses, ICRD records, and Dan Brownell's report. She also 
identified vocational information databases and software she relied upon. 3 She requested an 
interview with Claimant, but he refused. 
172. Dr. Collins defined functional limitation as "the hindrance or negative effect on 
the performance of tasks or activities, and other adverse and overt manifestations of a mental, 
emotional, or physical disability." She cited authority (Wright, 1980) in identifying the 
following 14 functional limitation areas that result from disability: mobility, communication, 
sensory, invisible, mental, substance abuse, pain, consciousness limitation, debilitation, and 
3 Dr. Collins utilized SkillTRAN, Idaho Occupational Wage and Employment Survey, Occupational Outlook 
Handbook, Department of Labor job listings, and O*NET. 
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restricted behavior, and atypical 
appearance. She identified Claimant's limitations based upon his 1988 FCE (noted, above) and 
his 2009 FCE, which she interpreted to include: no lifting more than 20 pounds, 15 pounds 
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently4; significant limitation with elevated work, kneeling and 
forward bending while standing; some limitation with standing work and static standing and 
sitting; some limitation for crouching and kneeling, stairs, and ladder climbing; no limitation on 
walking; and no limitation for right or left hand grip. In summary, "His most recent FCE allows 
light work with additional restriction for elevated work, position changes, occasional bending, 
climbing and kneeling." JE-748. 
173. Dr. Collins identified job categories for work Claimant has performed in the past 
in the logging and mechanic fields. She erroneously assumed Claimant had truck driving 
experience based upon ICRD records indicating Claimant wished to retrain as a truck driver. 
174. Using the Skil!TRAN program, Dr. Collins compared Claimant's pre-injury 
employability with his post-injury employability in order to estimate his loss of access to the 
local labor market. As to Claimant's pre-injury status, Dr. Collins opined that without any 
restrictions, Claimant had directly transferable skills for 71 job titles; with medium restrictions 
he had directly transferrable skills for 60 job titles and, assuming the restrictions from his 1988 
FCE, he had directly transferable skills for 10 job titles, representing an 86% loss of access to the 
labor market as a result of his 1987 neck injury. Considering unskilled work, he had access to 
58.8% of jobs in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Post-injury, Claimant had restrictions 
greater than imposed in 1988 due to additional restrictions on static sitting and standing. 
4 These are not consistent with Mr. Bengston's recommendations of IO pounds occasionally and frequently, and 30 
pounds rarely. 
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Assuming Claimant was to medium prior to his 2006 and light duty 
afterward, ~~nuw opined Claimant's loss of access would 83%. Considering unskilled 
work, his loss would be 53%. Dr. Collins posited that Claimant could, for example, still do some 
sawyer work. Also, he could inspect exhaust emissions, do some sorter operating and machine 
operating, hand soldering and knife setting, and some retail and driving jobs. 
By considering the most restrictive limitations, he can do some light work that 
does not require constant sitting or standing. Light work makes up 60% of the 
jobs in the labor market. If he improves like he did after his 1988 FCE, his access 
will be greater. 
JE-750. 
175. Dr. Collins also opined Claimant lost significant earning capacity as a result of his 
2006 industrial injury. She understood, incorrectly, that Claimant's net earnings for 2008 were 
$70,000, and, based upon an ad for a logger in St. Maries, that his pre-injury hourly wage was 
approximately $18. Post-injury, Dr. Collins opined that Claimant should be able to earn $8 to 
$10 an hour in light-duty jobs, such as driver, some production work, inspection, and retail jobs 
that are regularly available within 30 miles of his home. 
Labor market research using the Department of Labor job listings for one day 
found retail jobs, customer service work, front desk work, driving jobs, lot 
attendant/driver, solderer, and a runner position. The Department of Labor posts 
less than 25% of jobs that are available in a community, so this is just a small 
percentage of jobs he might consider. The economy is poor right now, but should 
improve in the next two years and provide additional opportunities. 
JE-750. 
176. Dr. Collins understood that Claimant had not attempted any job search since 
closing his business, and that he did not know how to look for work. Too, he did not believe he 
could do any work because he could not bend or do heavy lifting. She recommended that he 
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with a vocational rehabilitation 
his employment opportunities. 
and take a training course to 
177. On September 11, 2009, after interviewing Claimant in the presence of 
Mr. Brownell, Dr. Collins updated her opinions. She observed that Claimant appeared somewhat 
disabled because he did not move his head much, and that he answered her questions in a 
straight-forward manner. Claimant reported that his neck and shoulder conditions were his 
primary problems, with constant aching and sharp pains in his neck and shoulder, and limited 
function in his right shoulder. He was concerned that he had a rotator cuff tear or some other 
unaddressed, repairable, condition. He said he did not have permanent problems with his arms 
or hands prior to his 2006 injury. Also, when he looks down he gets a shooting pain in his right 
hand and his hand is very weak. He cannot read for long (he testified 20 minutes every three to 
four hours), cannot shave well because he has to hold his arms and chin up, and has a hard time 
doing anything that requires repetitive use of his hands if he also has to move his head. He also 
described low back pain with limited motion including bending, twisting, stooping, and 
squatting. He reported being able to stand only 15 minutes at a time. He could walk fairly well, 
but slowly because he cannot look at the ground and fears falling. He could sit for an hour 
before changing positions, or drive for an hour before getting out and walking around. He spent 
most of the day on the sofa watching television and did not climb the stairs in his house very 
often. 
178. Claimant reported that, prior to the 2006 accident, he could perform all aspects of 
his job as a logger, including operating a bull dozer, loader and processor; operate a chain saw all 
morning; walk on uneven ground, over logs and up hills, and other activities. 
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1 Claimant and Mr. also advised had tried to find Claimant, 
to no avail. Collins still believed Claimant could do some retail work that would allow him 
to walk primarily during the day without much lifting. "There have been two retail clerk 
positions listed in the past week for cashier/clerk in St. Maries." JE-753. She also noted 
Claimant's ideas for self-employment, including producing videos on safety for the logging 
industry, and on saw sharpening. He also had ideas about inventing underwater logging 
equipment and marketing some recipes. 
180. If Claimant's testimony as to his pre- and post-injury capabilities is found as fact, 
Dr. Collins opined that all of his post-injury disability is due to the 2006 injury. She also 
acknowledged that Claimant's difficulty looking down and his right hand pain are significant. 
"This is not addressed by the physicians, but there is mention of right hand problems in the 
functional capacities evaluations. This will be problematic in most light and sedentary work." 
JE-754. In addition, Dr. Collins acknowledged the job search difficulties accompanying the 
lackluster economy, but opined that it would improve in the next two years. 
181. Dr. Collins again updated her opinions in a written report dated October 23, 2010 
after reviewing Dr. Mc Nulty' s IME report and the Safety and Surveillance videos, and 
periodically considering the labor market within 30 to 40 miles of Claimant's home in St. Maries. 
She noted generally that Dr. McNulty, unlike most of Claimant's medical providers, felt Mr. 
Green's impairment was due to the 2006 injury and that he was asymptomatic previously. Also, 
Dr. McNulty agreed with Mr. Bengston's FCE recommendations and agreed that Claimant could 
do light duty work. 
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182. As the Safety Video, Dr. Collins "He showed no range of motion 
difficulties in his or low back. Concerning the September 2009 surveillance 
video of Claimant at his son's motorcycle competition, she opined, "This video depicted a 
gentleman that was very different from the gentleman I interviewed in his home in September of 
2009. At the time I met with him, he displayed fairly severe pain behavior, had very limited 
range of motion in his neck, and he stayed in a reclined position during most of the interview." 
Id. 
183. Dr. Collins did not believe that Claimant had conducted a "realistic" job search. 
"Based on my review of his physical capacities as shown on the surveillance video, and a light 
work restriction, I do think Mr. Green could have returned to work in some capacity, had he 
conducted a reasonable job search." JE-756. She listed a number of job openings5 in the area 
listed in June, July, August, September, and October 2010 that she thought Claimant may be able 
to do. 
184. Dr. Collins also criticized Mr. Brownell's methods. "It appeared Mr. Brownell 
was working in a dual capacity by providing vocational rehabilitation advice, while at the same 
time he appeared to be providing expert opinion regarding disability. I am unsure of his role, but 
under CRC guidelines, this is an ethics violation." JE-756. At the hearing, Dr. Collins 
elaborated that, whereas Mr. Brownell accompanied Claimant to talk to prospective employers 
with no current job openings, she would have instead provided Claimant with the information 
5 Job titles included log truck driver, truck driver (multiple), food service substitute, pit attendant, equipment 
operator (multiple), lead cook, delivery driver (multiple), fuel truck driver, truck driver to haul steel to Seattle, 
grocery store cashier, retirement home transportation driver, security officer, buffet cashier, transportation/cart 
attendant, gas station cashier, apartment manager, museum guide and gift shop sales person, semi-truck driver, 
security guard, construction truck driver, CDA resort driver, parkade night attendant, entry level loan processor, 
customer service representative (Kelly Services), part-time telephone operator, deli worker, retail sales associate, 
cashier (multiple), assembly worker, banquet cook, and buffet attendant. 
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and support to approach employers with current openmgs independently. 
Mr. Brownell's approach only highlighted Claimant's disability. Mr. Brownell disagreed, 
testifying that he had been able to put together job training packages for others in the past, with 
assistance and funding from IDVR. 
185. Dr. Collins opined that Claimant has good communication skills and "if he 
presents to an employer as he did on the surveillance video, he does not appear disabled. He is 
in his early 50's and appears to be fit." JE-757. 
CLAIMANT'S CREDIBILITY 
186. This matter was heard by Referee Just, prior to her retirement. Only Referee Just 
was in a position to make a judgment concerning Claimant's "observational credibility". Since 
the Commission did not have the opportunity to observe Claimant's demeanor at hearing, it is 
only empowered to make a judgment concerning Claimant's "substantive credibility". This 
determination may be made based on the Commission's review of the record before it. Stevens-
McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325, 179 P.3d 288 (2008). Here, the record is filled with 
conflicting facts and internal inconsistencies such that we are unable to conclude that Claimant is 
a credible witness. 
187. Claimant, two of his children, and Dan Brownell all testified that Claimant is the 
hardest-working, strongest, and toughest person they have ever known. However, the record is 
replete with evidence that challenges Claimant's credibility. 
188. With respect to the injuries Claimant claims are due to the 2006 industrial 
accident, Drs. Ludwig, Stevens, Zoltani, and Barnard all opined that Claimant magnified his 
symptoms during examinations, based in part upon Claimant's responses to Waddell's testing. It 
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is noted that Claimant disagreed with some of the methods employed by who were 
critical him, as well as the conclusions they drew. For example, Claimant felt justified in 
refusing to bend at the waist in the 2008 panel evaluation because he felt unsafe: 
There was a - - not bed - but a whatever there, similar to a table, but it was 
padded. And I told them, "I'll bend over towards that in case I keep going, 
because I have no balance." And they're like, "No, we want you to do it here," 
right toward the concrete floor. And I'm like, "I'm not doing that." I mean, 
seriously. Especially if they wanted me to keep my legs straight. 
TRI, p. 123. Similarly, Claimant minced no words in conveying his sentiments about the panel 
physicians' opinions that he could still work. "Well, they can go to hell. I worked with a broken 
foot before. I never stopped." TRl, p. 152. However sincere Claimant's protestations may be, 
they are insufficient to support a finding that the ultimate conclusions of any of his evaluators are 
based upon improper methodology or a preponderance of inaccurate medical findings. 
Importantly, no medical opinions in the record rebut these physicians' use or interpretation of 
Waddell' s tests, their findings on exam, or the manner in which they considered Claimant's 
medical history in deriving their opinions. Key physicians who found Claimant credible, 
including Dr. Dirks, Dr. Williams, and Dr. McNulty, apparently administered no credibility 
testing at all. They were satisfied to take Claimant at his word, even though his credibility had 
been questioned by others, both before and after his 2006 accident and injury. 
189. In addition, Claimant's testimony concerning his medical comse was often 
inconsistent with information contemporaneously recorded in his medical records, and he has 
reported symptoms in excess of objective findings throughout his worklife, sometimes receiving 
monetary settlements as a result of his persistent but uncorroborated complaints. Furthermore, 
Claimant's testimony in these proceedings has been undeniably internally inconsistent on the key 
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both 
testimony concerning quality of his following the 2003 performed 
by Dr. Ganz. Both on questioning by his attorney and by the attorney for the ISIF, Claimant 
testified that the surgery left him unable to perform many of the physical tasks he had been able 
to perform before he injured his thoracic spine. TRl, pp. 95/6-99/23; 159/5-162/4. Therefore, 
Claimant testified that following the 2003 thoracic spine surgery, he was never able to return to 
sawing all day owing to the problems he had with bending and lifting. He limited his sawing to 
two hours per day, and there were some days when he did not saw at all. He spent more of his 
time operating the Cat and the log processor. However, Claimant gave an entirely different 
description of his recovery from thoracic spine surgery at the time of his 2009 deposition. At 
that time, Claimant described his recovery as follows: 
Q. Do you think you made a full recovery from the thoracic, the T-12 L-1 
surgery? 
A. Oh, yeah. 
Q. Yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have any difficulty after you returned to work doing your 
logging? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. No part of the job? 
A. No. It was fine. 
Q. You could saw a tree, you could skid, you could operate machinery, 
everything? 
A. Yes. I could run and jump. Everything. Ride motorcycles. I could do 
anything I wanted to. 
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190. deposition Claimant qualified this testimony stating that Dr. Ganz 
had told him to avoid extremely hard to heavy lifting, but said that this restriction only impacted 
his ability to install a role of winch cable on his Cat, an activity which he was required to do 
once every three months or so. However, he was quite explicit that this was the only aspect in 
which his ability to perform his logging work or other physical activities was impacted by the 
thoracic spine surgery. (See Exhibit 24 at 345-346.) Claimant did not explain the discrepancy 
between his hearing testimony and his 2009 deposition testimony. TRI, pp. 162/17-164/3. 
Claimant was unable to reconcile these conflicting versions of how he fared following the 2003 
thoracic spine surgery, but his testimony on this issue is important because it might have a 
bearing on whether or not the thoracic spine injury is a pre-existing condition which constituted a 
subjective hindrance to Claimant prior to the subject accident. It is easy to understand how an 
insincere claimant might be incentivized, under circumstances similar to those at bar, to argue 
that he is totally and permanently disabled by virtue of the last injury alone; if the Claimant loses 
on his total and permanent disability claim, he has not hurt his chances of still obtaining a sizable 
disability award related to the last accident. This might explain Claimant's deposition testimony, 
which is counter to the great weight of the medical and other evidence; evidence which clearly 
denigrates Claimant's assertion that he could do anything he wanted to at the time the 2006 
Safety Video was prepared. 
191. It is also possible that Claimant's pre-injury medical and other records should not 
be relied upon to accurately characterize how Claimant was actually getting along prior to the 
subject accident. Perhaps Claimant overstated his physical problems in order to maximize the 
settlements he obtained in past workers' compensation cases. If so, then the 2006 Safety Video, 
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might 
actually be a more accurate representation of his functional capacity immediately prior to the 
subject accident. 
192. Another factor in assessing Claimant's credibility is his psychological condition. 
Claimant was diagnosed with a somatoform disorder in the 1980s and, in 2010, psychological 
testing led to a diagnosis of pain disorder. As well, the 2010 testing failed to confirm Claimant 
was malingering. The full meaning of these conclusions was not fleshed out in the record but, at 
a minimum, they tend to establish that at least some of Claimant's complaints in excess of 
objective findings are likely not due to an intent on his part to mislead his caregivers or this 
tribunal, but are instead the result of a psychological disorder that manifested prior to the 
accident precipitating the instant claims. 
193. It is also relevant that Claimant has been invested in obtaining a disability 
settlement since (at the latest) July 30, 2006, when he first applied for SSDI. At this time - less 
than one month following his 2006 industrial accident - no physician had yet opined Claimant 
had incun·ed any permanent impairment, let alone permanent disability, from any condition 
related to his subject injuries. 
194. The evidence of record establishes that Claimant is not a reliable historian with 
respect to his medical condition at any given time, that he has exaggerated details about his 
condition in sworn testimony offered in these proceedings, and that he has given inconsistent 
testimony over the years concerning the impact of his various injuries on his ability to work. 
There is also sufficient evidence to establish that Claimant's testimony is at least partially 
colored by secondary gain factors, as well as his pre-existing psychological pain disorder. 
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we are mindful that self-
complaints not been consistent over the does not mean that he is not 
significantly disabled at the present time.6 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
195. The provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally construed 
in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956, 793 P.2d 187, 
188 (1990). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical 
construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). However, the 
Commission is not required to construe facts liberally in favor of the worker when evidence is 
conflicting. Aldrich v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 122 Idaho 361, 363, 834 P.2d 878, 880 (1992). 
CAUSATION 
196. The Idaho Workers' Compensation Act places an emphasis on the element of 
causation in detennining whether a worker is entitled to compensation. In order to obtain 
workers' compensation benefits, a claimant's disability must result from an injury, which was 
caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Green v. Columbia 
Foods, Inc., 104 Idaho 204, 657 P.2d 1072 (1983); Tipton v. Jannson, 91 Idaho 904, 435 P.2d 
244 (1967). 
197. The claimant has the burden of proving the condition for which compensation is 
sought is causally related to an industrial accident. Callantine v. Blue Ribbon Supply, 103 Idaho 
734, 653 P.2d 455 (1982). Further, there must be medical testimony supporting the claim for 
6 One of the Commissioners remembers very well a comment made at a long ago hearing by then-
Commissioner Gerry Geddes. In the middle of cross-examination intended to expose that Claimant's past acts of 
dissimulation, all to discredit his current claim, Commissioner Geddes interrupted counsel to point out: "Just 
because he is a liar doesn't mean he didn't hurt himself at work." 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 70 
medical probability. claimant is 
probable, not merely a possible, connection between cause and effect to 
to establish a 
his or her 
contention. Dean v. Dravo Corporation, 95 Idaho 958, 560-61, 511 P.2d 1334, 1336-37 (1973). 
See also Callantine, Id. 
198. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that no special formula is necessary when 
medical opinion evidence plainly and unequivocally conveys a doctor's conviction that the 
events of an industrial accident and injury are causally related. Paulson v. Idaho Forest 
Industries, Inc., 99 Idaho 896, 591 P.2d 143 (1979); Roberts v. Kit Manufacturing Company, 
Inc., 124 Idaho 946, 866 P.2d 969 (1993). 
199. Claimant asserts that he suffered injuries to his cervical, thoracic, and lumbar 
spine areas, and his right shoulder as a result of his July 3, 2006 industrial accident. He also 
argues that he has chronic pain syndrome caused by the accident and subsequent surgeries. 
Defendants and ISIF both argue that the conditions requiring Claimant's surgeries were pre-
existing and not due, either in whole or in part, to an industrial accident. 
200. Accident. The evidence is sufficient to establish that Claimant suffered an 
industrial accident on July 3, 2006. Claimant's description of being struck on his head/hardhat 
by a falling tree is consistent over time and it is unrebutted. Also, medical records indicate 
Claimant reported the accident immediately, and that he suffered injuries consistent with such an 
event. 
201. Lumbar spine herniation (L4-5). Dr. Dirks and Dr. Ludwig opined that 
Claimant's lumbar spine herniation is consistent with being hit on the head by a falling tree. 
Further, no physician opined otherwise. Also, MRI imaging soon after the industrial accident 
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lumbar 
taken in 2004. bulge had grovvn into a 
at 1magmg 
that new 1magmg 
demonstrated was now compressing the left L4 nerve root. Also, some of Claimant's left-sided 
lower extremity symptoms were generally consistent with L4-5 neurological pathology. On the 
other hand, some of the symptoms Claimant reported were inconsistent; an epidural steroid 
injection failed to alleviate Claimant's symptoms (and, thus, failed to confirm that they arose 
from a neurological source) and an EMG study failed to confirm any left-sided acute 
neurological trauma. Also, some physicians were certain Claimant was not honest in his 
symptom presentation on their respective exams. Given this array of evidence regarding the new 
MRJ finding, several physicians offered causation opinions. 
202. Dr. Ludwig (in August 2006) initially ruled out an acute/industrial cause, even 
though Claimant's left-sided lower extremity symptoms were generally consistent with an L4-5 
injury, based upon Claimant's normal EMG results and his Waddell's test failures, among other 
things. Also, Dr. Ludwig noted that Claimant did not have a clinically significant response to the 
epidural steroid injection he received shortly following his industrial accident. At his deposition 
in January 2007, Dr. Ludwig repeatedly testified that he could not opine either that the industrial 
accident was or was not related to his need for lumbar surgery. However, by the end of 
questioning, Dr. Ludwig opined that the lumbar herniation was likely related to the industrial 
accident, and that Dr. Dirks' proposed fusion surgery would be reasonable to treat Claimant's 
L4-5 condition. (He deferred to Dr. Dirks as to the relatedness of including L3-4 in the fusion 
surgery.) The reasons for Dr. Ludwig's change of heaii are founded upon new information not 
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available to 
extremity radiculopathy, 
Dr. Dirks' 
the Safety Video. 
203. Dr. Stevens (in September 2006), and Drs. Barnard and Zoltani (in February 
2008) all opined that the enlargement at L4-5 was more likely due to natural degeneration than to 
a new trauma. They found Claimant's presentation was not credible, in part, due to multiple 
failed Waddell's tests. Drs. Barnard and Zoltani, after viewing the September 2007 surveillance 
videos, were certain that Claimant was faking his symptoms on exam. 
204. Dr. Dirks (in September 2006) opined that Claimant required surgery to 
decompress L3 through L5 due to his industrial injury. In 2012, he explained that the 
mechanism of injury was consistent with Claimant's complaints and his condition had worsened 
since 2004, so it is more likely than not that the industrial accident was a causal factor. He did 
not differentiate L3-4 from L4-5 when rendering an opinion, nor did he ever explain why a bi-
level fusion was necessary. 
205. Dr. McNulty (in September 2009) shared Dr. Dirks' ultimate opinion, employing 
a similar reliance upon the pre-existing imaging, the mechanism of injury, and the post-injury 
1magmg. 
206. It is somewhat troubling that neither Dr. Dirks nor Dr. McNulty explained how or 
whether the 2006 EMG testing figured into their respective opinions, given that it was pivotal to 
Dr. Ludwig's initial causation opinion. Dr. Ludwig did not fully explain why he changed his 
opinion, notwithstanding these results, but apparently Claimant's history of left-sided lower 
extremity neuropathy led him to place less reliance upon the EMG results. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER 73 
McNulty, and 
medical history at the time their initial opinions than was 
Dr. Dirks. By the time of the hearing, it is not apparent from the record that Dr. Dirks ever knew 
that other physicians had opined Claimant was not credible in terms of accurately reporting his 
symptoms, or that he had a significant history of spine injuries and treatment prior to 2003. He 
took Claimant at his word regarding the symptoms he was experiencing. As Claimant's treating 
surgeon, however, Dr. Dirks was significantly more knowledgeable of Claimant's then-current 
conditions than any other physician. 
208. Dr. Ludwig was aware of Claimant's credibility issue, having determined through 
his own examination that Claimant failed Waddell's tests, and also having looked into 
Claimant's prior medical records. Nevertheless, he appropriately altered his ultimate opinion 
regarding Claimant's lumbar spine condition after receiving new relevant information, 
establishing himself as an informed and objective witness more concerned with determining the 
"truth" than with advocacy. Also, as a former treating physician, Dr. Ludwig had more 
opportunities to evaluate Claimant than did any other opining physician except Dr. Dirks ( and 
Dr. Williams, addressed below). On the other hand, Dr. Ludwig's reliance upon the Safety 
Video in changing his opinion is problematic. He took those images to mean that Claimant 
performed at that level all the time. However, Claimant's testimony concerning his actual 
condition when he made the Safety Video was internally conflicting. At one point, Claimant 
testified that the Safety Video only caught him on a good day, and that his condition was much 
worse than depicted. As a result, the Safety Video as interpreted by Dr. Ludwig is insufficient to 
support a change in his original assumptions regarding Claimant's pre-existing condition. Also, 
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knowledge relevant pre-existing medical conditions and symptom reporting 
behavior. Dr. Ludwig's change of heart rests on shaky ground. It is not surprising that it came 
upon the heels of a confrontational cross-examination at his deposition. 
209. At the end of the day, it is persuasive that all of Claimant's opining treating 
physicians agreed that there is a causal link between his worsened L4-5 condition and his 
industrial accident. Dr. Ludwig's struggles with this question brought the case complexities into 
better focus, inviting heightened scrutiny of the relatively cursory treatment the IME physicians 
provided. Although their opinions were well-grounded in Claimant's pre-existing history and 
findings from their respective one-time examinations, they lacked the depth and breadth of 
experience with Claimant's case possessed by Drs. Ludwig and Dirks, especially. Along these 
lines, none of the IME physicians testified under oath or defended their opinions under cross-
examination in these proceedings; whereas, both Dr. Ludwig and Dr. Dirks did. Further, there is 
objective imaging evidence to corroborate Claimant's complaints, and Claimant's symptoms are 
consistent with the mechanism of injury. 
210. Claimant has proven that his L4-5 disc herniation is the result of a permanent 
worsening of his pre-existing asymptomatic disc bulge at that level. 
211. Thoracic spine herniation (Tl0-11). At his deposition m September 2012, 
Dr. Williams opined that Claimant has a symptomatic herniation at Tl 0-11 due to the industrial 
accident. He relied upon a CT myelogram, presumably from April 2008, to support his opinion. 
That study revealed a protrusion at Tl 0-11 that, in combination with degenerative spurring, 
mildly contoured the ventral cord. The results were of questionable clinical significance, so 
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and thoracic MRls, also April 2008, which he opined demonstrated 
multilevel minimal disc degeneration but, apparently, no neurologic pathology. There is 
apparently no imaging demonstrating a symptomatic herniation at Tl 0-11. 
212. Dr. Dirks also addressed a Tl0-11 herniation in his September 2012 deposition. 
He did not know whether Claimant, at the time, had a herniation at this level, but he opined that 
Claimant did not have a symptomatic herniation because Claimant had not reported any 
symptoms Dr. Dirks associated with that condition. Dr. Dirks had just taken Claimant to lumbar 
surgery in April 2012. Claimant's assertion in his briefing that Dr. Dirks "explained that the 
mechanism of the accident, getting struck on the head, was responsible for Green's current 
thoracic problems" is misleading. Dr. Dirks opined that being struck on the head could create or 
accelerate problems throughout the spine; however, he does not specifically address any thoracic 
problems, and he definitely does not opine that Claimant incurred a thoracic spine injury as a 
result of the July 2006 industrial accident. 
213. Drs. Barnard and Zoltani acknowledged a 2008 thoracic MRl demonstrating a 
"small disc protrusion" at Tl 0-11. JE-170. 
214. No other physician has opined that Claimant suffered any thoracic spine injury in 
2006. 
215. Dr. Williams' opinion is unsupported by the weight of medical evidence in the 
record. Claimant has failed to prove that he sustained an industrial Tl 0-11 herniation. 
216. Cervical spine strain and bulge (C5-6). Radiologic imaging confirmed an acute 
cervical sprain in the ligaments and musculature at C5-6 shortly following Claimant's industrial 
accident. No physician disputes that this injury was likely caused by Claimant's industrial 
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All opined it would heal with conservative treatment. None have opined that 
Claimant's strain did not, eventually, heal. Claimant has failed to establish that incurred any 
permanent damage to the ligaments or musculature at C5-6 due to his industrial accident. 
217. Claimant's disc bulge at C5-6 was evident on post-accident imaging taken 
July 11, 2006. According to the reading radiologist, at C5-6 Claimant had a broad-based right 
paracentral disc bulge causing mild contouring of the cervical cord and minimal spinal stenosis. 
According to Dr. Dirks, "there was a diffuse disk bulge at C5, 6 but no frank impingement of the 
neural elements." 2012 Dirks Dep., p. 21. No physician opined, based upon the 2006 MRI, that 
the C5-6 bulge was either acute or caused by the industrial accident, or that it was causing any of 
Claimant's symptoms. 
218. Following Claimant's L3-5 fusion in February 2007, Claimant began complaining 
of right-sided neck pain and numbness into his right arm. A cervical spine MRI conducted that 
month revealed, among other things, "moderate narrowing of the C5-6 right neural foramen" 
accompanied by bony changes. Dr. Dirks opined, without elaboration, that the MRI evidenced a 
C5-6 disc bulge correlating with Claimant's right radicular symptoms. In June 2007, Dr. Dirks 
performed C5-6 fusion surgery that he opined (in 2012) was related to the 2006 industrial 
accident. Dr. McNulty (in September 2009) also opined that Claimant's cervical surgery was 
necessitated by his industrial accident. On the other hand, Drs. Barnard and Zoltani (in February 
2008) opined that Claimant's cervical spine disc pathology was entirely related to pre-existing 
degenerative processes, and that the industrial accident had no permanent effect. 
219. According to the reporting radiologist, Claimant's November 24, 2004 cervical 
spine MRI showed pre-existing C5-6 pathology consisting of a mild to moderate broad posterior 
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right protrusion and end plate spurring causing a low-normal central canal 
volume, without deformity of the cord, and mild bilateral neural foraminal narrowing at C5-6, 
somewhat greater on the right. No physician provided any testimony establishing how, or 
whether, these findings were considered in developing their respective opinions regarding the 
nexus of Claimant's symptoms leading to his June 2007 C4-5 cervical fusion surgery. 
Dr. McNulty did not list this study among the records he reviewed prior to rendering his IME 
opinions. Dr. Dirks has never mentioned it. Drs. Barnard and Zoltani indicated in their IME 
report that they reviewed cervical imaging, but they did not identify any specific cervical studies. 
220. Claimant reported neck pain on the day of his industrial accident and consistently 
thereafter, to Drs. Ludwig, Stevens, and Dirks. Also, it requires no stretch of the imagination to 
understand how Claimant's industrial accident could have an effect on his pre-existing cervical 
spine bulge, and all parties agree that Claimant suffered injuries to the ligaments and 
musculature at the C5-6 level as a result of his industrial accident. In addition, it is conceivable 
that Claimant's symptoms and medications related to his contemporaneous low back condition 
and related surgery masked the more significant neck pain Claimant may have othenv:ise 
experienced. 
221. Amid conflicting expert testimony and in the absence of any testimony regarding 
the impact of Claimant's 2004 MRI results, the evidence establishes by a preponderance that 
Claimant incurred trauma to his C5-6 disc as a result of his industrial accident that necessitated 
his cervical spine fusion surgery. 
222. Right shoulder iniurv. Shortly prior to his cervical fusion surgery in July 2007, 
Claimant reported right-sided neck and arm pain, and Dr. Dirks noted weakness in his right 
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deltoid, triceps, and on exam. Just one his cervical fusion surgery, Claimant 
began complaining mostly posterior bilateral shoulder pain along with right arm pain and he 
sought additional pain medication to deal with it. In August 2007, Claimant still claimed 
bilateral shoulder pain, even though he was now taking MS Contin. Follow-up imaging led 
Dr. Dirks to opine there was no neurological basis for Claimant's pain. 
223. In September 2007, Claimant was filmed with no apparent shoulder difficulties in 
the surveillance video. In October 2007, Dr. Magnuson diagnosed chronic bilateral shoulder and 
thoracic spine area myofascial pain. Like others before him, Dr. Magnuson recommended 
physical therapy which, as before, Claimant did not follow up with due to his pain. On exam 
around this time, Dr. Dirks noted severe atrophy of the right arm in the deltoid and biceps areas, 
with loss of strength in the right deltoid muscle. Dr. Williams in early 2008 undertook 
management of Claimant's pain care and opined that his cervical and shoulder pain were his 
worst problems. Dr. McNulty reported in his September 2009 evaluation report that Claimant 
had reported right shoulder symptoms immediately following his industrial accident; however, 
Claimant's medical records through 2006 and early 2007 do not reference right shoulder pain or 
mJury. 
224. Claimant underwent a right shoulder MRI in November 2009. It failed to 
demonstrate any significant shoulder pathology, leading Dr. McNulty to opine that Claimant did 
not incur any permanent right shoulder injury as a result of his industrial accident. Dr. Williams, 
employing hopeful reasoning, opined that the clear MRI established not that Claimant had no 
injury, but that Dr. Williams' treatment must have healed the right rotator cuff tear he diagnosed 
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based upon Claimant's complaints examinations. No other physician opined 
Claimant's right shoulder symptoms are related to his industrial accident. 
225. Claimant's right shoulder and arm atrophy evidence a lack of use that could be 
related to pain. However, the record lacks sufficient evidence to connect the source of such pain 
to the industrial accident or either of his subsequent accident-related surgeries. Also, Claimant's 
medical records evidence a history of chronic right shoulder and arm symptoms unexplainable 
by objective evidence. In July 1987, following his skidder accident, Claimant had severe right 
shoulder pain with right arm and hand tingling without evidence of any neurological defect or 
acute injury. By May 1988, he was diagnosed with chronic pain in his neck, shoulders, right 
arm, and elsewhere. These pain reports continued through the end of 1988, when Claimant 
received a settlement related to the industrial injury he claimed caused it. Claimant did not 
return for treatment following receipt of his settlement payment and he soon returned to logging. 
226. Claimant has failed to prove that he incurred a right shoulder injury as a result of 
the 2006 industrial accident. 
227. Chronic pain syndrome. Claimant was diagnosed with somatoform disorder in 
1988. In 2010, psychological testing confirmed he had a psychological pain disorder. Claimant 
has not established that he has a physical chronic pain syndrome, nor that he incuned any new 
psychological condition as a result of his industrial accident as set forth in Idaho Code § 72-451. 
228. Claimant has failed to prove that he incuned chronic pain syndrome as a result of 
the 2006 industrial accident. 
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IMPROVEMENT 
229. As a prerequisite to determining Claimant's PPI or PPD, the evidence must 
demonstrate that he is medically stable. To wit, "permanent impairment" is any anatomic or 
functional abnormality or loss after maximal medical rehabilitation has been achieved and which 
abnormality or loss, medically, is considered stable or non-progressive at the time of evaluation. 
Idaho Code § 72-422. The statute does not contemplate that a claimant must be returned to his 
original condition to be considered medically stable, but only that the condition is not likely to 
progress significantly within the foreseeable future. Another important consideration is that 
workers' compensation benefits are allocated based upon injuries stemming from specific 
workplace accidents and occupational diseases. In this case, that means that only the conditions 
related to Claimant's July 2006 industrial injuries are compensable. Therefore, the Commission 
should focus upon Claimant's current diagnoses related to his subject industrial injuries to 
determine whether he is medically stable. 
230. Here, Claimant's permanent conditions resulting from his July 3, 2006 industrial 
accident include his L4-5 disc herniation requiring spinal fusion surgery in February 2007 and 
his cervical disc bulge at C5-6 requiring fusion surgery in July 2007. 
231. Drs. Bernard and Zoltani opined that these conditions were medically stable as of 
the date of their panel evaluation on February 13, 2008, even though Claimant continued to 
report pain, crunching and snapping in his neck ( worsening after surgery), as well as pain in his 
mid and low back. They found Claimant's complaints were unsupported by objectively 
verifiable causes and, further, they both opined that Claimant was faldng his symptoms. 
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At deposition, Dr. Dirks opined that Claimant reached MMI by February 21, 
2008 (one year follm::ving his February 2007 lumbar spine surgery). He continued to recommend 
testing for Claimant's ongoing pain complaints after that time to confirm his industrial injuries 
were stable, including a cervical/thoracic spine CT myelogram on April 10, 2008, and MRis on 
April 25, 2008, neither of which revealed pathology that would explain Claimant's continuing 
symptoms. Thereafter, Dr. Dirks agreed that conservative care to control Claimant's pain was 
warranted, but he did not believe Claimant had any condition as a result of his industrial injuries 
that could be improved with surgery. 
233. Dr. Williams, on the other hand, opined on April 9, 2008, that Claimant would not 
reach MMI for at least a year and that he required additional pain medications and manipulative 
treatment for chronic pain in his neck and shoulders. The record establishes that the treatment 
Dr. Williams endorsed (and that Claimant received) was palliative in nature. As of September 
2012, Dr. Williams still recommended ongoing treatment. He acknowledged that, as an 
osteopath, his concept of medical stability is different from a medical physician's. Dr. Williams' 
opinions regarding Claimant's medical stability status are less persuasive than the medical 
physicians' generally, and Dr. Dirks' in particular. 
234. On October 1, 2008, Dr. Ganz evaluated Claimant's neck pain and opined that it 
was due to muscle spasm, with no radicular component. He recommended that Claimant return 
to physical therapy, noting that Claimant only went twice following his cervical fusion surgery, 
then quit because it hurt. Claimant had declined physical therapy before, due to pain, and there 
is no evidence in the record to establish that Claimant followed Dr. Ganz' recommendation. 
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On September 8, 2009, McNulty opined Claimant had reached MMI and 
assessed PPI to both his cervical and lumbar spine conditions. 
236. Only Dr. Williams opined that Claimant was not medically stable in or around 
February 2008. Dr. Williams' opinion is based, in part, on Claimant's shoulder and right arm 
symptoms that were not proven to be related to his industrial injuries. Further, Dr. Williams 
apparently based his opinion (that Claimant had not reached MMI) on his concurrent opinion that 
Claimant needed treatment for pain relief, with which Dr. Dirks concurred. Claimant's need for 
pain relief as a result of his industrial injuries cannot be quantified, due to his credibility issues 
and his psychological pain disorder. Moreover, even if Claimant's residual pain could be 
attributed to his industrial injuries, the evidence in the record establishes that this condition was 
stable. 
237. As Claimant's treating surgeon, Dr. Dirks had more opportunities to observe all of 
Claimant's relevant conditions than did the other opining physicians. He followed up with 
appropriate testing on all of Claimant's residual complaints, finding no physiological basis. 
238. Claimant's residual pain complaints are likely due to a combination of his pre-
existing somatoform disorder and incentives related to the pendency of the instant litigation. 
239. Claimant reached MMI as of April 25, 2008, the date on which the last test 
ordered by Dr. Dirks to confirm the status of Claimant's industrial conditions returned benign 
results. 
MEDICAL CARE 
240. Idaho Code § 72-432(1) mandates that an employer shall provide for an injured 
employee such reasonable medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital 
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medicines, required by the employee's physician or 
needed immediately after an injury or disability from an occupational disease, and for a 
reasonable time thereafter. Claimant is also entitled to reasonable palliative care. Hamilton v. 
Boise Cascade Corp., 84 Idaho 209,370 P.2d 191 (1962). 
241. If the employer fails to provide the same, the injured employee may do so at the 
expense of the employer. Idaho Code § 72-432(1). Of course an employer is only obligated to 
provide medical treatment necessitated by the industrial accident. The employer is not 
responsible for medical treatment not related to the industrial accident. Williamson v. Whitman 
Corp./Pet; Inc., 130 Idaho 602, 944 P.2d 1365 (1997). 
242. In Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, 116 Idaho 720, 722-723, 779 P.2d 395, 
397-398 (1989), the Court held that medical treatment already received is reasonable when: 1) 
the claimant made gradual improvement from the treatment; 2) the treatment was required by the 
claimant's physician; and 3) the treatment was within the physician's standard of practice, the 
charges for which were fair, reasonable, and similar to charges in the same profession. The 
Court has announced no similar standard for prospective medical treatment; thus, Sprague 
provides some guidance but the instant case must be judged on the totality of the circumstances 
with respect to his request for additional medical care. Ferguson v. CDA Computune, 2011 UC 
0015 (February 25, 2011); Richan v. Arla G. Lott Trucking, Inc., 2001 UC 0008 (February 7, 
2011). 
243. Claimant seeks benefits for ongoing treatment by Dr. Williams of, primarily, his 
neck, thoracic spine, and shoulder conditions. He asserts that the manipulations and narcotic 
pain medications Dr. Williams administers are helping his body heal itself. Dr. Williams, at the 
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the hearing, was prescribing more pain medications than January 2008, when he 
began treating Claimant. Claimant was only treating with Dr. Williams once 
the time of the hearing, as opposed to once per week at the beginning of his treatment. 
month at 
244. Dr. Williams has been a strong advocate of Claimant, writing open-ended letters 
opining as to his long-term disability and testifying under oath in these proceedings. He came to 
Claimant's case nearly a year following his lumbar spine surgery and approximately six months 
following his cervical spine surgery. His opinions are sometimes inconsistent with Dr. Dirks', 
and he believes Claimant will require manipulations and medications indefinitely. He diagnosed 
a right shoulder rotator cuff tear without the aid of radiologic imaging then, after Dr. McNulty 
ordered an MRJ that demonstrated no tear, he took credit for helping the "tear" to heal without 
entertaining the possibility that there never was a tear in the first place. Dr. Williams' opinions 
are generally not very persuasive because they appear more strongly grounded in advocacy than 
in reasonable interpretations of objective and clinical evidence. 
245. As discussed elsewhere herein, Claimant's pain complaints are unreliable in terms 
of identifying the etiology of the pain. Dr. Dirks ruled out a treatable cervical spine pain source 
in April 2008. He agreed that Claimant was in pain, due to his ongoing complaints and his right 
shoulder atrophy, but he did not causally connect Claimant's industrial injuries to this pain. He 
did not opine that Claimant should receive treatments from Dr. Williams indefinitely, but he did 
acknowledge that they helped because they kept Claimant's head aligned. 
246. Claimant's thoracic and shoulder injuries were determined, above, not related to 
his industrial accident. 
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247. Claimant incurred a new whiplash-type injury to his cervical spine as a result of 
his October 2010 chair fall which reignited his cervical spine symptoms. 
248. Claimant has proven that Dr. Williams' treatment of his lumbar spine through 
April 25, 2008, and his cervical spine through October 22, 2010 (including palliative care 
following April 25, 2008) was reasonable and related to his 2006 industrial injuries. He is 
entitled to reimbursement for qualifying treatment through those dates. 
INDUSTRIAL INJURY PP/ AND MEDICAL RESTRICTIONS 
249. Following his 2006 lumbar spine fusion surgery, Claimant was limited as set forth 
in Mr. Bengston's 2009 FCE. Although this FCE was conducted more than a year following the 
date on which Claimant reached MMI, no party disputes that these results accurately reflected 
Claimant's post-industrial accident functional abilities. The Claimant's lumbar and cervical 
spine injuries, with their attendant PPI and medical restrictions, are determined to be causally 
linked to Claimant's 2006 industrial accident. Unfortunately, no physician specifically 
diagnosed the source of each of Claimant's functional deficits. Drs. Dirks and McNulty did, 
however, rule out an industrial source for Claimant's right shoulder and hand deficits indicated 
in the FCE. 
250. Lumbar spine. In September 2009, Dr. McNulty assessed 20% whole person PPI 
to Claimant's lumbar spine condition. No other physician assessed lumbar PPL Therefore, 
Claimant has 20% whole person PPI, with no apportionment to pre-existing conditions. 
251. Cervical spine. In September 2009, Dr. McNulty assessed 25% whole person PPI 
to Claimant's cervical spine, without apportionment. 
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Claimant could 
sit occasionally, walk frequently, and sit/stand/walk for eight hours per day, five days per week, 
so long as he could change positions frequently and at his own pace. Claimant could carry 30 
pounds rarely and ten pounds occasionally or frequently and could bend or stoop occasionally. 
Claimant was significantly limited in any activity requiring him to shift from a neutral spine 
condition, like bending or twisting. 
253. Dr. McNulty restricted Claimant from heavy (and very heavy) work due to the 
weakness in his spine created between his thoracic (non-industrial) and lumbar (partially 
industrial) fusions. He agreed with Mr. Bengston' s light-duty FCE recommendations. 
254. Mr. Brownell and Dr. Collins agree that Claimant was limited to sedentary and 
some light-duty work following his 2006 industrial injury. 
PERMANENT DISABILITY 
255. "Permanent disability" or "under a permanent disability" results when the actual 
or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent because of pe1manent 
impairment and no fundamental or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected. 
Idaho Code§ 72-423. "Evaluation (rating) of permanent disability" is an appraisal of the injured 
employee's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by 
the medical factor of permanent impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors provided in 
Idaho Code § 72-430. Idaho Code § 72-425. 
256. The test for determining whether a claimant has suffered a permanent disability 
greater than permanent impairment is "whether the physical impairment, taken in conjunction 
with nonmedical factors, has reduced the claimant's capacity for gainful employment." Graybill 
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v. Swift & Company, 11 Idaho 293, 294, 766 P.2d 763, 764 (1988). sum, the focus of a 
determination of permanent disability is on the claimant's ability to engage gainful activity. 
Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3, 7, 896 P.2d 329, 333 (1995). 
257. Time of disability determination. The Idaho Supreme Court in Brown v. The 
Home Depot, WL 718795 (March 7, 2012) reiterated that, as a general rule, Claimant's disability 
assessment should be performed as of the date of hearing. Under Idaho Code § 72-425, a 
pe1manent disability rating is a measure of the injured worker's "present and probable future 
ability to engage in gainful activity." Therefore, the Court reasoned, in order to assess the 
iajured worker's "present" ability to engage in gainful activity, it necessarily follows that the 
labor market, as it exists at the time of hearing, is the labor market which must be considered. 
However, the Commission is afforded latitude in making alternate determinations based upon the 
particular facts of a given case. 
258. ISIF argues that the time-of-hearing labor market statistics should be applied, as 
per Brown, but it would work an injustice to ISIF and Employer/Surety to assess Claimant's 
disability (particularly whether he is totally and permanently disabled) as of the time of the 
hearing because these defendants are not liable for any worsening in Claimant's condition 
attributable to non-industrial causes following the last accident. Consequently, ISIF argues that 
Claimant's disability should be determined as of the date of medical stability. 
259. The Commission agrees that Claimant's disability should be assessed as of the 
date on which he became medically stable from his last industrial accident for the following 
reasons. Importantly, there is sufficient evidence in the record to establish that Claimant reached 
medical stability following his subject industrial accident, but before his subsequent injury. 
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Also, Claimant's condition attributable to the industrial accident and his pre-existing conditions 
can more precisely assessed as of the date of MMI. This is because Claimant's subsequent 
injury required surgical intervention at a site he contends was permanently impaired by his 
subject industrial accident. The worsening in his functional abilities (if any) attributable to the 
subsequent condition cannot be separated from his industrial and prior conditions by objective 
testing. Yet, testing and opinions in the record confirm Claimant's functional capabilities prior to 
the non-industrial subsequent injury. Under these circumstances, it would be nothing more than 
an academic exercise to consider Claimant's time-of-hearing condition, then attempt to 
"subtract" his subsequent conditions to determine Defendants' liability. The addition, then 
subtraction of irrelevant information would unnecessarily complicate the determination of 
Claimant's disability, leading to a less accurate assessment of Claimant's loss of functional 
abilities attributable to his industrial accident and more effort and expense required of all parties. 
Therefore, Claimant's local labor market will be determined as of the hearing date; however, his 
functional capabilities will be determined as of April 25, 2008, the date on which he reached 
MMI. 
260. Nonmedical factors. Claimant has a GED and scored at the college level in math 
skills on the TABE test administered by Mr. Brownell. He has some on-the-job training in 
mechanics, as well as extensive experience in all aspects of logging, including operating and 
maintaining machinery, hands-on management of logging salvage jobs, budgeting and record-
keeping, paying bills, complying with laws related to employment and maintaining a business, 
and related activities. Claimant does not have experience hiring employees from outside his St. 
Maries "grapevine" area contacts. He does not possess office-ready computer skills, and he has 
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not worked in a job requires him to accommodate walk-in customers since was a service 
station attendant in high school. 
261. Claimant is not disfigured, though he did walk with a limp, at times, on and 
around April 25, 2008. Claimant was, at that time, a fit man in his late 40s. Claimant is well-
known in his local labor market as a logger who has suffered a significant back injury. 
262. Permanent disability - two methods. As a threshold matter, Claimant must 
establish he was totally and permanently disabled as of April 25, 2008 to prove ISIF is liable for 
his benefits. There are two methods by which a claimant can demonstrate that he or she is totally 
and permanently disabled. 
263. 100% method. A claimant may prove total and permanent disability if his or her 
medical impairment together with the nonmedical factors total one hundred percent Idaho Code 
§ 72-430(1) provides that in determining percentages of permanent disabilities, account should 
be taken of the nature of the physical disablement, the disfigurement if of a kind likely to 
handicap the employee in procuring or holding employment, the cumulative effect of multiple 
injuries, the occupation of the employee, and his or her age at the time of accident causing the 
injury, or manifestation of the occupational disease, consideration being given to the diminished 
ability of the affected employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable 
geographical area considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee, and 
other factors as the Commission may deem relevant, provided that permanent partial or total loss 
or loss of use of a member or organ of the body no additional benefits shall be payable for 
disfigurement. If the claimant has met this burden, total and permanent disability has been 
established. If, however, the claimant has proved something less than one hundred percent 
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fitting within definition of an he or she can still demonstrate total disability 
odd-lot worker. Boley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity 130 Idaho 278, 281, 939 P.2d 
854, 857 (1997). 
264. Claimant does not argue that he is totally and permanently disabled by the 100% 
method. Moreover, the record establishes that Claimant is not so disabled that he can do no 
work at all. Therefore, Claimant is not totally and permanently disabled by the 100% method. 
265. Odd-lot doctrine. Claimant argues that he is totally and permanently disabled as 
an odd-lot worker. An odd-lot worker is one "so injured that he can perform no services other 
than those which are so limited in quality, dependability or quantity that a reasonably stable 
market for them does not exist." Bybee v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 
76, 81, 921 P.2d 1200, 1205 (1996). Such workers are not regularly employable "in any well-
known branch of the labor market - absent a business boom, the sympathy of a particular 
employer or friends, temporary good luck, or a superhuman effort on their part. " Carey v. 
Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 112, 686 P.2d 54, 57 (1984). Claimant 
carries the burden of proof to establish total permanent disability under the odd-lot doctrine, 
which may be established in any one of three ways: 
a. By showing that the claimant has attempted other types of employment without 
success; 
b. By showing that the claimant or vocational counselors or employment agencies 
on his behalf have searched for other work and other work is not available; or 
c. By showing that any efforts to find suitable work would be futile. 
Lethrud v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 560, 563, 887 P.2d 1067, 1070 (1995). 
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266. The establishes that Claimant has attempted other 
types of employment since the subject accident. Following the date of injury, he continued as 
the sole proprietor of St. Joe Salvage, although all logging work was performed by his 
employees. Claimant was forced to close his business in October of 2008. The question is 
whether the facts demonstrate that it was because of his injuries that Claimant was ultimately 
unsuccessful in his efforts to continue as the sole proprietor of St. Joe Salvage. 
267. In 2007 and 2008, Claimant's participation in the sole proprietorship consisted of 
running safety meetings, finding out where Potlatch wanted Claimant to log, doing payroll, and 
paying the bills. TRI, p. 169/20-23. He did no to minimal work in the woods. Even so, 
Claimant's business had gross receipts of $244,396.00 in 2007, and Claimant had an adjusted 
gross income of $70,295.00 in that year. Claimant only ran his business through October of 
2008. Even so, for 2008, Claimant's tax returns show gross receipts of $187,673.00 with 
adjusted gross income of $50,016.00. Claimant testified that he closed his business in October of 
2008 because he had been operating at a financial deficit. He testified that he lost a top worker 
due to an injury, had to deal with the breakdown of his Cat, and faced a $12,000.00 workers 
compensation insurance premium payment that he could not meet. It is difficult to square 
Claimant's testimony that he had been losing money in the business prior to its closure with his 
tax returns, which show an AGI in excess of $50,000.00 for 2008. However, it is easier to 
understand how events such as the loss of key personnel or equipment can suddenly turn a 
business from profitable to unprofitable. The closure of Claimant's business led, in short order, 
to the loss of his home and property, effectively putting him on the street, or close enough 
thereto to make no difference. If Claimant's business was still profitable, we doubt very much 
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that he close order to 
Although Claimant's return to logging following the subject 
accident ultimately proved unsuccessful, we are not persuaded that it proved unsuccessful 
because of Claimant's work injury. Ultimately, the evidence persuades us that Claimant was 
forced to close his business because of business-related misfortunes, not because he was 
physically incapable of continuing to run his business in a profitable fashion. Therefore, 
Claimant has not shown total and permanent disability by evidence that he attempted other types 
of employment without success. 
268. Second Lethrud Method. Next, Claimant can satisfy his burden of showing that 
he is an odd-lot worker by demonstrating that he, or vocational rehabilitation experts on his 
behalf, have searched for other work to no avail. Claimant has engaged in some independent job 
search activities since the subject accident. He has filed one application for employment with the 
Tribe, and though he alluded to other applications for employment, he did not identify any other 
employers with whom he filed a formal application. Aside from Claimant's application with the 
Tribe, Dan Brownell could not remember any other employers with whom Claimant filed an 
application, but testified that he thought the filing of formal applications for employment a waste 
of time in Claimant's case. (Transcript 93/15-23.) Mr. Brownell assisted Claimant in searching 
for employment by contacting area employers both with, and without, Claimant. Mr. Brownell 
did not prepare a resume for Claimant outlining Claimant's background, skills, and other 
attributes, explaining that such a resume would not actually advance any of Claimant's goals 
towards finding a job. However, he acknowledged that Claimant actually does have a lot of 
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things to proud which could be beneficially exploited on a resume, such as his good 
reputation with Potlatch and his multi-year awards as logger of the year. 
269. Although Mr. Brownell testified that he saturated Claimant's labor market with 
job contacts and inquiries on Claimant's behalf, Dr. Collins was critical of this approach, 
testifying that by accompanying Claimant on job contacts, or making the contacts without 
Claimant, Mr. Brownell may have unintentionally sabotaged Claimant's prospects for making a 
good impression on a potential employer; Mr. Brownell's presence robs Claimant of the 
opportunity to make his own impression on a potential employer and signals to that employer 
that Claimant may be damaged goods. Dr. Collins was also critical of Mr. Brownell's 
lackadaisical attitude towards the preparation of formal job applications and a suitable resume to 
accompany such applications. Dr. Collins was also critical of Mr. Brownell for not seeking 
employment where the job openings were. Per Dr. Collins, many of the job contacts and 
inquiries made by Mr. Brmvnell were made at places where no current job openings existed. 
270. Further, Mr. Brownell acknowledged that he did not focus his efforts on placing 
Claimant in cashiering, retail, or other service industry jobs because of his perception that 
Claimant suffered from what he colloquially described as a "yuck factor", even though Claimant 
admittedly had math and other skills that could be exploited in such employment. According to 
Mr. Brownell, Claimant's physical presentation, bad dentition, and rustic demeanor made him a 
poor candidate for any job which required interaction with the public. However, Mr. Brmvnell 
was also the first to state that Claimant was well-known and well-liked in his small community, a 
legend in fact. Even if we give credence to Mr. Brownell's observations concerning Claimant's 
appearance and mannerisms, we believe that he inappropriately excluded from his job search 
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physically capable 
which openings frequently appear, and which claimant was 
performing. On balance, we cannot say that Mr. Brownell's failure to 
identify suitable employment for Claimant is sufficient to demonstrate that Claimant is an odd-
lot worker. 
271. Third Lethrud method. Mr. Brownell opined that it would be futile for Claimant 
to attempt to find work in the St. Maries area. In addition to Claimant's medical and non-
medical factors, Mr. Brownell cited the peculiarity of Claimant's local labor market in which 
employers are familiar with the logging industry and the potential liability associated with 
employing an ex-logger with a spine injury. Specifically, everyone knows Claimant. They also 
know that he is no longer logging due to a spinal injury, and are unwilling to risk financial 
liability, should he again injure himself. Testimony in the record from potential employers 
supports Mr. Brownell's opinion in this regard, as does his 30 plus years of experience placing 
individuals in jobs in the St. Maries area. 
272. Dr. Collins opined that, at least until his 2010 chair injury, Claimant was 
employable in regularly occurring jobs like retail sales, cashier, security guard, and driver. 
Mr. Brownell testified that security guard and driver likely required physical abilities in excess 
of Claimant's limitations. He did not believe Claimant would be employable in other jobs for a 
variety of reasons, many of which are peculiar to the St. Maries area. Contrary to 
Mr. Brownell's testimony regarding a deli job, the evidence does not establish Claimant would 
have trouble tallying. However, even though Claimant is apparently well-liked in his hometown, 
such that his rustic presentation might not be an obstacle to employment, Claimant would be 
competing with able-bodied individuals, many with customer service or other directly-related 
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,_,-,,-,,,--, which 1s an as more reliable. 
he had not nrn,rlrc,,l someone else for more than 20 years, and had not worked 
outside the logging industry for more than 30 years, except for one short stint as a mechanic. In 
addition, Claimant's lack of computer skills and his sitting restriction would have precluded him 
from being competitive for back office and telephone work for which he may otherwise qualify 
based upon his established computational skills. 
273. Based on the foregoing, we find that Claimant has proven his odd-lot status by 
demonstrating that efforts to find suitable work would be futile. In making this determination, 
we recognize that there is some potential conflict between this conclusion, and our determination 
that Claimant did, in fact, successfully continue to work as the sole proprietor of St. Joe Salvage 
through October of 2008, and that the business' failure has more to do with a number of 
coincidental business misfortunes than it does Claimant's physical injuries. However, that 
Claimant was able to find ways to operate his business in 2007 and 2008 as a nonworking sole 
proprietor is not necessarily fatal to a determination that Claimant is totally and permanently 
disabled. Claimant need not demonstrate that there is no work that he can do. He is merely 
required to demonstrate that he can perform no services other than those which are so limited in 
quality dependability or quantity that a reasonably stable labor market for them does not exist. 
See Bybee v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, supra. Claimant's self-employment was 
just such a limited employment opportunity, one that is unlikely to arise again for Claimant. 
274. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Claimant has met his prima facie case 
of demonstrating that he is an odd-lot worker because it would be futile for him to look for work. 
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now some kind of suitable IS 
and available to claimant." V. County Road 
Department, 107 Idaho 109,686 P.2d 1067 (1995). Defendants must prove there is: 
An actual job within a reasonable distance from [claimant's] home which 
[claimant] is able to perform or for which [claimant] can be trained. In addition, 
the [employer] must show that [claimant] has a reasonable opportunity to be 
employed at that job. It is of no significance that there is a job [ claimant] is 
capable of performing if he would in fact not be considered for the job due to his 
injuries, lack of education, lack of training, or other reasons. 
Lyons v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 565 p.2d 1360 (1977). 
276. Dr. Collins listed a number of advertised positions that she opined may be within 
Claimant's restrictions within 30 to 40 miles of his home. Although she did not check on every 
opening, the evidence of record, including Mr. Brownell's opinions, indicates that it is likely that 
Claimant could have done, at a minimum, some retail sales/cashiering work. There is no 
evidence, however, rebutting the testimony herein of the potential employers regarding the 
stigma associated with Claimant's spine condition, or affirming that Claimant would be a serious 
contender for any specific job. As such, the evidence fails to establish that Claimant had a 
reasonable opportunity to achieve employment in any proposed position. Claimant's lack of 
experience and appearance would preclude him from some of the jobs within his functional 
abilities. The fact of his back injury would likely preclude him from the rest. Requiring few 
skills, these jobs would place Claimant in competition with a broad hiring pool of many able-
bodied individuals, who would likely be selected over Claimant due to the stigma of his 
significant spinal pathology and related liability fears. 
277. Defendants have failed to prove that there is work in Claimant's local labor 
market that he has a reasonable opportunity to obtain. Claimant has established that he was 
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totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine as of April 
on which he reached MMI following his July 2006 industrial injuries. 
ISIF LIABILITY 
2008, the date 
278. Idaho Code § 72-332(2) provides that ISIF is liable for the remainder of an 
employee's income benefits, over and above the benefits to which an employee is entitled solely 
attributable to an industrial injury, when the industrial injury combines with a pre-existing 
permanent physical impairment to result in total and permanent disablement of the employee. 
279. In Dumaw v. J L. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 795 P.2d 312 (1990), the 
Idaho Supreme Court listed four requirements a claimant must meet to establish ISIF liability 
underldaho Code§ 72-332: 
(1) Whether there was indeed a pre-existing impairment; 
(2) Whether that impairment was manifest; 
(3) Whether the alleged impairment was a subjective hindrance to employment; and 
( 4) Whether the alleged impairment in any way combines with the subsequent injury to 
cause total disability. 
Dumaw, 118 Idaho at 155, 795 P.2d at 317. 
280. In evaluating the claim of Employer/Surety that responsibility for Claimant's total 
and permanent disability should be shared between Employer/Surety and the ISIF, it is first 
necessary to address Defendants' argument that notwithstanding his current proclamations, 
Claimant is bound by the provisions of the prior lump sum settlements which identify pre-
existing impairments totalling ten percent of the whole person. The argument is that since 
Claimant acceded to these PPI ratings when settling the prior claims, he cannot now be heard to 
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assert that all disability is referable to subject accident. 
Defendants that Claimant should be judicially estopped from arguing that 
responsibility for his total and permanent disability should not be shared between 
Employer/Surety and the ISIF. Notwithstanding any other objections which might be raised to 
the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel, we find it inapplicable for the simple reason 
that in this proceeding Claimant takes no position that could be deemed inconsistent with the 
averments allegedly made in the earlier lump sum settlements. It is Defendants who have made 
claim against the ISIF, and it is Defendants who have assumed the burden of proving all the 
elements of ISIF liability. Claimant has asserted that he is totally and permanently disabled, but 
has taken no position on whether responsibility for his disability should be borne by Employer 
alone or by Employer and ISIF jointly. (See Claimant's Opening Brief at 28.) What Defendants 
are really attempting to do is bind the ISIF to the averments of the prior lump smn settlement. 
However, the ISIF did not make the averments in question and was not even a party to the prior 
settlements. The Commission concludes that the doctrine of judicial estoppel has no application 
to the facts of this case. Having determined that the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply, 
we must now determine whether or not the elements of ISIF liability are met by the evidence 
before us. 
PRE-EXISTING PERMANENT PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT 
281. Claimant has a number of pre-existing conditions which may qualify as pre-
existing permanent physical impairments. Some of these can be disposed of fairly quickly. In 
1993 Claimant underwent bilateral carpal tunnel surgery. In 1995 he suffered a right shoulder 
separation for which he underwent surgery. In 2000 Claimant was diagnosed with a hernia for 
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which he 
which he underwent 
two 2001 Claimant suffered a left shoulder separation for 
2002. For the conditions referenced above, the record fails to 
disclose that Claimant suffered any permanent physical impairment. Nor does it appear that any 
of the other elements ofISIF liability are satisfied for any of these conditions. 
Lumbosacral Spine 
282. Claimant suffered an unspecified injury to his lumbar spine in 1984. The 2005 
lump sum settlement agreement reflects that Claimant was given a five percent PPI rating for the 
effects of the 1984 injury. However, there are no medical records in evidence which support the 
assertion that Claimant was given a five percent PPI rating for a 1984 lumbar spine injury, much 
less the nature and extent of his lumbar spine injury. In 1987 Claimant suffered a work related 
accident while operating a skidder. Although his injuries were primarily to the neck, jaw, right 
shoulder and upper extremities, there are some references to lower back symptoms among the 
constellation of Claimant's other symptoms. The 1987 accident was eventually resolved via a 
lump sum settlement, which referenced Claimant's entitlement to a five percent PPI rating on 
account of the 1987 injury. However, the lump sum settlement does not reflect to what body part 
or parts the five percent PPI rating attached. Nor are there any contemporaneous medical records 
which support the award of a five percent PPI rating arising from the 1987 work accident. 
283. The record does reflect that Claimant began repo1iing neuropathies m 
approximately 1988. In December of 2004, Dr. Dirks confirmed that an EMG evidenced 
residual radiculopathy in Claimant's Sl nerve distribution. In August of 2006, Dr. Ludwig 
assessed permanent restrictions of "no significant repetitive bending or heavy lifting due to his 
ongoing condition of chronic S 1 radiculopathy on the right as well as his history of lumbar 
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but not due to mJury " JE-30. In September 2006, 
SI radiculopathy. 
284. On September 8, 2009, Dr. McNulty assessed Claimant's permanent impairment 
related to the 2006 accident, assigning a 20% PPI rating to Claimant's lumbar spine injury. He 
declined to apportion any part of this impairment to a pre-existing condition, reasoning as 
follows: 
Though Mr. Green did have pre-existing degenerative changes, they were 
asymptomatic and he was functioning at a high level prior to his injury. For this 
reason, I did not feel that apportionment is indicated in this case. However, if he 
did have a prior lumbar spine workmen's compensation settlement, that would be 
subtracted from the 20% whole-person impairment that is attributable to his 
lumbar spine condition. 
I have reviewed the FCE and agree with the findings. Mr. Green has a fusion at 
T12-Ll and at L3-L5. Because of those fusions, he has increased stress between 
LI and L3. He should not engage in heavy physical activities such as logging. 
He is more suited to work in a light job duty category as outlined in the FCE. 
JE-23, p. 332. 
At first blush, Dr. McNulty's treatment of the issue of apportionment of PPI appears somewhat 
inconsistent with the records he reviewed in connection with his evaluation. Both D:rs. Ludwig 
and Stevens noted Claimant's pre-existing chronic S-1 radiculopathy, yet Dr. McNulty failed to 
consider these findings when addressing the issue of apportionment, concluding that Claimant's 
lumbar spine was asymptomatic prior to the subject accident. Dr. McNulty's treatment of the 
apportionment issue can be reconciled with the records of Drs. Ludwig and Stevens by 
recognizing that Claimant's radiculopathy was at S-1, while Dr. McNulty' s rating addressed only 
L3-L5. 
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285. The Claimant may a 
impairment due to his well-documented 1 radiculopathy. However, although we conclude that 
this pre-existing condition may have been of sufficient severity to warrant an impairment rating, 
the record does not disclose that Claimant was ever rated for this condition. 
Thoracic Spine 
286. In 2002, Claimant suffered an injury to his thoracic spme at T12-Ll. He 
underwent a fusion surgery at this level in January of 2003, performed by Dr. Ganz. Dr. Ganz 
released Claimant without restrictions referable to the Tl2-Ll fusion in 2004. However, both 
Dr. Dirks and Dr. Ludwig testified that permanent medical restrictions against bending and 
lifting would be appropriate following Claimant's fusion, such that he should avoid heavy and 
very heavy work, like logging, following the surgery. In September of 2006, Dr. Stevens opined 
that Claimant's pre-existing conditions precluded him from heavy and very heavy work. 
287. The Commission concludes that Claimant is likely entitled to an impairment 
rating referable to the TI2-Ll fusion and residuals. However, the record altogether fails to 
establish what that impairment rating might be. 
Cervical Spine 
288. Among Claimant's complaints following the 1987 skidder accident were 
complaints of neck, jaw, and bilateral upper extremity symptoms. Some of Claimant's medical 
providers felt he was chronically disabled due to pain following the 1987 accident, even though 
there was little to no objective evidence of injury. Although it was recommended that Claimant 
not return to logging, he did anyway, even though he was afforded the opportunity through the 
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1 lump sum as a truck . Claimant continued to as a 
until 2004, evidently any ongoing spine complaints. 
289. In 2004, Claimant sought treatment after he hit his head getting into his Cat MRI 
imaging did not identify evidence of neurological injury, but did reveal some degeneration in 
Claimant's cervical spine. No physician ever assessed any PPI related to this injury, and he 
settled his workers compensation claim for the 2004 accident via a 2005 lump sum settlement, 
which failed to reference any PPI referable to the cervical spine. 
290. The evidence fails to establish that Claimant had any pre-existing permanent 
physical impairment referable to his cervical spine. 
291. Manifest: "Manifest" means that either the employer or employee was aware of 
the condition so that the condition can be established as existing prior to the injury. See Royce v. 
Southwest Pipe of Idaho, 103 Idaho 290, 294, 647 P.2d 746, 750 (1982). Here, Claimant was 
diagnosed with a thoracic spine injury in 2002 for which he underwent fusion surgery in 2003, 
and his residual SI radiculopathy was diagnosed following an EMG nerve conduction study in 
November 2004. Claimant, who is also the Employer, knew of his pre-existing sacral and 
thoracic spine conditions prior to July 2006. 
292. Subjective hindrance: ISIF disputes that Claimant had any pre-existing 
condition that constituted a subjective hindrance prior to his final industrial mJunes. The 
"subjective hindrance" prong of the test for ISIF liability is defined by statute: 
"Permanent physical impairment" is defined in section 72-422, Idaho Code, 
provided, however, as used in this section such impairment must be a permanent 
condition, whether congenital or due to injury or disease, of such seriousness as to 
constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or to obtaining re-
employment if the claimant should become employed. This shall be interpreted 
subjectively as to the particular employee involved, however, the mere fact 
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that a is employed at of subsequent injury shall not 
create a presumption that the preexisting permanent physical impairment 
was not such seriousness as to constitute such hindrance or obstacle to 
obtaining "-'AHII.HUHUlrrlP•TI 
Idaho Code§ 72-332(2) (emphasis added). 
293. The Idaho Supreme Court set out the definitive explanation of the "subjective 
hindrance" language in Archer v. Bonners Ferry Datsun, 117 Idaho 166, 172, 686 P.2d 557, 563 
(1990): 
Id. 
Under this test, evidence of the claimant's attitude toward the pre-ex1stmg 
condition, the claimant's medical condition before and after the injury or disease 
for which compensation is sought, nonmedical factors concerning the claimant, as 
well as expert opinions and other evidence concerning the effect of the preexisting 
condition on the claimant's employability will all be admissible. No longer will 
the result tum merely on the claimant's attitude toward the condition and expert 
opinion concerning whether a reasonable employer would consider the claimant's 
condition to make it more likely that any subsequent injury would make the 
claimant totally and permanently disabled. The result now will be determined by 
the Commission's weighing of the evidence presented on the question of whether 
or not the preexisting condition constituted a hindrance or obstacle to employment 
for the particular claimant. 
294. Archer makes it clear that an injured worker's attitude towards a pre-existing 
condition is but one factor to be considered by the Commission in detern1ining whether or not the 
pre-existing physical impairment constituted a subjective hindrance to Claimant. After Archer, 
the Commission is required to weigh a wide variety of medical and nonmedical factors, as well 
as expert and lay testimony, in making the determination as to whether or not a pre-existing 
condition constituted a hindrance or obstacle to employment for the particular claimant. 
295. With respect to his thoracic spine injury, Claimant has offered conflicting 
testimony from which one could conclude either that this condition was or was not a hindrance to 
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he to surgery. We are more 
medical testimony, paiiicularly that of Dirks Ludwig, which establishes that 
Claimant reasonably did have permanent medical restrictions on bending and lifting such that 
Claimant should avoid heavy and very heavy work following his thoracic fusion surgery. 
296. Regarding Claimant's pre-existing S-1 radiculopathy, we note that the 
limitations/restrictions attached to this condition do not appear to be any different than those 
given to Claimant for his prior thoracic spine injury. As such, it is difficult to understand how 
the S-1 radiculopathy could be deemed to constitute a subjective hindrance to Claimant prior to 
the 2006 accident. If the condition did not materially decrease Claimant's :functional ability, 
would Claimant or anyone else consider the condition to constitute a hindrance to his 
employability? Probably not, but as developed below, we need not come to a resolution of this 
question, because we find that Claimant's S-1 radiculopathy does not satisfy the "combining 
with" element of the prima facie case against the ISIF. 
Combining With: 
297. As part of its prima facie case, Employer/Surety bears the burden of establishing 
that both Claimant's pre-existing S-1 radiculopathy and his pre-existing thoracic spine condition 
combined with his accident produced impairments to cause total impairment and disability. 
Employer/Surety bears the burden of demonstrating that but for the pre-existing conditions, 
Claimant would not be totally and permanently disabled following the work accident. See 
Garcia v. JR. Simplot Co., 115 Idaho 966, 772 P.2d 1973 (1989); Bybee v. State Industrial 
Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 76, 921 P.2d 1200 (1996). 
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298. ISIF that Claimant's 2006 industrial accident, standing alone, rendered him 
totally and permanently disabled. Therefore, the claim against the ISIF must be dismissed 
because the requisite "combining with" elements of the prima facie case is not met In making 
this argument, the ISIF relies heavily on the 2006 Safety Video, and certain portions of 
Claimant's testimony, which tend to establish that Claimant was unhampered by any of his pre-
existing conditions prior to the 2006 accident. Therefore, the 2006 accident, standing alone, left 
him totally and permanently disabled. As noted above, we assign little weight to Claimant's 
conflicting testimony concerning his pre-injury and post-injury abilities. More persuasive to us 
is the testimony of Mr. Brownell and Dr. Collins, both of whom opined that Claimant's pre-
existing conditions, in particular, the thoracic spine injury, limited his ability to engage in gainful 
activity in his labor market. 
299. We have also concluded that as of his date of medical stability following the 2006 
industrial accident, Claimant is an odd-lot worker via the path of futility. The remaining 
question is whether this result obtains solely from the combined effects of the work accident and 
Claimant's pre-existing physical impairments. We find the records of Drs. Ganz and McNulty 
particularly instructive on this question. In his report of October I, 2008, Dr. Ganz offered the 
following comments on the impact of the thoracic spine fusion on the injuries attributable to 
Claimant's work accident: 
The patient specifically asked me whether I would recommend that he return to 
logging again, and my recommendation is that he should not return to logging or 
heavy labor again because of his prior lumbar fusion and then the fusion that I 
performed for the central disc herniation of Tl2-Ll. The only motion segment 
that remains in his back is at Ll-2 and L2-3, and with heavy work, those will 
certainly begin to fail and most likely will require surgery in the future. 
JE-21, p. 309. 
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8, 2009, offered similar observations: 
I have reviewed the FCE and agree with the findings. Mr. Green has a fusion at 
at Because those fusions, he has increased stress 
LI and L3. He should not engage in heavy physical activities such as logging. 
He is more suited to work in a light job duty category as outlined in the FCE. 
JE-23, p. 332. 
300. Therefore, per Drs. Ganz and McNulty, the fact that Claimant has a pre-existing 
Tl2-Ll fusion increases the risk that he will have further problems from the L3-5 fusion unless 
he observes certain prophylactic limitations/restrictions. We believe this demonstrates that 
Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine condition does combine with the effects of the work 
accident to contribute to Claimant's total and permanent disability. 
301. With respect to Claimant's pre-existing S-1 radiculopathy, we are unable to 
identify any persuasive evidence of record which would lead us to conclude that this condition is 
implicated in contributing to Claimant's total and permanent disability. As noted above, the 
limitations/restrictions referable to the S-1 radiculopathy do not appear to be any different than 
the limitations/restrictions relating to Claimant's earlier thoracic spine condition. Nor does there 
appear to be any evidence suggesting that Claimant suffered a worse outcome from the effects of 
the work accident as a consequence of the S-1 radiculopathy. In short, the evidence is 
insufficient to demonstrate that the S-1 radiculopathy combined with Claimant's thoracic spine 
condition and his accident produced conditions to cause total and permanent disability. Rather, 
the evidence establishes that Claimant's total and permanent disability is a result of the combined 
effects of Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine condition and the injuries associated with the 
2006 accident. 
CAREY FORMULA 
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302. Determination of the amount ofISIF liability is a matter of calculation set forth by 
the Idaho Supreme Court. Carey v. Clearwater County Road Dept., 107 Idaho 109, 686 P .2d 54 
(1984). To establish the amount of ISIF liability, the extent - in percentage of the whole person 
- of qualifying permanent physical impairments is required. 
303. The most persuasive evidence on the question of the extent and degree of 
Claimant's accident-caused impairment comes from Dr. McNulty. Dr. McNulty proposed that 
Claimant has a twenty percent PPI rating referable to his lumbar spine condition and a twenty-
five percent PPI rating referable to his cervical spine condition, with no impairment to pre-
existing conditions. 
304. We have found that while Claimant has a long and complicated pre-injury and 
medical history, only one of these pre-existing conditions combined with the subject accident to 
cause total and permanent disability. Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine condition combined 
with the accident-produced cervical and lumbar spine injuries to cause total and permanent 
disability. We have also found that the pre-existing thoracic spine condition satisfies all other 
elements of the primafacie case against the ISIF. The problem, of course, is that although we 
have found that the pre-existing thoracic spine condition was of such a severity to constitute a 
pre-existing permanent physical impairment, the extent and degree of Claimant's permanent 
physical impairment for that pre-existing condition has not been quantified by Employer/Surety, 
who bears the burden of proof in this regard. The Commission recognizes its authority, as 
discussed in Hartman v. Double L Manufacturing, 141 Idaho 456, 111 P.3d 141 (2005), to 
request evidence on the issue of Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine impairment, yet we are 
reluctant to do so when the parties, represented by experienced counsel, had ample opportunity 
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to marshal such evidence prior to hearing. The issue was clearly noticed and the parties are well 
aware of the elements required to prove and calculate ISIF liability. However, we believe the 
facts of this case mandate an assessment of the extent and degree of Claimant's pre-existing 
thoracic impainnent considering the overwhelming proof that Claimant suffered from a pre-
existing impairment which would impact Employer/Surety and ISIF's liability. Justice demands 
that we request that the parties present additional evidence of Claimant's pre-existing thoracic 
spine condition. As in Hartman we deem it necessary to retain jurisdiction of this matter in order 
to allow the parties to adduce additional evidence on the following question: 
(1) What is the appropriate impairment rating for Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine 
condition? 
305. The parties are directed to conduct such additional discovery and/or investigations 
that may be needed to provide the Commission with the evidence necessary to address this issue. 
If necessary, an additional hearing will be scheduled to allow the parties to present evidence and 
arguments on the issue as they deem fit. The Commission will necessarily defer any assessment 
of how responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent disability should be apportioned 
between Employer/Surety and the ISIF under Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 
107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984) pending additional evidence necessary to apply the Carey 
formula. 
TEMPORARY AND TOTAL DISABILITY 
306. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-408 and § 72-409, during his period of recovery, an 
injured worker is entitled to temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits calculated, 
for the first 52 weeks following the subject accident, at sixty-seven percent of his average weekly 
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wage, and thereafter, at sixty-seven percent of the currently applicable average weekly state 
wage. 
307. Idaho Code § 72-419 identifies the various ways to calculate the average weekly 
wage of injured workers, the method of calculation depending on whether the worker in question 
is paid by the hour, week, month or year or by his output. Claimant does not fall into any of the 
categories specified by the statute. As the sole proprietor of St. Joe Salvage, Claimant has never 
been paid a "wage", whether it be hourly, weekly, monthly or yearly. The sections which come 
closest to describing Claimant's situation are Idaho Code § 72-419(5) and Idaho Code § 72-
419(10) which specify: 
Idaho Code § 419(5). If at such time the hourly wage has not been fixed or 
cannot be ascertained, the wage for the purpose of calculating compensation shall 
be taken to be the usual wage for similar services where such services are 
rendered by paid employees. 
Idaho Code§ 419(10). When circumstances are such that the actual rate of pay 
cannot be readily ascertained, the wage shall be deemed to be the contractual, 
customary or usual wage in the particular employment, industry or community for 
the same or similar service. 
However, even these methods of calculating an injured worker's average weekly wage provide 
little guidance under the facts of this case; Claimant is not an employee. Rather, he is a sole 
proprietor who has elected coverage under the workers' compensation laws of this State. 
308. However, that he is entitled to TTD benefits during a period of recovery following 
a compensable work accident should be beyond cavil. When he elected coverage for himself, 
Claimant was certainly entitled to expect that he would receive the same classes of benefits as 
any other injured worker. Certainly, the Surety did not tell Claimant that because he was a sole 
proprietor, he was not entitled to time loss benefits since he was not a "wage earner". 
Anecdotally, the average weekly wage of sole proprietors such as Claimant has been calculated 
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the past by refe1Ting to tax returns and associated schedules. However, we need not decide 
Claimant's average weekly wage should be calculated for purposes of this case, since 
Claimant is entitled, at most, to the payment of temporary partial disability benefits. Under 
Idaho Code § 72-408, where Claimant has found employment at a lower paying job during his 
period of recovery, he is entitled to benefits for partial disability, calculated per Idaho Code § 72-
408(2) as follows: 
Partial disability. For partial disability during the period of recovery an amount 
equal to sixty-seven percent (67%) of his decrease in wage-earning capacity, but 
in no event to exceed the income benefits payable for total disability. 
309. Here, during the entirety of his period of recovery from July 4, 2006 through 
April 25, 2008, Claimant continued to operate St. Joe Salvage. He reported no earnings to 
Employer/Surety, yet his tax returns reveal that he had adjusted gross income from business 
profits of $42,321.00 for 2006, $70,295.00 for 2007, and $50,016.00 for 2008. For the period 
July 4, 2006 through March 13, 2008, Surety paid TTD benefits to Claimant of $28,703.90, 
representing what Surety thought it was required to pay for Claimant's period of temporary total 
disability. However, since Claimant continued to operate St. Joe Salvage during the period in 
question, he was entitled, at most, to temporary partial disability benefits. A review of 
Claimant's tax returns reveals that in the years following the subject accident, Claimant earned 
more than he had in the years leading up to his industrial accident. In short, the evidence does 
not reflect that Claimant suffered a "decrease in his wage earning capacity" following the subject 
accident, and during the time that he continued to operate St. Joe Salvage. Quite apart from the 
question of how to calculate Claimant's average weekly wage, Claimant has simply failed to 
demonstrate that he earned less in his business after the subject accident than before. Claimant 
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has demonstrated no entitlement to temporary partial disability benefits under Idaho Code § 72-
408(2). Employer/Surety has overpaid benefits in the amount of $28,703.90, and is entitled to a 
credit of $28,703.90 against its obligation to share in responsibility for Claimant's total and 
permanent disability. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
310. The final issue is Claimant's entitlement to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 
72-804. Attorney fees are not granted as a matter of right under the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Law, but may be recovered only under the circumstances set forth in Idaho Code 
§ 72-804 which provides: 
If the commission or any court before whom any proceedings are brought under 
this law determines that the employer or his surety contested a claim for 
compensation made by an injured employee or dependent of a deceased employee 
without reasonable ground, or that an employer or his surety neglected or refused 
within a reasonable time after receipt of a written claim for compensation to pay 
to the injured employee or his dependents the compensation provided by law, or 
without reasonable grounds discontinued payment of compensation as provided 
by law justly due and owing to the employee or his dependents, the employer 
shall pay reasonable attorney fees in addition to the compensation provided by 
this law. In all such cases the fees of attorneys employed by injured employees or 
their dependents shall be fixed by the commission. 
311. The decision that grounds exist for awarding attorney fees is a factual 
determination which rests with the Commission. Troutner v. Traffic Control Company, 97 Idaho 
525, 528, 547 P.2d 1130, 1133 (1976). 
312. Claimant asserts that Surety unreasonably delayed payment of his temporary 
disability benefits. As addressed above, Claimant failed to establish entitlement to TTD benefits 
because he failed to prove he had any lost wages. Therefore, Claimant is not entitled to an award 
of attorney fees related to the manner in which Surety paid him TTD benefits. Claimant also sets 
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forth a laundry list of complaints about Surety's behaviors in adjusting the claim and 
communicating with the panel experts that he asse1is constitute unreasonable practices. Too, 
Claimant asserts that Surety did not pay bills associated with claims it accepted, and did not pay 
mileage due. The record and briefing are insufficient to establish Claimant's claims with the 
specificity necessary to form the basis for an order for attorney fees. 
313. Claimant has failed to establish he is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 72-804. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
1. Claimant has proven that he suffered injuries to his cervical and lumbar spine 
areas as a result of his industrial accident on July 3, 2006. 
2. Claimant has proven entitlement to medical care for his cervical and lumbar spine 
injuries through April 25, 2008. 
3. Claimant has failed to establish entitlement to temporary disability benefits. 
Surety is entitled to a credit of $28,703.90 for its overpayment, such credit to be applied as 
anticipated by Idaho Code § 72-316. 
4. Claimant has proven PPI related to his July 2006 industrial accident of 20% of the 
whole person related to his lumbar spine condition and 25% of the whole person related to his 
cervical spine condition. 
5. Claimant has proven that he is totally and permanently disabled as of April 25, 
2008. 
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6. Employer/Surety has proven that Claimant's thoracic spine injury warrants the 
assignment of a PPI rating, was manifest, constituted a subjective hindrance, and combined with 
the effects of the subject accident to cause permanent and total disability. 
7. Employer is liable for its portion of disability as may be established by 
application of the Carey formula and it shall begin paying total and permanent disability benefits 
immediately, based upon the date of medical stability (April 25, 2008), with opportunity for 
adjustment with ISIF after relevant pre-existing PPI and Carey formula applications have. been 
ascertained. 
8. ISIF is liable for its portion of disability as may be established by application of 
the Carey formula. 
9. Jurisdiction over this matter is retained for the purpose of reqmrmg 
Employer/Surety to put on additional proof concerning the extent and degree of permanent 
physical impairment referable to Claimant's thoracic spine condition. 
10. If necessary, the Commission will schedule another hearing for the purpose of 
taking evidence and argument on the extent of the thoracic spine impairment. 
11. Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-
804. 
12. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all 
matters adjudicated. 
INDU~MM~~~-
Thomas P. Baskin, Chairman 
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DEFENDANT EMPLOYER/SURETY'S MOTION FOR CLARTFTCATION ON ORDER AND MOT!ON FOR 
DEADLINE ON FURTHER PROCEEDINGS - 1 
r / N 
ERIC S. BAILEY, ISB NO.: 4408 
BOWEN & BAILEY, L.L.P. 
1311 W. Jefferson Street 
Post Office Box 1007 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1007 
Telephone: (208) 344-7200 
Facsimile: (208) 344-9670 
Attorneys for Defendant Employer/Surety 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ROY GREEN, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
ST. JOE SALVAGE, 
Employer, 
and 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Surety, 
and 
STA TE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
I.C. No.: 06-007698 
DEFENDANT EMPLOYER/SURETY'S 
MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION ON ORDER 
AND MOTION FOR DEADLINE 
ON FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
COME NOW Defendants, St. Joes Salvage and Travelers fudemnity Company, by and through their 
attorneys of record, Bowen & Bailey, LLP, and hereby requests that the Commission address 2 issues in 
this matter. At this point in time these Defendants are not making a Motion for Reconsideration. 
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Instead, Defendants are making two separate motions for post-order activities from the Findings of 
Conclusions of and Order as filed January 2014. 
1. The Industrial Commission has ordered ISIF and the Employer/Surety to engage in 
some additional activity to establish impairment ratings for purposes of addressing the "CAREY" 
Formula for determining ISIF proportionate responsibility in this matter. Jurisdiction has been 
retained. Insomuch as it appears that the paiiies may need to go as far as having a second hearing, 
these Defendants would like to establish a timeframe for additional activity. 
It is proposed that the Industrial Commission issue an Addendum, or subsequent Order 
indicating that the parties are to have any activity needed to be undertaken completed within 120 
days from the date of any such order. It is believed that this would allow both of the parties ample 
time within which to formulate additional evidence and documentation that may be needed. Withing 
this period of time, parties can deal with the question of whether another hearing will be required in 
this matter. Defendants simply do not want this to be an open ended situation where this case now 
languishes for many more months. It has been going on long enough. As such, Defendants would 
respectfully request that the Industrial Commission issue an order establishing a 120 daytimeline on 
the parties' ability to generate additional evidence to be submitted to the Industrial Commission. 
2. The Industrial Commission has indicated that ISIF is liable for a portion of disability 
m this matter. (Order, Section 8). The Industrial Commission has ordered the Defendant 
Employer/Surety to pay total and permanent disability benefits. Defendants believe that this is an 
onerous burden upon the Employer and is inconsistent with how the payment of total permanent 
benefits is undertaken in a case. In fact, in situations ofISIF liability, Defendants are unaware of any 
case law or statute suggesting such a process. 
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Obviously, the Industrial Commission has already decided ISIP is liable. What has not been 
decided is an analysis under the CAREY Formula as to when the Employer's responsibility would 
end for making any payments, and when ISIP' s responsibility for taking over all total perm benefits, 
(i.e. TTD payments) would start. 
In a normal situation where the CAREY Formula analysis has occurred, both the Employer 
and ISIP are contemporaneously exposed to payment of certain benefits. During the timeframe that 
the Surety is required to pay out their exposure under that analysis, payments are made essentially at 
the PPI/PPD rate. Then, during that same period of time that the Surety is making the monthly 
payments for its portion of the total perm benefits ISIF makes up the differential between what the 
payment is at the PPD rate, and what the appropriate TTD rate payment would be. 
Once the Employer's proportionate responsibility has run and all of the Employer's payments 
have been made (pursuant to the CAREY Formula), ISIP then takes over full payment ofbenefits for 
the remainder of the disabled Employee's life. This is well established, and there is no question as to 
how that process normally proceeds. 
In the current matter, the Commission has issued its Findings of Pact and Order that ISIF is 
liable to some degree. The exact "degree" is that dispute. Nonetheless, ISIF should be making 
payments on Claimant's benefits for the differential between the PPD rate and the TTD rate from 
April 25, 2008 to some indeterminate time in the future. That is absolutely undisputed. That is how 
the payment system works. 
What is up in the air is when the Surety's timeframe ends and ISIF is relegated to taking over 
the entirety of payments. That is what the issue is about in this case. Since the Industrial 
Commission has found Claimant to be totally and pem1anently disabled and ISIF to be liable to some 
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degree, then ISIF owes those "differential" payments. The Defendants agree that at this point in time 
there is insufficient evidence to identify when these Defendants' obligation ends. All 
Defendants are stating is that no matter how one looks at this case, if Claimant is totally and 
permanently disabled and ISIF has liability (as per the Industrial Commission's Order) then ISIF 
should be making the differential payments until such time as the Industrial Commission determines 
the full extent of the Employer's liability. 
If the Employer's liability does not end until many, many months down the line into the 
future, then there is no harm to ISIF because ISIF would still only be making the differential 
payments as is required by statute and case low and would not have to pay out money for the full 
total perm payment erroneously and prematurely. Once again, ISIF should be making that 
differential payment to the Claimant. 
WHEREFORE, these Defendants respectfully request that the Industrial Commission 
modify the prior Order indicating that ISIF should make immediate payment to the Claimant of the 
differential amounts not owed by these Defendants for total perm benefits to the Claimant until such 
time as Defendant Employer/Surety's ultimate liability is ascertained from this next round of 
litigation. 
These Defendants also request an Order from the Industrial Commission establishing a 
deadline of 120 days to generate additional evidence as previously ordered. 
DATED this 18th day ofFebrmny, 2014. 
ERIC S. BAILEY \ 
Attorneys for Defendant Emplo1er/Surety J 
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LC. No. 06-07698 
DEFENDANT ISIPS RESPONSE TO . 
EMPLOYER/SURETY·s MOTIONS 
FOR CLARIFICATION ON ORDER 
AND MOTION FOR DEADLINE ON 
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
Comes now the Defendant State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, by and 
through its attorney of record, Thomas W. Callery of Jones, Brower and Callery, PLLC, and 
responds to the motions filed by the Defendant Euxployer/Surety on or about February 18, 2014. 
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1. The Employer/Surety has requested a motion establishing a 120 day timeline in which 
the parties are to generate additional evidence to be submitted to the Industrial Commission on 
the issue of impairment and a proposed Carey apportionment. The ISIF believes that the parties 
can move expeditiously on this issue without the establishment of a deadline; Frankly, the 
Employer/Surety has had a period in excess of 6 years to obtain an impairment rating for the 
Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine condition. Further, the Order of the Industrial 
Commission indicates that the burden of establishing an impairment rating is upon the 
Employer/Surety to put on additional proof concerning the extent and degree of impairment for 
the Claimant's thoracic spine. 
Unlike the Employer/Surety, the Fund has not obtained any Independent Medical 
Evaluations during the pendency of the case. It is the intention of the Fund to review the 
additional evidence that the Employer/Surety obtains, but would reserve the right to obtain its 
own Independent Medical Evaluation pending review of the Employer/Surety's additional 
evidence. The burden of proof in this case remains on the Employer/Surety and the Fund should 
be allowed sufficient time to rebut that evidence if it so desires. 
Further, a hearing, as proposed by the Commission in its Order, can be established on an 
expedited basis if necessary due to the limited nature of the issue. 
2. The second motion of the Employer/Surety appears to be requesting that the 
Commission enter an order for the immediate payment of the so called differential amount by the 
ISlF from the date of stability (April 25, 2008) forward. Although the Employer/Surety tries to 
couch its pleading as not a motion for reconsiderationi in essence, the motion is exactly such a 
motion. It seeks affirmative relief from the original Order of the Commjssion and is hardly 
seeking clarification. The Order is not ambiguons. 
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The Industrial Commission's Order clearly sets forth its intention that the 
Employer/Surety begin "paying total and permanent disabilify benefits immediately. The 
appropriate Carey apportionment is specifically reserved for a later determination. Should it be 
necessary for an adjustment following a final order on the Carey apportionment, then such action 
can be taken at that time. It is the Employer/Surety who failed to establish as part of its prima 
facie case, a pre-existing impairment. The only reason a Carey apportionment is not available 
immediately is because the Employer/Surety failed to put on proof of a permanent physical 
impairment with regard to the pre-existing thoracic spine condition. 
Before the Industrial Special Indemnity FlUld should be ordered to begin making 
payments, a prima facie case must be established. It is not prejudicial to the Employer/Surety to 
make it pay the full total and permanent disability payment at the TTD rate in a situation such as 
the present case where the Commission is retaining jurisdiction to allow the Employer/Surety an 
opportunity to present a pre-existing impairment rating. It was the Employer/Surety's obligation 
to provide that evidence to the Commission and it had ample time in the many years that this 
litigation has been pending. It is not now an emergency, and payment by the Industrial Special 
Indemnity FlUld can await a proper and fully adjudicated and final Carey apportionment 
detennination. 
/ 
DATED this 2.. '> day of February, 2014. 
DEFENDANT ISIF'S RESPONSE TO 
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C. 
THOMAS W. CALLERY \ 
Attomey for State of Idaho Industrial 
Special Indemnity Fund 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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V. 
ROY GREEN, dba ST. JOE SALVAGE, 
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and 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
IC 2006-007698 
ORDER REGARDING 
CLARIFICATION 
On February 18, 2014, Defendants Employer and Surety ("Defendants") filed two 
motions in response to the Commission's decision in the above-captioned case. The first motion 
seeks to limit the time during which the parties may collect additional evidence. The second 
motion purports to seek "clarification" of the decision, specifically ~7 of the order, which states: 
Employer is liable for its portion of disability as may be established 
by application of the Carey formula and it shall begin paying total and 
permanent disability benefits immediately, based upon the date of 
medical stability (April 25, 2008), with opportunity for adjustment 
with ISIF after relevant pre-existing PPI and Carey formula 
applications have been ascertained. 
Green v. St. Joe Salvage, IC 2006-007698, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 114 
(January 29, 2014). 
ORDER REGARDING CLARIFICATION -1 
Defendant State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF") objects to the motions, 
arguing, first, that a deadline for evidence compilation is not necessary, and second, that the order 
requires no clarification, because it is not ambiguous. ISIF asserts that Defendants are essentially 
making a motion for reconsideration. 
Regarding the first motion, we agree with ISIF that no deadline is necessary. Defendants bear 
the burden of proof on the issue of Claimant's permanent impairment referable to his thoracic spine 
condition. Therefore, the time it takes to compile the necessary evidence will largely be determined 
by Defendants. ISIF is correct that it should be afforded sufficient time to collect rebuttal evidence, if 
necessary. The Commission will not at this time presume to estimate how long the compilation of 
evidence will, or should, take. If, in the future, any of the parties believes that another party is 
unfairly delaying proceedings in this matter, the Commission will entertain a relevant motion. At this 
time, however, setting a deadline would be premature. 
Regarding the second motion, we likewise agree with ISIF that what Defendants are seeking 
1s not clarification, but reconsideration. The order is unambiguous, and it is clear from their 
arguments that Defendants understand its requirements. Defendants simply object to the 
requirements, stating that the order places an "onerous burden" on them. Defendants argue that in a 
"nonnal situation ... both the Employer and ISIF are contemporaneously exposed to payment of 
certain benefits." Defendants' Motion, p. 3. This is not, however, a normal situation. The degree of 
ISIF's liability has not been determined. Defendants have been granted an extraordinary opportunity 
to put on more evidence relating to Carey apportionment, and it is not unreasonable, in the meantime, 
to require Defendants to pay total and permanent disability benefits to Claimant. The order allows for 
adjustment, if necessary, after the extent ofISIF's liability has been determined. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendants' motions for deadline and clarification are 
DENIED. 
ORDER REGARDING CLARIFICATION -2 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this~_ day of March, 2014. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ATTEST: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
""""a,1,:t~,t?f~by certify that on the /qr{'1 day of March, 2014, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing'ORDER REGARDING CLARIFICATION was served by regular United States 
Mail upon each of the following: 
STARR KELSO 
POBOX1312 
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83816 
ERIC S BAILEY 
PO BOX 1007 
BOISE ID 83701 
THOMAS W CALLERY 
PO BOX 854 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
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ORDER REGARDING CLARIFICATION 3 
ERIC S. BAILEY, ISB NO: 4408 
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP 
1311 W. Jefferson Street 
Post Office Box 1007 
Boise, Idaho 83701-1007 
Telephone: (208) 344-7200 
Facsimile: (208) 344-9670 
Attorneys for Defendant Employer/Surety 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ROY GREEN, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
ST. JOE SALVAGE, 
Employer, 
and 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMP ANY, 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
J.C. No.: 06-007698 
NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH 
WITH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
DIRECTIVE 
Comes now Defendant Employer/Surety by and through their undersigned counsel of record, 
and hereby submits the following evidence in compliance with the Industrial Commission's Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order as filed on January 29, 2014. 
NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DIRECTIVE -
Industrial Commission, in its Order indicated the following: 
Jurisdiction over this matter is retained for the purpose of requmng 
Employer/Surety to put on additional proof concerning the extent and degree of 
permanent physical impairment referable to Claimant's thoracic spine condition. 
The Industrial Commission furthermore indicated that if necessary, the Industrial 
Commission would schedule another hearing for the purpose of taking evidence and argument as to 
the extent of the thoracic spine impairment. Insomuch as the Industrial Commission indicated that 
there may be necessity for scheduling a hearing, that also presumes that there was no specific 
requirement that there be a hearing in this matter. 
As such, Defendants have submitted as Exhibit A to this document its additional proof as 
defined by the Industrial Commission concerning the need for evidence as to extent and degree of 
permanent physical impairment referable to Mr. Green's thoracic spine condition. By way of this 
submission, these Defendants believe that they are in compliance with the request of the Industrial 
Commission to provide it with this additional information. 
On the chance that another hearing may be "necessary'', Defendants would certainly reserve 
the right to present additional testimonial evidence from any physician who has either treated 
Claimant or has rendered opinions as to issues concerning Claimant's thoracic spine. 
DATED this 2 day of May, 2014. 
ERIC S. BAILEY 
Attorneys for Defendants E ployer/Surety 
l 
NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DIRECTIVE - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on th;-2_, day of May, 2014, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was delivered to the following party(ies) in the method indicated: 
STARR KELSO 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 1312 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-1312 
FAX: (208) 664-6261 
THOMAS W CALLERY 
JONES BROWER & CALLERY 
PO BOX 854 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
FAX: (208) 746-9553 
(counsel for ISIF) 
"N 
[ ] 
U.S.MAIL 
HAND DELNERY 
FACSIMILE 
~ U.S.MAIL 
[ ] HAND DELNERY 
[ ] FACSIMILE 
NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DIRECTIVE - 3 
IMPAIRMENT RATING 
DATE: 03/19/2014 
PATIENT NAME: GREEN, ROY 
 
 
DATE OF INJURY: April of 2002 
Benewah Community Hospital 
St Maries Family Medicine 
229 S. 7th Street 
St Maries, ID 83861 
(208) 245-5551 
www.bchmect:org 
Mr. Green is a 54-year-old male who is known to me through an IME performed 
on 9/8/2009. Please refer to that report for additional information 
concerning Mr. Green's medical treatment. 
Mr. Green sustained.an injury in April of 2002. He had progressive symptoms 
of lower extremity paresthesias and eventually bladder dysfunction. He was 
evaluated by Dr. Ganz in January of 2003. Dr. Ganz obtained a myelogram and 
enhanced CT scan on 1/15/2003. which demonstrated a significant herniated 
disc at the T12-Ll level. At the time of that appointment, Mr. Green was 
having lower extremity weakness as well as urinary incontinence. On 
1/29/2003, Dr. Ganz performed an anterolateral thoracotomy for approach to 
the Tl2-Ll disc space. He performed a microdiscectomy at Tl2-Ll and an 
anterior lumbar interbody fusion with allograft bone and hardware. Mr. Green 
notes a prolonged period of convalescence from that surgery; however, he did 
eventually return to work. 
Subsequent to that injury, he has had cervical and lumbar spine surgery. 
Mr. Green was examined on 3/19/2014. He has a well-healed thoracotomy 
incision on the right side. The incision is well healed and 18 cm in length. 
He does have decreased peri-incisional sensation on the right side, but not 
on the left. No pain with thoracic rotation of his spine. No evidence of 
infection and minimal tenderness over the operative site. 
Mr. Green has reached maximal medical improvement concerning his injury and 
subsequent surgery at T12-Ll level. His surgery was performed in 2004 and the 
5th edition of the AMA. Guides will be used to calculate an impairment 
HJBIT A 
GREEN, ROY 
3/19/2014 
Page 2 
His symptom complex best falls into DRE thoracic category 4 with a 20% whole 
person impairment. That impairment is attributable to the fusion at the T12 
disc space, incorporating T12 and Ll. 
Medical records from 2003 through 2004 were reviewed concerning Mr. Green's 
treatment with Dr. Ganz, Dr. Dirks, and Dr. Luther. 
Thank you for allowing me to evaluate Mr. Green. 
Sincerely, 
MD* 
JMM:ml 
BEFORE 
ROY GREEN, 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Claimant, 
V. 
ROY GREEN, dba ST. JOES SALVAGE 
LOGGING, 
Employer, 
and 
IRA VELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
IC 2006-007698 
ORDER ON ISIF LIABILITY 
This matter went to hearing before the Industrial Commission on August 2 land August 
22, 2012. On or about January 29, 2014, the Industrial Commission entered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order finding, inter alia, that Claimant is totally and permanently 
disabled, and that ISIF shares in responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent disability by 
virtue of a pre-existing thoracic spine injury. However, because Employer put on no proof that 
would allow the Commission to quantify apportionment of total and permanent disability 
between the Employer and the ISIF, the Commission retained jurisdiction over the case for the 
purpose of adducing additional proof on the extent and degree of Claimant's permanent physical 
impairment for his pre-existing thoracic spine injury. The Commission's decision specifies that 
the decision is final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated pursuant to Idaho Code 
ORDER ON ISIF LIABILITY - 1 
§ 8. No party a motion for reconsideration within 20 days of Commission's 
decision as allowed by Idaho Code§ 72-718. By order dated April 
the following issue for hearing: 
2014, the Commission set 
The extent of ISIF liability for total permanent benefits as previously addressed 
by the Industrial Commission. 
As noted, having found that responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent disability should 
be shared between Employer and the ISIF, the only element remaining to quantify ISIF liability 
is the identification of the impairment rating related to Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine 
mJury. 
The parties referred this question to physicians of their choosing. Dr. Mc Nulty evaluated 
Claimant on behalf of Employer while Dr. Sears evaluated Claimant on behalf of ISIF. In 
rendering their opinions on the extent and degree of Claimant's thoracic spine impairment, both 
physicians relied on the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5th Edition 
(Guides). Dr. Sears testified that he thought it more appropriate to rely on the 5th Edition to the 
Guides because the 5th Edition affords an opportunity to rate Claimant's impairment based on a 
diagnosis-related estimates method, which, according to Dr. Sears, offers a more accurate way to 
assess Claimant's impairment for his thoracic spine injury under the peculiar facts of this case. 
(Sears deposition 15/10-17 /19). 
Following his examination of Claimant, Dr. McNulty proposed that Claimant qualifies 
for rating under DRE thoracic category IV, which suggests a rating ranging between 20% to 23% 
of the whole person for individuals with alteration of motion segment integrity or bilateral or 
multilevel radiculopathy. Dr. McNulty rated Claimant at the lower range of category IV, giving 
him a 20% whole person rating. 
ORDER ON ISIF LIABILITY - 2 
Sears testified that on exam Claimant had no bilateral or multilevel 
radiculopathy, so only way that category IV status could be entertained for Claimant is if he 
can be said to have "alteration of motion segment integrity". Dr. Sears testified that Claimant 
cannot qualify for this diagnosis since alteration of motion segment integrity is identified from 
flexion and extension radiographs demonstrating translation of one vertebra on another of more 
than 2.5 mm. Since Claimant is fused at Tl2-Ll, and since the fusion is solid, it follows that he 
does not have any motion at T12-Ll, and cannot, therefore have any translation of one vertebral 
body on another with flexion and extension. 
The complete qualifying criteria for DRE thoracic category IV reads as follows: 
Alteration of motion segment integrity or bilateral or multilevel radiculopathy; 
alteration of motion segment integrity is defined from flexion and extension 
radiographs as translation of one vertebra on another of more than 2.5 mm; 
radiculopathy as defined in thoracic category III need not be present if there is 
alteration of motion segment integrity; if an individual is to be placed in DRE 
thoracic category IV due to radiculopathy; the latter must be bilateral or involve 
more than one level. 
AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5th Edition. 
Using the definition of alteration of motion segment integrity quoted above, it would not seem 
that Claimant can qualify for a category IV diagnosis since he has neither radiculopathy, nor 
alteration of motion segment integrity. 
However, as pointed out during the deposition of Dr. Sears, the Guides contain expanded 
definitions of "alteration of motion segment integrity" at several places. At page 378 of the 5th 
Edition to the Guides, the following definition of alteration of motion segment integrity is found: 
Alteration of motion segment integrity can be either loss of motion segment 
integrity (increased translational or angular motion) or decreased motion resulting 
mainly from developmental changes, fusion, fracture healing, healed infection, or 
surgical arthrodesis. 
ORDER ON ISIF LIABILITY - 3 
page 383 of the 5th Edition to the Guides, a similar definition of 
is found: 
motion segment 
Motion segment alteration can be either loss of motion segment integrity 
(increased translational or angular motion) or decreased motion secondary to 
developmental fusion, fracture healing, healed infection, or surgical arthrodeses. 
From these sections, it appears that alteration of motion segment integrity is intended to refer to 
both alteration and loss of motion segment integrity. Loss of motion due to fusion is specifically 
included in these definitions of alteration of motion segment integrity. 
It is clear that a finding of alteration of motion segment integrity is one of the paths 
towards obtaining a DRE thoracic category IV diagnosis. What is puzzling is that in defining 
that term for the purposes of DRE thoracic category IV, the editors of the Guides chose to give a 
narrower definition than that used by the editors to more generally describe what is meant by 
altered motion segment integrity. From this, it could be argued that the more specific definition 
described in the qualifying criteria for DRE thoracic category IV should govern. However, as 
Employer has pointed out, one of the illustrative examples provided by the editors to the Guides 
augers against this conclusion. In example 15-11, at page 391 to the 5th Edition, an individual 
with a thoracic spine fusion was found qualified for DRE thoracic category V, in part, because he 
demonstrated "alteration of motion segment integrity given the fusion" under category IV. 
Therefore, it seems clear that the editors of the Guides anticipated that a loss of motion segment 
integrity can be demonstrated by a successful fusion surgery which produces a decrease in 
motion. 
Dr. Sears testified that he found that Claimant was not qualified for inclusion in category 
IV because he had no abnormal translation of one vertebral body over another. However, on 
cross examination, Dr. Sears conceded that the definition of alteration of motion segment 
ORDER ON ISIF LIABILITY - 4 
integrity appears to include decreased motion by way of successful fusion. on this 
definition, he acknowledged that an individual with a thoracic spine fusion would qualify for 
inclusion in category IV. 
Even so, Dr. Sears declined to amend his opinion on the appropriate impairment rating 
for Claimant, who assuredly had a Tl2-Ll fusion as part of the treatment for his pre-existing 
thoracic spine injury. Dr. Sears explained that loss of motion segment integrity at this level is 
not significant, and that an individual with a successful fusion following surgery should be able 
to return to good function. Accordingly, he testified that he continued to abide by the 16% rating 
he awarded to Claimant, even though he had previously acknowledged the propriety of applying 
the 5th Edition to the Guides to this situation exactly because it offered a diagnosis-based method 
of evaluation that would not confuse the contributions of Claimant's various injuries to his 
complaints. 
Having considered the evidence, we conclude that the evaluation performed by 
Dr. McNulty is more persuasive, and that Employer has met its burden of showing that Claimant 
suffers from a 20% PPI rating for the effects of his pre-existing thoracic spine injury. 
With this conclusion in place, it is now possible to perform the calculations necessary to 
apportion Claimant's total and permanent disability between the ISIP and Employer. 
Claimant's impairments total 65% (20% lumbar spine, 25% cervical spine, 20% 
pre-existing thoracic spine). This leaves 35% residual disability to apportion between Employer 
and the ISIF under Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 
(1984). Using the formula adopted in that case, Employer's liability for the payment of PPI and 
PPD is calculated as follows: 45/65 x 35 = 24.23 + 45 or 69.23 of the whole person. This 
represents Employer's liability for disability, inclusive of the 45% impairment found owing. 
ORDER ON ISIF LIABILITY - 5 
Claimant is entitled to payment of 346.15 of PPI/PPD benefits, at the appropriate rate, 
commencing on the date medical stability. Thereafter, Claimant is entitled to the payment of 
total and permanent disability benefits at the statutory rate by the ISIF. 
In its brief: the ISIF has raised a number of challenges to the Commission's January 29, 
2014 decision. As noted by Employer, that decision is final and conclusive as to matters 
adjudicated pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-718. Neither party filed a timely 
motion for reconsideration following the January 29, 2014 decision. As such, the Commission is 
not authorized to entertain a motion to revisit the matters decided in the original decision. 
Idaho Code § 72-718 adopts a version of the doctrine of res judicata peculiar to the Idaho 
workers' compensation system. A decision of the Commission is res judicata as to matters 
actually adjudicated in the absence of a timely motion to reconsider. The decision became final 
and conclusive as to matters adjudicated therein by the Commission 20 days after the date of the 
decision. Neither the parties, nor the Commission may disturb such a decision lest the plain 
meaning of "final and conclusive" be ignored. 
As we noted in the recent case of Powell v. Northwest Cascade, Inc., Order Denying 
Reconsideration, 2007-001470, 2014 IIC 0050 (2014), we are mindful of the fact that in the 
recent case of Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 155 Idaho 903, 318 P.3d 893 (2014), the 
Supreme Court observed that an order of the Commission making an award to Claimant of 
medical benefits in an amount certain was not a "final order", but was, instead, an "interlocutory 
order", which could have been revisited by the Commission at any time until a final appealable 
order was issued. In Powell, the order at issue was final and conclusive per Idaho Code § 72-
718, and no timely motion for reconsideration had been filed. We noted that while Vawter might 
suggest a contrary result, we were unwilling to read that case as broadly as might be suggested, 
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where the not treat the § 72-718. 
It is difficult to square Vawter with the unambiguous provisions of Idaho Code § 18. 
present, we will be guided by what we perceive to be the applicable provision of the statutory 
scheme. We decline to entertain the ISIF's several arguments against the Commission's January 
29, 2014 decision. 
__::.--=-~=-----' 2014. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
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I hereby ce1iify that on the day of 201 a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER ON ISIF LIABILITY was served by regular United States Mail 
upon each of the following: 
STARR KELSO 
PO BOX 1312 
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83816 
ERIC BAILEY 
PO BOX 1007 
BOISE ID 83701-1007 
KENNETH L MALLEA 
PO BOX 857 
MERIDIAN ID 83680 
THOMAS W CALLERY 
PO BOX 854 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
ka 
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Thomas W. Callery 
JONES BROWER & CALLERY 
P.O. Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-359] 
Fax: (208) 746-9553 
Email: tcallery@lewiston.com 
Idaho State Bar No. 2292 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
78 SW 5th Avenue, Suite 1 
P.O. Box 857 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Telephone: (208) 888-2790 
Fax: (208) 888-2789 
Email: klm@mallealaw.com 
Idaho State Bar No. 2397 
Attorneys for Defendant/ Appellant State of Idaho 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
ROY GREEN, 
Claimant/Respondent, 
vs. 
ROY GREEN, dba ST. JOES SALVAGE 
LOGGING, 
Employer/Respondent, 
and 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, 
Surety /Respondent, 
and 
******** 
LC. No. 2006-007698 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED CLAIMANT, ROY GREEN, AND HIS 
ATTORNEY, STARR KELSO, P.O. Box 131 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1312 AND 
DEFENDANTS ROY dba JOES SALVAGE LOGGING AND 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY AND THEIR ATTORNEY, ERIC S. 
BAILEY, P.O. Box 1007, Boise, ID 83701 AND THE CLERK OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Defendant, STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, appeals against the above-named Claimant, ROY GREEN, and 
above-named Defendants, ROY GREEN, dba ST. JOES SALVAGE LOGGING AND 
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMP ANY to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Idaho 
Industrial Commission Order and Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law entered 
January 29, 2014, and the Order on ISIF Liability entered November 26, 2014. 
Commissioner Baskin, Chairman. 
2. The issues presented on appeal include: 
Whether the Commission erred in sua sponte retaining jurisdiction in this case. 
Whether the Commission abused its discretion in sua sponte retaining jurisdiction in this 
case. 
Whether the Commission erred in relieving Employer/Surety from its failure to prove the 
elements ofISIF liability, which such issues were clearly noticed for hearing. 
Whether the Commission's finding that Claimant's thoracic spine condition "combined 
with" the industrial injuries to render Claimant totally and permanently disabled is 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Whether the Commission erred in concluding as a matter of law that Claimant suffered 
from a permanent pre-existing physical impairment within the meaning of section 
72-332(2) when no physician had assigned an impairment rating for Claimant's thoracic 
spine condition. 
Whether the Commission erred in applying the Carey Formula when at hearing there was 
no evidence of any impairment rating for Claimant's thoracic spine condition. 
3. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
Judgment or Orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and 
pursuant to I.AR., Rule 1 l(d). 
4. A reporter's transcript of the Hearing held on August 21 and 22, 2012, was 
prepared and used by the parties in post hearing briefing and is requested for inclusion in 
the record on appeal. 
5. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the 
agency's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR.: 
a. All Exhibits admitted at the hearing held on August 21 and 22, 
2012. 
b. All Post-Hearing Depositions. 
c. All Post-Hearing Briefs of the parties. 
d. ISIF Brief on Retained Jurisdiction filed November 10, 2014. 
6. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each 
reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out 
below: 
Julie Mccaughan 
M & M Reporting Services 
816 Sherman A venue, #7 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814 
(208) 765-1700 
b. That the Appellant is exempt from paying any clerk's fee or filing 
fee because Appellant is an agency of the State ofldaho. 
Dated: December 2). , 2014 
Dated: Decembe0-7, 2014 
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Respectfully submitted, 
Thomas W. Callery 
Attorney for Appellant 
-~~~ Kenneth L. Mallea 
Attorney for Appellant 
/ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on day December, 2014, a true and 
correct copy of the within and foregoing document was served upon: 
Starr Kelso 
P.O. Box 1312 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1312 
Attorney for Claimant 
Eric S. Bailey 
Bowen & Bailey, LLP 
P.O. Box 1007 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorney for Employer/Surety 
Court Reporter 
U.S. mail 
__ by facsimile 
OF 
ROY GREEN, 
Claimant/Respondent, 
v. 
ROY GREEN, dba ST. JOES SALVAGE 
LOGGING, Employer, and TRAVELERS 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, Surety, 
Defendants/Respondents, 
and 
r 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Appeal From: 
Case Number: 
Order Appealed from: 
Attorneys for Appellant (ISIF): 
CERTIFICATE OF 
Industrial Commission, 
Thomas P. Baskin, Chairman presiding 
IC 2006-007698 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, 
filed January 29, 2014, and Order on ISIF Liability, 
filed November 25, 2014. 
Thomas W. Callery 
PO Box 854 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
PO Box 857 
Meridian, ID 83680 
GREEN-I 
Attorney for Respondents 
(Employer & Surety): 
Appealed By: 
Appealed Against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Name of Reporter: 
Transcript Requested: 
Dated: 
CERTIFICATE 
Erle Bailey 
PO Box 1007 
Boise, 83701-1007 
Defendant/ Appellant (ISIF) 
Claimant/Respondent (Roy Green) 
Defendants/Respondents (Roy Green, dba St. Joes 
Salvage Logging, Employer, and Travelers 
Indemnity Company, Surety) 
December 23, 2014 
No fees paid. Appellant is ISIP, a state agency. 
Julie Mccaughan, M&M Reporting Services 
Standard transcript has been requested. Transcript 
has been prepared and filed with the Commission. 
December 29, 2014 
' I ~ • , ~ 
. l 1'. (_tJ 
·1~i:)1E GOUR F 
M'PEALS 
I t.M B: 
I, Kenna Andrus, "''!".'""" Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission of the State ofldaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct 
photocopy of the Notice of Appeal, Findings of Conclusions of Law, and Order, and 
Order on ISIF Liability, and the whole thereof, in IC case number 2006-007698 for Roy 
Green. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of 
said Commission this 29th day of December, 2014. 
1 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD 
I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all 
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record Supreme Court 
No. 42782 on appeal by Rule 28(b)(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b ). 
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are correctly 
listed in the List of Exhibits. Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court upon settlement 
of the Reporter's Transcript and Agency's Record herein. 
DATED this 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD (ROY GREEN -42782) - 1 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ROY GREEN, 
Claimant/Respondent, 
V. 
ROY GREEN, dba ST. JOES SALVAGE 
LOGGING, Employer, and TRAVELERS 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, Surety, 
Defendants/Respondents, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 42782 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
TO: STEPHEN W. KENYON, Clerk of the Courts; and 
Thomas W. Callery for Defendant/ Appellant; 
Kenneth L. Mall ea for Defendant/ Appellant; 
Starr Kelso for Claimant/Respondent; and 
Eric Bailey for Employer & Surety Respondents. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and, 
pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been 
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following: 
Attorney for Appellant: 
THOMAS W CALLERY 
PO BOX 854 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
Attorney for Claimant/Respondent: 
STARR KELSO 
PO BOX 1312 
COEURD'ALENEID 83816 
KENNETH L MALLEA 
PO BOX 857 
MERIDIAN ID 83680 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION (ROY GREEN - 42782) - 1 
Attorney for Employer & Surety/Respondents: 
ERIC BAILEY 
PO BOX 1007 
BOISE ID 83701-1007 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all 
parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the 
Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. 
In the event no objections to the Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript are filed within the 
twenty-eight day period, the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript shall be deemed settled. 
Assistant Commission Secretary 
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